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I. INTRODUCTION
THE HISTORY OF SECONDARY COPYRIGHT LIABILITY: FROM

INTERSTITIAL GAP FILLER TO ARBITER OF THE CONTENT WARS
(PART I REDUX)

Recent years have witnessed a stream of disputes between the major content owners, such as film studios and
record labels, against the purveyors of new digital technologies. Copyright owners have challenged new devices like
the portable MP3 player and digital video recorder and
search and file sharing services, most notably P2P networks
like Napster, Scour, and Kazaa. The film studios and record
labels have cast the struggle as a moral crusade against
"thievery," characterizing certain networks as a "21st century piratical bazaar," shaping the debate in clear terms of
right and wrong, legitimate businesses against shady piracy
operations, and the solid values of the past against wired
youth who have no respect for property. While there is a
great deal that is truly novel about digital media, distributed digitally over global networks, that will be explored in
this article, there is nothing particularly new about this
struggle.
Viewed in broader context, the string of disputes in the
opening years of the 21st century is merely the most recent
emanation of the generations-old battle between content
and technology, in effect, the continuation of the same industrial turf war that pitted the film studios against the
manufacturer of the VCR in the eighties, the record labels
against purveyors of cassette tape systems and services in
the seventies and the publishers against manufacturers of
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photocopiers in the sixties.1 In each case, the macro business issue is the same: a new device or system, now commonly termed a "destructive technology" by those on the
content side, threatens the established modes of business
and distribution controlled by content owners by virtue of
their copyright ownership. In each case, the argument
raised by the content owners is that their copyright monopoly in the popular content that will be played, recorded or
distributed via this new technology extends to and therefore
renders illegal the device or system at issue, whether it is a
VCR, a photocopier or file sharing network. In each case,
the legal theory argued by the content owners against the
technologists is essentially the same, that although the
purveyors of technology do not themselves directly violate
copyright as they do not copy, distribute or otherwise tread
on the statutory rights protecting film, music, and other
works, they are contributorily infringing or vicariously liable for the infringements committed by users of their de-

1. See generally, REPROGRAPHY AND COPYRIGHT LAW (Lowell H. Hattery &
George P. Bush eds., 1964) for information and a variety of scholarly views on
the efforts of the publishing industry to squelch the first automated, widely
distributed photocopier, the Xerox 914, in 1960. Similarly, the recording
industry fought the audio cassette recorder, unsuccessfully pushing for a
royalty on cassette recorders and tapes. See Jon Pareles, Grabbingfor Royalties
in the DigitalAge, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1992, §2, at 26 (late edition, final). The
recording industry did succeed in limiting the business arrangements made
possible by the audio cassette recorder by statute with the Record Rental
Agreement of 1984 which generally forbids the renting of phonorecords. See 17
U.S.C. § 109 (b) (2000). Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S. 417 (1984), stands as the seminal case ruling on the legality of the first
relatively inexpensive consumer VCR, the Sony Betamax. A&M Records, Inc. v.
Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001), remanded sub nom. Leiber v.
Napster, Inc., 2001 WL 789461 (N.D. Cal. 2001), aff'd, A & M Records, Inc. v.
Napster, Inc., 284 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002), is the result of the recording
industry's war against the first mover in P2P file sharing networks. The Ninth
Circuit recently remarked on the seeming inability of the music industry to
meet a technology they like:
From the advent of the player piano, every new means of reproducing
sound has struck a dissonant chord with musical copyright owners,
often resulting in federal litigation. This appeal is the latest reprise of
that recurring conflict, and one of a continuing series of lawsuits
between the recording industry and distributors of file-sharing
computer software.
MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1158 (9th Cir. 2004), cert.
granted, 125 S.Ct. 686 (2004).
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2
vice or service.

The doctrines of secondary copyright liability themselves are designed to pin liability on those who do not actually violate the copyright statute, that is, those who do
not directly infringe copyright rights, but, who, as a matter
of fairness or to serve some other overarching policy concern, should nonetheless be liable for the copyright infringement of others taking place within their ambit. The
doctrines have been an essential tool to break through organizational structures designed to skirt liability, to attack
the bad actor in a scheme that may involve a number of
players more directly involved with actual copying and distribution of works and to hold the person in charge accountable, even if he has studiously avoided trespassing the
rights enumerated in the Copyright Act. The history of the
doctrines is thus the story of judicial efforts to stretch the
law to capture succeeding generations of always-inventive
business people and pirates looking to skirt liability.
The lawyer's drive to rationalize, the copyright owners'
vigilance in exploiting every opportunity to expand their
rights, and the courts' need to fashion rules broad enough to
meet the challenges of succeeding generations of pirates
have pushed the doctrines from limited, fact-specific holdings to extremely broad equitable principles. In effect, copyright law has adopted the concepts of liability for joint tortfeasors while jettisoning the requirement of a joint enterprise and, likewise, confirmed the liability of the principal
for the acts of his agent, even where no principal/agent relationship exists.
The net results of this evolutionary expansion to get at
the bad guys are legal standards so lax that they no longer
serve their intended policies, constrain judicial reasoning,
or provide predictable results. The co-conspirator in a counterfeiting scheme, as well as someone providing parking,
plumbing or other "support services" at a swap meet may be
on the hook for copyright infringement. The dancehall
owner who profits from the infringing performances of his

2. There are, of course, notable exceptions where a technologist arguably
engages in direct copyright infringement, most notably in recent years. See
UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.Com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
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orchestra, as well as the organizer of a trade show whose
participants may play infringing music in their booths are
both liable for copyright infringement. Though there are a
number of reasons for the expanding away of the limiting
factors in these doctrines-knowledge and contributory acts
for contributory infringement, right and ability to control
and financial benefit for vicarious liability-the overall effect is rules that may extend copyright liability to those indirectly, even remotely involved with the actual reproduction or distribution of content.
A. The Settled Rules and the Policies They Serve
Notwithstanding the broad mandate of the doctrines
and the several forces pushing their expansion, nearly a
century of litigation has yielded settled verbal formulations
of the rules for secondary copyright liability. Following the
leadership of the Second Circuit, courts have expanded the
concepts of respondeat superior and joint and several liability for tortfeasors deeply into the field of copyright, 3 creating two major sub-species of indirect copyright liability:
(1) "vicarious liability" which holds a party liable if "he has
the right and ability to supervise the infringing activity and
also has a direct financial interest in such activities" 4 and
(2) "contributory infringement" which holds a party liable if
he has knowledge of the infringing activity and induces,
causes or5 materially contributes to the infringing conduct of
another.

3. As the Supreme Court explains, "vicarious liability is imposed in virtually
all areas of the law, and the concept of contributory infringement is merely a
species of the broader problem of identifying circumstances in which it is just to
hold one individual accountable for the actions of another." Sony, 464 U.S. at
435.
4. Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159,
1162 (2d Cir. 1971).
5. Id. The nomenclature in this area can be confusing. Frequently, the broad
concept of holding one liable for the infringements of another is termed
"vicarious liability," with "contributory liability" being one subspecies of this
broader concept. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 435. However, different standards for
liability, with different rationales, have evolved in the case law under the
headings of "vicarious liability" and "contributory liability." To avoid confusion,
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Taken together, the rules serve several closely related policy interests. The rules promote fairness by holding liable
those who knowingly assist infringement or have the power
to stop infringement and fail to do so. By holding those with
the power to stop infringement liable, the rules also encourage policing for copyright infringement. Likewise, by
holding those who benefit from infringement liable, the
rules for secondary liability serve a loss spreading function
as well, requiring businesses who benefit from copyright infringement to internalize those costs.
The meaning of these rules is less clear than their
broad mandate. Still, some generalizations may be gleaned
from the significant body of precedent interpreting contributory infringement and vicarious liability in the context
of traditional piracy and liability avoidance schemes in the
old world of books, phonograph records and tapes.
B. Breakdown of ContributoryInfringement
The concept of contributory infringement has existed
for a long while in copyright, but up until the last two decades was quite limited in scope. In 1984, the Supreme
Court summarized the precedent holding a third party liable for contributory infringement as those instances in
which "the 'contributory' infringer was in a position to control the use of copyrighted works by others and had authorized the use without permission from the copyright
owner. '6 Indeed, the concept of authorizing the exploitation

this article treats "vicarious liability" and "contributory infringement"
separately and refers to the broader concept of holding one party liable for the
acts of another as "indirect liability."
6. Sony, 464 U.S. at 437. In encapsulating the precedent, the Court relied
heavily on the opinion authored by Justice Holmes in Kalem Co. v. Harper
Bros., 222 U.S. 55 (1911). In Kalem, the Court held that the producer of an
unauthorized film dramatization of the copyrighted novel, Ben Hur, was liable
for sale of the motion picture to distributors who arranged for exhibition of the
film. Id. When reviewing the case precedents in the Sony opinion, the Supreme
Court characterized the precedents as situations in which "the 'contributory'
infringer ... authorized the use without permission from the copyright owner."
Sony, 464 U.S. at 437. In fact, the Court in Sony went on to distinguish the
sales of video tape recorders at issue in that case from the prior cases on the
grounds that the case against the VTR rested on providing the "means" of
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of another's work was so closely tied to the concept of "contributory infringement" that many courts and commentators viewed the addition of the new right "to authorize" exercise of other copyright rights in the 1976 Copyright Act as
merely a confirmation of the doctrine of contributory liabilstatute
ity as developed under the 1909 Act, the copyright
7
which immediately preceded the present Act.

copying and "constructive knowledge" of that copying-a circumstance for which
"[t]here is no precedent in the law of copyright." Id. at 436, 439. The Supreme
Court summarized its own and lower court precedent: "In such cases, as in
other situations in which the imposition of vicarious liability is manifestly just,
the 'contributory' infringer was in a position to control the use of copyrighted
works by others and had authorized the use without permission from the
copyright owner." Id. at 437; see also Celestial Arts, Inc. v. Neyler Color-Lith
Co., 339 F. Supp 1018, 1019 (E.D. Wis. 1971) (responding to defendant's
argument that "contracting" with a third party to produce counterfeit copies
does not constitute infringement, the court held, "[i]t is well settled that all
parties who unite to produce counterfeit copies of copyrighted material are
liable for damages"); Universal City Studios v. Nintendo Co., 615 F. Supp. 838
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) clarified by 726 F. Supp. 928 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd,797 F.2d 70
(2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 987 (1986) (finding defendant liable for
authorizing/licensing a third-party to breach another's copyright by making
unauthorized copies or performances); Sony, 464 U.S. at 435 (indicating that
"contributory infringement" was a fairly narrow concept).
7. See MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT

§12.04 [A] (2004) (reading the addition of the copyright right to "authorize"
exercise of rights by others in 17 U.S.C. § 106 as confirming the established
notions of indirect liability under the 1909 Copyright Act rather than creating a
new, independent basis for infringement). Nimmer's interpretation is consistent
with the view of the House Report on the '76 Act. The House Report explains
that the "[u]se of the phrase 'to authorize' is intended to avoid any questions as
to the liability of contributory infringers." H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 61 (1976),
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5674. The court in Danjaq, S.A. v.
MGM/UA Communications, Co., 773 F. Supp. 194, 201 (C.D. Cal. 1991), aff'd
sub nom. Danjaq, S.A. v. Pathe Communications Corp., 979 F.2d 772 (9th Cir.
1992), likewise interpreted the use of "authorize" in the '76 Act as merely
confirming the existing contributory liability doctrine, not establishing a new
basis of direct infringement. But see ITSI T.V. Prod. v. Cal. Auth. of Racing
Fairs, 785 F. Supp. 854, 860 (E.D. Cal. 1992) (holding that the right to
"authorize" in 17 U.S.C. § 106 provides a new basis of direct infringement). In
ITSI, the court found U.S. jurisdiction in a copyright matter because the
"authorizing" took place in the U.S., even if other infringement took place in a
foreign country. Id. at 854. The holding in Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v.
Aveco, Inc., 800 F.2d 59 (3d Cir. 1986), similarly found that "authorizing" public
performance by renting rooms to watch videos is a direct infringement under
the '76 Act.
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Over the course of the last few decades, contributory infringement has expanded into a broader rule of general applicability, the touchstones for liability being knowledge
and a material contribution to infringement.
1. The Meaning of Knowledge. It is now accepted with
black-letter status that the standard for assessing knowledge is objective, that is, whether the defendant knew or
had reason to know of the infringing activity.8 This objective standard is alternatively phrased in cases as "actual or
apparent knowledge" 9 or actual or "constructive knowledge". 10 An objective knowledge standard precludes people
from shunting liability with studied and contrived, even if
actual, ignorance.
The governing standard makes clear that the relevant
object of the defendant's knowledge is "infringing activity."
While there is no set verbal formulation or much explicit
guidance on the meaning of "infringing activity," it is fair to
say that courts historically tend to find the knowledge element satisfied if the defendant had a general understanding or belief that infringement of the sort alleged is likely
taking place." The plaintiff need not show that the defen-

8. The objective standard for knowledge, here, as in most areas of the law,
appears reasonable on its face. A defendant need not be rewarded for having a
mind askew by nature, or, more importantly for theories of indirect liability,
studiously maintained blank. An objective standard effectively modifies the
standard from one prohibiting affirmative bad acts to one precluding negligent
behavior. Instead of a negative injunction not to take action when one knows
that it will aid or result in an illegal act, we have a positive requirement to meet
an objective standard in those actions.
9. Cable/Home Communication Corp. v. Network Prod., Inc., 902 F.2d 829,
846 (lth Cir. 1990).
10. Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 262 (5th Cir. 1988).
11. More recent cases dealing with new technologies and computer networks
in particular, which will be discussed at length in the sequel to this article, take
a much tougher and ostensibly inconsistent line, requiring actual knowledge of
a specific infringement at a time when remedial action is possible. See MGM
Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1160-63 (9th Cir. 2004), cert.
granted, 125 S.Ct. 686 (2004); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d
1004, 1021 (9th Cir. 2001), aff'd, 284 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002); Religious Tech.
Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1374
(N.D. Cal. 1995). These cases, from Sony forward, expressly reject the
sufficiency of constructive knowledge. However, in practice, this tighter verbal
formulation arguably has not raised the evidentiary hurdle for plaintiffs or
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dant knew plaintiffs particular copyrights were being infringed or which specific
acts resulted in the direct infringement at issue. 12
Strangely, this broad reading of knowledge appears to
be of rather recent origin or acceptance, even though it
seems to be implicit in some of the most important, lawmaking precedent. In its Sony decision, the Supreme Court
explained that defendant's liability would necessarily rest
on a finding that the defendant sold equipment with "constructive knowledge [of the fact] that their customers might
use the equipment to make unauthorized copies of copyrighted material" and later stated bluntly that, "[t]here is
no precedent in the law of copyright for the imposition of vicarious liability [read secondary liability] on such a
theory."13

otherwise impacted ultimate results. The court, in UMG Recordings Inc. v.
Sinott, 300 F. Supp. 2d 993, 998-99 (E.D. Cal. 2004), all but recognizes the
divergent standards for knowledge, striving mightily to explain why the looser
standard of knowledge developed in tangible media cases such as Fonovisa, Inc.
v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996) and finding expression with
respect to technology in Napster ought to apply, while the more exacting
standards expressed in Religious Tech. Center and more recently, Grokster
should not apply. See UMG Recordings, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 998. The court does
not address why it is appropriate to have different standards of knowledge in
the same rule to be applied selectively depending on the technology or business
arrangement at issue.
12. The Eastern District of California, the first court to rule on the merits of
contributory infringement claim against a flea market operator, expressly
rejected the defendant's contention that "actual 'knowledge of specific instances
of infringement' are required to satisfy the 'knowledge' prong of contributory
liability." Sinott, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 998. The court did not add much to the
prior cases in stating affirmatively what type of knowledge will suffice as it
based its finding that the knowledge prong was met largely on constructive
knowledge and knowledge that ought to be imputed as a result of defendant's
willful ignorance. Id. at 999. "Knowledge" in Sinott, as in the more widely cited
flea market opinion Fonovisa,could only be disputed in the most legalistic sense
as the facts revealed numerous cease and desist letters, visits from plaintiffs
investigator's and other efforts to inform the defendant more fully. Id. at 9991000. As the court put it, "Sinnott purposefully refused to witness the
infringement, and chose not to act on the personal notification he received. This
does not allow him to disavow knowledge of the infringement, however." Id. at
1000.
13. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 418, 439
(1984).
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2. The Meaning of ContributoryActs. The material contribution, cause or inducement of infringement may take
the form of either (a) "personal conduct that encourages or
assists the infringement" or (b) "provision of machinery or
goods that facilitate the infringement."14 Alternatively,
contributory acts have been parsed into (x) acts made with
the purpose of providing direct assistance in expediting the
underlying infringement or (y) acts to provide the means or
facilities for the admitted copying.15 For the purposes of
applying indirect liability theories to computer networks,
providing the site and facilities for the infringement is to
category of contributory acts under
date the most important
16
the current cases.
Any limitations placed on the nature of contributory
acts have been largely superseded in any jurisdiction that
has embraced the Ninth Circuit's Fonovisa decision. In that
decision, the court applied a "site and facilities" analysis to
hold that a flea market operator was liable for the sale of
counterfeit records by a third-party vendor who sold its
wares at the flea market. The relevant contributory acts in
the view of the court were the "support services" provided
by the swap meet, including the "provision of space, utilities, parking, advertising, plumbing and customers."' 7 The
Ninth Circuit rejected the approach of the district court
that required some showing that the defendant expressly
promoted or encouraged the sale of counterfeit products.
The decision does not directly address the issues of how
substantial or directly related the contribution needs to be.
It seems that Fonovisa establishes an implicit rule that
providing the site or facilities for infringement is a substantial and direct enough participation for establishing contributory liability. While the Fonovisa approach certainly
serves the interest of incentivizing self-policing, it does so
by a tremendous loosening of the legal standard, presump-

14. Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. v. West Pub. Co., 158 F.3d 693, 706 (2d Cir.
1998) (holding that use of West's "star pagination" system in Bender's CD-ROM
versions of judicial opinions did not contributorily infringe West's copyright in
the organization of its judicial opinion reporters).
15. Demetriades v. Kaufmann, 690 F. Supp. 289, 293 (S.D.N.Y 1988).
16. See, e.g., Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1154; Napster, 239 F.3d at 1004.
17. Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996).
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tively roping in third-parties for providing services and
facilities only tangentially related to the infringement at
issue. Landlords and perhaps even gardeners, plumbers
and trash collectors who offer their services to likely infringers may be on the hook for providing the "site and
facilities" for infringement via their "support services."' 8
C. Breakdown of Vicarious Liability
The theoretical underpinnings for vicarious liability, as
well as the problems the doctrine addresses, differs somewhat from those of contributory infringement. Instead of
looking to a defendant's participation in an infringement
operation and his culpability for that participation as contributory infringement, vicarious liability looks to the strict
liability of rationales of respondeat superior liability to hold
the person who is in charge and benefits from infringement
liable, even if he wished to avoid infringement and took
reasonable steps to avoid infringement. Much of the early
precedent deals with whether dancehall operators are responsible for the unauthorized performance of musical
works by independent contractor orchestras within the establishments. The cases produce a neat dichotomy still
employed by courts today between dancehall proprietors
who are liable for the infringing performances of orchestras,
whether employee or independent contractor, on the one
hand, and absentee landlords on the other hand, who are
not liable for the copyright infringements of their tenants.
18. One recent district court opinion indicates that there is only so far a
court will go in hanging liability on third-party, content-neutral service
providers, notwithstanding Fonovisa. In Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa International
Service Assn, No. C 04-0371 JW, 2004 WL 1773349 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2004),
discussed infra, the court found that credit card service companies engaged in
processing membership fees for a web site operator were too tangentially
related to the posting of infringing photos on the site for contributory
infringement liability to attach. That court, however, did not challenge the rule
of Fonovisa. Instead, it attempted to distinguish the case on the facts. The
opinion concluded that plumbing, parking and the type of support services at
issue in Fonovisa "were directly tied to not only the business operations of the
infringers, but specifically to their infringing conduct" where credit card
processing was not. Id. at *3.The court also concluded that plumbing and the
like are "essential" where credit card processing is not. Id. at *4.The court
reached what most would consider an uncontroversial result, but the
distinctions on which it relied, placing plumbing closer to the heart of a piracy
operation than credit cards, is dubious. See id. at *1.
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The elements of vicarious liability are easy to state-(1)
the right and ability to control coupled with (2) a direct
financial benefit. As explained below, understanding these
elements in the context of the circumstances in which the
cause of action arises is not such a simple matter.
1. The Meaning of Right and Ability to Control. Generally speaking, "defendants are found to have 'control' over a
performance if they 'either actively operate or supervise the
operation of the place wherein the performances occur, or
control the content of the infringing program.'" 19 The focus
is on the defendant's potential or as the standard puts it,
"the right and ability to control," regardless of what the
contract says and how the relationship actually works in
practice. 20 Because the question is one as to ultimate,
rather than practical operational control, the power to
exclude suffices to establish the right and ability to control.2 1 The ultimate right to preclude the infringing activity
from taking place by simply precluding all activity of the
sort at issue will also suffice. 22 The defendant's ultimate
power to exclude or choose not to draw end customers also

19. Polygram Int'l Publ'g, Inc. v. NevadafTIG, Inc., 855 F. Supp. 1314, 1328
(D. Mass. 1994) (internal citation to the House Report omitted).
20. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY (1958) speaks in terms of the
"right to control" as well, but for tort liability to pass not only must the control
be much deeper (the physical conduct of the agent for it to be deemed a
servant), but the inquiry is much more exacting taking into account all the
factors of section 220.
21. In Fonovisa, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that a swap meet operator "had
the right to terminate vendors for any reason whatsoever and through that
right had the ability to control the activities of vendors on the premises." 76
F.3d at 262.
22. So, in Polygram, the trade show organizer's power to preclude all
vendors at the show from playing any music whatsoever satisfied the right and
ability to control prong with respect to infringing music played by a specific
vendor in a rented booth. Polygram, 855 F. Supp. at 1329 (emphasizing that the
trade show organizer's "Rules and Regulations" permitted it to "restrict exhibits
that 'because of noise, method of operation, materials or any other reason
become objectionable' and "to police exhibitors during the show"); see also
Napster, 239 F.3d at 1023 (stating that "[t]he ability to block infringers' access
to a particular environment for any reason whatsoever is evidence of the right
and ability to supervise").
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satisfies the right and ability to control prong. 23
It may not overstate the breadth of the right and ability
to control element to say that any ongoing commercial relationship may suffice for vicarious copyright liability
purposes, unless the infringement is wholly unrelated to defendant's business. If the relationship can be terminated or
is otherwise subject to binding rules imposed in part by the
defendant, the right and ability to control will likely be
found.
2. The Meaning of Financial Benefit. The vicarious
liability standard also requires "an obvious and direct financial interest in the exploitation of copyrighted materials. '24 The requirement of a financial benefit is presumably
a stand-in for the requirement in agency that an agent act
for the benefit of the principal. 25 Two interpretive strains in
the case law emerge, one that actually requires that the
link between the infringement and the financial benefit be
"obvious and direct" and one that effectively reads these
limiting terms out of the standard, permitting almost any
hypothetical
financial
benefit, however amorphous,
unquantifiable, and tenuously linked to the infringement,
to suffice. The actual text of the standard aside, either rule
arguably fits the dancehall paradigm.
Apparently viewing things in this way, a number of
courts have overlooked the "direct and obvious" limitations,
plausibly inserting an implicit limitation "however indirect
and amorphous" to broaden the reach of liability. Indeed,
the District Court of Massachusetts, in an uncommon act of
intellectual honesty in its Polygram decision, expressly
rejected the Shapiro standard requiring a "direct and obvious" financial benefit, adopting instead language from a

23. The court in Fonovisa cited the swap meet promoter's control over the
access of customers to the swap meet and its promotion of the swap meet to
support its conclusion that the swap meet operator had the right and ability to
control the vendor of counterfeit records. 76 F.3d at 262-263; Polygram, 855 F.
Supp. at 1328 (also noting trade show organizers promotion of the trade show
as a factor supporting a finding of a right and ability to control).
24. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H. L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir.
1963).
25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1958).
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Judiciary Committee report on the 1976 Copyright Act,
which requires only that the defendant "expect commercial
gain from the operation and either direct or indirect benefit
for the infringing performance. ' 26 Under this approach,
which the District of Massachusetts states "more nearly
captures the standard that is currently applied by courts in
copyright cases," the financial benefit requirement does not
significantly limit vicarious copyright liability.
If the defendant is a for-profit venture and chooses to
permit others to provide music or other copyrighted material to its patrons, one can safely presume that there is a
sufficient financial benefit. Indeed, one must strain to identify any commercial situations involving the performance or
distribution of copyrighted works that would not meet this
lax standard.
In the end, the doctrine of vicarious copyright liability
seems to be not so much a body of rules that provide foreseeable results as a flexible vehicle for courts to make
ultimate policy judgments as to what type of enterprises
should internalize the costs of copyright injuries occurring
within its sphere of operations. It seems that as a policy
matter the law holds liable businesses that have copyright
infringement at their core (dancehalls), businesses that
benefit in small ways that may be difficult to quantify
(background music at racetracks and the like) and businesses engaged in leasing certain types of retail space
(departments within stores, trade show booths and swap
meet stalls). At the same time, the law seeks to provide
amnesty for landlords as a general matter. Given this
patchwork of broad and sometimes contradictory objectives,
explanatory standards will be tough to find.
D. The Challenges of Coupling Poor Rules with the Novelty
of a Networked World
The law as it evolved up to the precipice of the technology/content wars spawned by consumer electronics seems
greatly over-tasked. Even taken on its own terms, in the
context of its own tangible media problems, the rules

26. Polygram, 855 F. Supp. at 1326 (emphasis added and citation omitted).
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appear to be little more than loose guidelines that offer few
interpretive constraints to courts. If any form of support
services can constitute a material contribution to copyright
infringement and the knowledge required is generalized
knowledge that infringement of the sort alleged is taking
place, how distant must a relationship be to avoid copyright
liability? The same question may be posed with respect to
vicarious liability. If the right to control may be established
by the power to exclude or refuse to transact business with
the infringer, and the financial benefit required is satisfied
by the syllogistic logic that businesses do what is good for
them, so if they maintain a business relationship with the
infringer they must benefit financially, what commercial
relationships are too loose to avoid the translation of copyright liability? The policy aim of fairness appears to be at
the whim of the strict liability policy rationales of loss
spreading and incentivizing policing.
Under the current expansive standards, one can
reasonably argue that the doctrines of contributory and vicarious liability effectively impose an affirmative duty on
technologists to put policing devices in every network client
and on every central server. One could just as easily argue
that these doctrines preclude the development of network
protocols detached from a software client or other means of
policing and limiting use of the network. While the mail
and public square may be free zones of discourse, copyright
may require the placement of censors, human or artificial,
to screen the content and nature of every communication
online. This apparently draconian and un-democratic result
naturally leads one to question whether and to what extent
the indirect liability standards in the context of computer
networks serve the policies of fairness, incentivizing policing, and loss-spreading they are intended to effectuate. How
the standards apply at all to a fully-distributed system or
the technologist who merely provides open protocols and
leaves it to others to implement the software and hardware
that comprise the network is even less clear. In the end, the
wired world seems to present problems without tangible
media analogs.
The analysis that follows examines how the indirect
liability doctrines have been applied to the VCR, bulletin
board systems, online service providers and other technolo-
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gies of the network age. This examination shows that the
expansive standards for secondary copyright liability can
result in unlimited liability for those engaged in providing
the software, hardware, services, and perhaps even
concepts, that power computer networks, without necessarily serving the policies of fairness, self policing, or loss
spreading that the doctrines are intended advance. The
reach of some cases would seem to make operation of broad
computer networks impossible without incurring copyright
liability, while others, particularly RTC v. Netcom, confront
and reject this possibility with a more nuanced approach.
This discussion of indirect copyright liability and its application to computer networks will conclude with a discussion
of the somewhat inconsistent precedent dealing with P2P
file sharing networks-Napster, Grokster and Aimster. In
the final analysis, digital media distributed by digital
means remains problematic under existing law. We are left
with options that tend to tilt to the extremes of either
stifling or permitting all forms of innovation regardless of
their practical effect upon the rights and expectations of
copyright owners.
E. Summary of Possible Solutions
With the problems of applying contributory infringement and vicarious liability precedent to new technologies
thus framed, the discussion moves to consider several
possible solutions that could break this current impasse
and perhaps even the historical cycle that dooms each generation of technological innovation to litigation wherever
content is concerned. The doctrines of contributory
infringement and vicarious liability could be interpreted
more narrowly, tightened back to the calibration of an earlier age. With respect to contributory infringement, for
example, "knowledge" could mean actual knowledge of specific acts of infringement at a time when remedial action is
possible. Likewise, vicarious liability could be interpreted to
require a relationship far more akin to the traditional principle/agency relationship on which the doctrine is supposedly modeled. A focus on the accepted right, not just the
ability, to control one's conduct by barring them from use of
the machine or service at issue could go a long way toward
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clarifying and limiting vicarious liability copyright claims.
In addition, Congress and/or the courts could elect to
clarify and strengthen the countervailing forces in copyright
law that accommodate the development of new technologies. The Supreme Court could explain in its upcoming
Grokster decision the meaning and scope of its seminal
Sony decision, which twenty years after its issuance still
remains open to widely varying interpretations and has
generated a split among circuits regarding its application to
file sharing networks.
Ultimately, however, the old analogies and principles of
contributory infringement and vicarious liability simply fail
us when we begin to analyze the new relationships and
functional powers enabled by global computer networks.
These analogies may become even more strained as the unforeseeable possibilities of processing power, massive
storage capacity and global wireless links begin to emerge.
When trying to determine what ought to be the relative
liability of the consumer who owns a computer which serves
as a node on a network, the electronics maker who provides
the various devices that comprise the network, engineers
who designed and published the protocols that define the
network, and the communications companies that provide
links among all the nodes, it does little good to ask if the
relationship among the parties in question is more like an
absentee landlord/tenant relationship or a dance hall
owner/orchestra relationship.
The paradigmatic analogies of indirect copyright liability case law became loose metaphors long ago. Dissecting
them to make policy judgments on computer networks
which involve human and machine relationships of a type
and on a scale without prior analogs makes little sense. The
old dance hall, landlord, trade show, swap meet and other
factual analogs do little to lead the courts to coherent, reasonable results.
The essential factors and policies underlying the tests
for contributory infringement and vicarious liability seem to
skirt or misdiagnose the basic problems presented by the
manipulation of content over computer networks. While
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"knowledge" is a significant, limiting factor in the tangible
world of human beings, books, tapes and other widgets, it is
no such limitation in the context of computer networks. If
technology permits tracking the substance and details of
every communication and transaction the concept of knowledge loses its limiting force. Moreover, it is not at all clear
that the policies the "knowledge" requirement seeks to further, fairness and encouraging private policing, are furthered or even ought to be furthered online. If digital technology permits a service provider to have perfect knowledge
regarding everything that transpires on its system, is fairness served by holding the service provider liable for all the
illicit conduct that takes place on its system? If perfect
knowledge is possible, do we really want a rule that encourages policing to that degree, effectively forcing private technology and service providers to identify the substance and
nature of all communication over open networks in search
of copyright infringements? Are there social costs to
burdening channels of communication with such liability
that the current rules do not adequately factor?
The same dynamic is present and questions are raised
with respect to the "right and ability" to control the behavior of users on a network. Technology permits pervasive
controls that could preclude illicit communications to a
great degree by almost any party providing key services or
equipment to the network. Hardware manufacturers, online
service providers and even users who act as nodes on a distributed network, it seems, all have the right and ability to
control traffic and illicit content to a great degree. Similarly, focusing on "site and facilities" as a material contribution to copyright infringement appears to do little other
than drive network architectures away from the goal of efficiency and toward ever more distributed designs. The same
functionality can be provided to the direct infringer and the
copyright owner can be left just as aggrieved whether data
is manipulated on one machine or another on the network.
The key insight of P2P networks is that bandwidth, processing power, and storage capacities permit almost any
household PC to operate as a server, i.e. a node on the
network. Digital rights management and security technologies have not lagged far behind new network architectures.
Audio "fingerprinting," watermarking and other technologies permit reasonably effective policing of even the most
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open and distributed networks. In this context, focusing on
which data is stored on what computers to determine
liability makes little sense.
This article, therefore, concludes with a somewhat radical proposal for an entirely new means of resolving the
seemingly intractable conflict between content and technology-a no-fault, comparative liability system. Perhaps the
current problems may be resolved by a system which
requires all those who provide products or services that assist or enable direct infringement to internalize a fraction of
the actual cost of that infringement to the content owner,
proportionate to the defendant's relative financial benefit
from the infringement. In this way, we avoid the contention
that necessarily surrounds our current all-or-nothing approach which either condemns a technology or gives it a
free ride regardless of its role in powering copyright infringement. With the stakes thus reduced, technologists
would be free to create and sell any kind of software, service, or device they can imagine, so long as they internalize
the costs their works impose on content owners in the form
of copyright infringement. Copyright owners would be
assured of fair compensation for their loss from a broader
range of potential defendants. Consumers would benefit
from a marketplace of technologies unfettered by policy
fights over the line between the copyright monopoly and the
freedom to create. All constituencies involved, including investors, would benefit from the reduced risk variables and
transaction costs of a regime that reduces the high-stakes,
to-the-death litigation of today to a much simpler task of
determining damages and apportioning liability.

II. THE HISTORY OF INDIRECT LIABILITY AND TECHNOLOGY
FROM SONY TO GROKSTER
With the legal and factual groundwork thus laid, we
can now turn to the application of these two indirect liability doctrines-vicarious liability and contributory infringement-to new technologies.
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A. The Sony Case-The Supreme Court Speaks
The Supreme Court decision in Sony27 remains the last
and most complete word on the subject of secondary copyright liability and new technologies. The decision continues
to dominate the field. In a five to four split with a well-reasoned dissent, the Court made what would strike most
consumers as a totally uncontroversial call--companies can
make VCR's and people can buy them. 28 At the dawn of the
1980s, the film and television industry faced an existential
threat. The Sony Betamax and its later VHS competitors,
we were told, would unhinge the entire economy surrounding the production of film and video entertainment. To the
major film studios, suburban privateers would reduce
Hollywood conglomerates to rubble with their newfound
power to record television programming. 29 True to form, the
major entertainment companies ran to the courts asking
the federal government "in effect, to declare VTR's contraband. '' 30 Also true to form, the entertainment and media
plaintiffs viewed the litigation as a tactical tool to expand
the reach of the copyrights they owned. The plaintiffs did
not necessarily seek to will the VCR out of existence as they
apparently have tried to do with Internet technologies for so

27. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
28. Id.
29. The rhetoric and predictions from the film studios could not have been
more dire or extreme. In his 1982 testimony before Congress, Jack Valenti,
President of the MPAA, explained the threat of the evil box atop the TV, "I say
to you that the VCR is to the American film producer and the American public
as the Boston strangler is to the woman home alone." Home Recording of
Copyrighted Works: Hearing on H.R. 4783, H.R. 4794, H.R. 4808, H.R.5250,
H.R. 5488, and H.R.5705 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and
the Admin. Of Justice of the Comm. On the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 8 (1983)
(statement of Jack Valenti, President, Motion Picture Association of America,
Inc.). Of course, the Hollywood plaintiffs that ganged up on overseas electronics
manufacturer Sony (which at the time was not in the film and TV club)
demonstrated their inability to gauge their own interests. The video rental
market now far outweighs film box office receipts at roughly $9.5 billion
domestic box office to $24.2 billion home video revenues. The depth of television
entertainment has also grown with the number of channels multiplying several
times since the fight over the VCR.
30. Sony, 464 U.S. at 441 n.21. The use of the discarded acronym "VTR" for
Video Tape Recorder demonstrates how unsettled the technology and its place
in society was, even as late as the Supreme Court decision in 1984.
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many years, nor did they seek to clear the market of competitors so they could make VCR's themselves. The record is
clear that they would have been perfectly content merely to
be paid a royalty by Sony and other manufacturers on every
VCR created. 3 1 Money and control of the controversial
device were at stake.
The VCR, in a way, presented the classic contributory
infringement case. If Sony was not liable for the infringements of the end users, content owners would be left only
with the wholly unworkable option of pursuing the direct
infringers, the growing millions of VCR users. From a copyright point of view, the case was not an easy one. The
closely split Supreme Court reversed a well-reasoned Ninth
Circuit opinion when it held that Sony could sell the VCR
without incurring indirect copyright liability. 32 In doing so,
the Court appeared to articulate a broad exception to the
doctrines of indirect copyright liability that gave technologists free reign to develop devices without worrying about
lawsuits from the content industries.
Using the staple of commerce doctrine in patent law as
a rough guide, the Supreme Court ruled, "[T]he sale of
copying equipment, like the sale of other articles of
commerce, does not constitute contributory infringement if
the product is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable
purposes." 33 The Court continued, "Indeed, it need merely be
capable of substantial non-infringing uses."34 If the specific
result in this case no longer seems controversial, the
sweeping generosity of the Sony standard remains awesome
35
and continues to be the subject of much disagreement.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 456.
33. Id. at 442.
34. Id. (emphasis added).
35. As discussed in greater depth infra, the Ninth Circuit in Napster read
severe limitations into the Sony standard, holding that actual knowledge
vitiates a Sony defense and that Sony is not applicable to vicarious liability.
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1022 (9th Cir. 2001) ("[W]e
note that Sony's 'staple article of commerce' analysis has no application to
Napster's potential liability for vicarious copyright infringement."). Judge
Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit in In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334
F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003), voiced his disagreement with the Ninth Circuit's
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The import of the words merits close examination. A defendant need not show that the technology in question is used
to a large extent for non-infringing purposes or that the
36
technology is used anywhere for non-infringing purposes.
All that need be shown is that the technology is capable of
some hypothetical use of substance. Even if it were demonstrably true that the technology at issue was used solely for
illegal purposes, the Sony standard, if taken literally, would
not find the technologist vicariously liable-remarkable.
The four dissenters struck what many might intuitively
consider a better balance. They would have required that "a
significant portion of the product's use [be] non-infringing. '37 Judge Blackmun, writing for the dissenters,
explained further, "If virtually all of the product's use, however, is to infringe, contributory liability may be imposed; if
no one would buy the product for non-infringing purposes
alone, it is clear that the manufacturer is purposely profiting from the infringement, and that liability is appropriately imposed. ' 38 This standard probably would have killed
the VCR as the Ninth Circuit effectively directed.
At the time the suit was filed, Blockbuster was still
roughly six years away from its inception in Texas. The
very companies that would later push their entire product
to the VCR were the plaintiffs. Home video cameras as late
as the Supreme Court decision were large, expensive, and
just beginning to penetrate the market. Through most of
the pendancy of the suit, the amount of content consumers
legitimately copied was almost certainly minimal relative to
the VCR's predominant use-recording copyrighted audio
visual works produced and broadcast on television for commercial gain by the plaintiffs in the suit. The dissenters'
test, as well as any other test that looked at what people
were actually doing with their VCR's, would likely doom
reading of Sony and in doing so, staked out a different, but equally controversial
position. The Seventh Circuit is of the view that Sony cannot possibly mean
that a mere capability of a non-infringing use is sufficient, notwithstanding the
clear language of the opinion. Instead, the Seventh Circuit requires some
evidence of an actual non-infringing use. Aimster, 334 F.3d at 651-53.
36. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 416.
37. Id. at 491 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
38. Id.
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this technology that one suspects may have already made
it into the homes of some of the esteemed justices by the
time the case reached them. In order for the VCR to get by,
the rule arguably had to be as broad and permissive as that
articulated by the majority. One had to look at capabilities
and the potential of the thing at issue, not what it currently
was or why people actually wanted it.
Indeed, there was not much else that one could do with
a VCR except record plaintiffs' works, which raises a second
truly remarkable aspect of the Sony standard. As the Ninth
Circuit opinion in the case explained, "[v]ideotape recorders
are manufactured, advertised, and sold for the primary
purpose of reproducing television programming[,] [and]
[v]irtually all television programming is copyrighted material. '39 Therefore, the lower court concluded, "videotape
recorders are not 'suitable for substantial non-infringing
use."'

40

Even the Supreme Court's permissive rule does not provide an easy route around this problem. On an honest
review of the situation, it was difficult to see what exactly
was the "substantial non-infringing use" to which the VCR
might be put. Recording television programs and films protected by copyright seems to cut a very clear case of copyright infringement. So, using the arcane magic to which
only the justices themselves are privy, the majority
concluded that recording television broadcasts for later
viewing at home or "time shifting" was not copyright
infringement at all but a permissible fair use. 41 And thus,
the VCR was permitted to grow into adulthood, and its
technological progeny prospered.
As with almost any decision of this magnitude and
scope, there are many plausible readings. However, to
many commentators and influential courts, it appeared that
by denying the Hollywood plaintiffs "the exclusive right to
distribute VTRs simply because they may be used to in-

39. Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963, 975 (9th Cir.
1981).
40. Id.
41. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 442.
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fringe copyrights," 42 the court was enforcing a policy "to prevent copyright holders from leveraging the copyrights in
their original work to control distribution of (and obtain
royalties from) products that might be used incidentally for
infringement, but that have substantial non-infringing
uses." 43 To a certain extent, the Sony decision made some
progress toward tightening up the expanding contributory
liability standard as well, definitively stating that, at least
under Supreme Court precedent, providing the "means" to
infringe and encouraging infringement were not sufficient
to establish indirect liability. 44 Under this view, the Sony
test was exported from the context of VCRs and "copying
equipment" (the term the Supreme Court used in defining
inthe scope of its test) to cover "products" more generally, 47
cluding CD-ROMs, 45 software, 46 and even online services.
To be sure, later courts grappling with the contrary demands of keeping a lid on apparent piracy and the laxity of
the Sony standard articulated numerous limitations to
permit a finding of liability in the post-VCR era. The same

42. Id. at 441 n.21.
43. Matthew Bender v. West Publ'g Co., 158 F.3d 693, 707 (2d Cir. 1998); see
also, PAUL GOLDSTIEN, COPYRIGHT § 6.1.2 (2d ed. 1996) (reading Sony as a

means of keeping copyright owners from influencing goods not connected to
copyrighted work).
44. Sony, 464 U.S. at 436 (distinguishing the prior Supreme Court
contributory infringement case, Kalem Co. v. Harper Brothers, 222 U.S. 55
(1911), from the situation in Sony on the grounds that "[t]he producer in Kalem
did not merely provide the 'means' to accomplish the infringing activity; the
producer supplied the work itself. . ."). The Court termed plaintiffs' conclusion
from Kalem that providing the means to infringe and encouraging infringement
is sufficient to establish contributory liability a "gross generalization that
cannot withstand scrutiny." Id.
45. See Bender, 158 F.3d at 693.
46. See Vault v. Quaid, 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988) (applying Sony
standard to software designed to crack floppy disk security); Realnetworks, Inc.
v. Streambox, Inc., No. C99-2070P, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1889 (W.D. Wash.
Jan. 18, 2000) (applying Sony standard to "Ripper" software designed to convert
content from proprietary Real format into other digital formats); Lewis Galoob
Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992) (concluding that
Sony gives users the right to use programs in unintended ways beyond time
shifting).
47. See A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001)
(applying Sony to P2P file sharing service).
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tensions that push the expansion of the doctrines of contributory infringement and vicarious liability necessarily
press for the limitation of Sony. Later courts limited Sony
to machines and other general purpose equipment, seizing
upon the Court's analogy to the staple articles doctrine in
patent law. 48 Other courts have held that the existence of
contributory acts vitiate a Sony-based defense. 49 Recent
courts have held that the existence of knowledge vitiates a
Sony- defense and that Sony is wholly inapplicable to
vicarious liability.50 In rejecting these views, another
influential court has turned the standard on its head,
holding that Sony demands evidence of a substantial noninfringing use. 51 Still other courts have sought to cut-off the
reach of Sony with a tough reading of "substantial noninfringing use," distinguishing Sony on the patently thin
basis that a great deal of public domain and other noninfringing content was available for copying on VCR's in the
early 1980s where the presence of such abundant noninfringing
material was lacking in the particular case at
hand. 52

48. See generally RCA Records v. All-Fast Sys., Inc., 594 F. Supp. 335
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (limiting the reach of Sony to the manufacture of machines
only); A&M Records v. Abdallah, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 1449 (C.D. Cal. 1996)
(limiting the reach of Sony to "staple articles" only).
49. See generally Cable/Home Communication Corp. v. Network Prod., Inc.,
902 F.2d 829 (11th Cir. 1990) (distinguishing Sony on the grounds that the VTR
manufacturer had not "influenced or encouraged" unlawful acts); Abdallah, 948
F. Supp. at 1456-57 (rejecting a Sony-type defense because the defendant went

beyond selling blank tapes and actually assisted piracy operations of its
customers by timing original cassettes for copying and referring would-be
pirates to other necessary suppliers and even providing financing on occasion).
50. See Napster 239 F.3d at 1022.
51. In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 651-53 (7th Cir. 2003).
52. See generally Abdallah, 948 F. Supp. at 1449 (rejecting a Sony defense,
in part, because time-loaded cassettes have no substantial non-infringing use).
The court in Sony stated that the plaintiffs, though major content owners,
represented only about 10% of all television broadcast programming. Sony, 464
U.S. at 443. See also Streambox, No. C99-2070P, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1889, at
*22 (holding that the Streambox product which permitted users to capture
secure Real format streams, a sort of "digital VCR," was not saved by Sony
because "The Sony decision turned in large part on a finding that substantial
numbers of copyright holders who broadcast their works either had authorized
or would not object to having their works time-shifted by private viewers');
Sony, 464 U.S. at 446.
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Congress has also taken a bite out of the permissiveness of Sony with the anti-circumvention provisions of the
DMCA. By forbidding all efforts to defeat anti-piracy protections, Congress effectively created an opt-out to Sony.
Even if creation of a copy or reproduction would be permitted under Sony, the DMCA forbids the effort if the content53
owner has placed any form of security on the content.
Despite these on-and-off limitations of lower courts left
to wrestle with the true meaning of the Supreme Court's
authority, Sony remains the final word on the subject,
articulating a test that severely limits the doctrine of contributory infringement in the context of new technologies
and represents a strong policy statement that copyright
monopolies may not be leveraged to prevent useful new
technologies from reaching consumers. Only history will tell
whether any adjustments or clarifications the Court chooses
to make in Grokster will clarify matters. Predicting what
the Supreme Court will do ex ante or what rules will work
for unforeseeable technologies ex ante are both tricky businesses.
B. The Doctrines Get Wired: Indirect Liability and Digital
Information Networks in the 1990s
1. The Problem in a Nutshell: A Greater Need for the
Doctrines but Greater Challenges in Application. The
Information Revolution spawned by the Internet doubtlessly carries with it some costs. Some of the information
now so freely and easily obtained on such a massive scale
may be protected by copyright and disseminated without a
license. As the access to and ability to reproduce and distribute public domain and licensed materials scales in the
Internet age, so too does the power to do the same with
unencrypted copyrighted content. There is, accordingly, a
vast new range of direct copyright infringements enabled by
a host of technologies and services from hardware to software, to phone line, cable and satellite Internet access,
raising the inevitable question of whether any of those engaged in providing such technologies and services may be

53. 17 U.S.C §§ 201-02 (2000).
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held secondarily liable for the copyright infringements of
the end users they, at least in part, enable. The need for effective doctrines becomes more acute. As direct infringement becomes more common and widespread, pursuit of the
direct infringers becomes increasingly inefficient and
impractical for content owners. If copyright owners are to
tame the wild frontiers of the Internet, they must do so by
first breaking the central intermediaries who provide the
tools and lines of communication that make such free interchange of information possible.
a. The Digital Frontier as a New Vista for Piracy. The
ability to access services, vast databases, and individuals
made possible by the Internet has ushered in a wave of
economic growth that may place the open computer network, along with prior innovations like steam power and
electricity, as engines that powered a quantum leap in human discourse and commerce. However, these new technology-enabled freedoms carry with them an unprecedented
threat to content owners as copies move from an unwieldy,
fixed, tangible form to easily manipulated, flexible digital
formats. Tangible copies carried inherent advantages for
copyright owners that are lost online. Reproducing and
distributing copies was a costly endeavor. Paper, vinyl,
plastic, or celluloid stock has to be purchased and an operation of commercial scale set up to mechanically reproduce,
bind, and package works in any significant number. In
addition, tangible copies have mass. The more copies one
has, the heavier the load, adding significant shipping costs
to distribution. Lastly, mechanical reproduction from an offthe-shelf copy usually resulted in degradation increasing
with each successive duplication, particularly with respect
to any form of mechanical sound recording or magnetic
tape. Often the more copies made, the greater the degradation, making illicit copies without the aid of master
recordings perceptibly inferior. 54 Thus, the burdens of the
Newtonian world of mechanical reproduction of permanent
copies in tangible material put the brakes on casual piracy
and raised high cost and technology barriers for pirates to
54. Anyone who listened to a bootleg Beatles recording or saw an illicit video
tape of Star Wars in the 1970s can likely attest that the interest was the
novelty of such a hard-to-get, taboo item. The records and tapes themselves
tended to be so rife with static that they failed completely as entertainment.
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overcome.
The same content that once required the film to be
printed, a book to be copied, or a tape to be duplicated can
now be duplicated and distributed on a massive scale at the
push of a button at virtually no incremental cost to the person directing the operation or receiving the fruits thereof.55
Piracy on a large, impersonal scale in the digital age has
accordingly moved from the exclusive province of those
willing to invest capital and labor in a significant, illegal
commercial enterprise to the fingertips of everyone with a
commodity PC and Internet access. Hundreds of millions of
consumers are so empowered and many of them are actively
engaged in efforts to find, download, store and distribute
copyrighted materials. Major content industries claim the
loss of billions in revenues from the traffic in illicit copies
online. At the same time, content owners argue that they
have a great need for an effective remedy, because seeking
recompense from direct infringers seems wholly unworkable.
The need for effective secondary copyright liability doctrines thus seems as great today as the power of computer
technology to empower consumers to enjoy content, and the
costs of unlicensed distribution to copyright owners. No
matter how multitudinous fly-by-night piracy operations
may have been in the past, no matter how many grey market swap meets existed, no matter how many dancehall
owners skirted BMI and ASCAP, the numbers would neces-

55. Printing and distributing, for example, even 1000 copies of the Complete
Writings of Abraham Lincoln would be a costly endeavor, necessitating the
printing and shipping of hundreds of pounds of paper. Accomplishing the same
task digitally requires de minimus effort. The entire work in digital form is
roughly 1 MB in size. With CPU speeds exceeding 3 gigahertz and disk space
exceeding 80 GB on household desktop machines, duplicating and storing, if
necessary, 1000 copies of the work is a virtually instantaneous and cost free
task, assuming one already owns a computer. Moreover all 1000 copies made
can be distributed anywhere in the world via the Internet requiring only several
minutes of bandwidth, assuming broadband connections on both ends. Again,
there is no incremental cost, assuming one has already paid for Internet access.
If one were to break down the actual cost of the bandwidth minutes consumed,
it would be pennies at most. Lastly, each of those 1000 copies will be identical,
with no degradation in quality from the first to the last.
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and movies
sarily pale to the terabytes of unlicensed music
56
today.
airwaves
and
wires
the
traverse
that
b. The Challenge of Porting the Legal Standards.As the
problems of piracy and the need to hold third parties liable
balloon, the similarities between the problems de jour and
the inherited precedent grow increasingly tenuous.
Perhaps the VCR was just another printing press or photocopier, and perhaps the standards evolved to deal with such
copying equipment may even be applied to routers, hard
drives, and other computer hardware that copies, stores
and transmits information. However, the relationships
among humans and machines in a digital, networked environment are without close precedent, some would argue
without any reasonable analogs at all. Beyond the widgets
that can copy and store copyrighted works, there is the
software, the codes, and protocols that make the transformation, reproduction, distribution, display and storage of
content possible. Much of the intermediate action takes
place within and between machines in a form and manner
that will not be perceived by a human. Information is
cached, parsed, zapped here and there, and reassembled all
without human intervention. Moreover, unlike prior information networks enabled, more or less, by a single core
infrastructure such as phone or telegraph lines owned by a
small number of companies, now the average citizen and his
equipment play key roles, serving as important relay nodes
on the network. In the P2P/distributed computing context,

56. In addition to the obvious problems of unlicensed traffic in copyrighted
content, the shift from analog to digital formats creates a great many more

technical direct infringements. Every time data embodying a copyrighted work
moves from a notebook computer back to the desktop, from the desktop to a
handheld device or portable player and even from the hard disk into RAM to
enable the viewing or playing of the work, a copy for purposes of copyright law
has been made. See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518
(9th Cir. 1993) (affirming that 'copying' for purposes of copyright law occurs
when a computer program is transferred from a permanent storage device to a
computer's RAM"). Without a license, or the statutory right under 17 U.S.C. §
117 (2000), which permits reproduction as an "essential step" in the execution of
software, such manipulation and even viewing of content constitutes acts of
copyright infringement. The technologist, software or service provider could be
liable as vicarious or contributory infringers for the boundless numbers of
infringements taking place within and between machines. The scope of this
article, however, is limited to an examination of secondary liability for the more
basic and obvious direct infringements.

2005]

FROM SONY TO GROKSTER

173

each user can perform important computing and transmission functions essential for the operation of the whole
network. These are the remarkable circumstances the inherited precedent of dancehalls and swap meets must
address.
On the one hand, the broad doctrines of indirect copyright liability would seem to hold almost anyone involved in
the creation, maintenance, or operation of computer
networks liable for any copyright infringement which occurs
on such a network. If the knowledge required for contributory infringement is merely knowledge that infringing
activity of the sort alleged is likely taking place, it is difficult to see how knowledge could be avoided by anyone
involved in running a computer network of any scale. If
contributory infringement is to have some meaningful limitation, it seems that "knowledge" will have to require
something more than the loose standard applied with
respect to tangible media.
The presence of contributory acts are all but a given for
any party providing essential hardware, software or connectivity. Anyone involved with computer networks, it would
seem, is providing some sort of support services to the operation of the network and hence making a material contribution to the copyright infringement taking place over it
under the inherited legal standard. Likewise, it is difficult
to imagine how anyone in the networking business,
whether providing hardware, software or even protocols,
can avoid vicarious copyright liability. If the power to
exclude or shut down satisfies the right of control prong, it
would seem that anyone who retains any communication
with and control over their technology, whether it be software or hardware, end user or commercial ISP, has the
requisite control to keep third-party infringers from using
their equipment or services. As discussed above, if the
defendant is a commercial enterprise, financial benefit is
essentially presumed, making vicarious liability difficult to
avoid.
c. How to Reconcile Sony and the Doctrines of Indirect
Liability. On the other hand, the Sony exception for new
technologies would seem to undermine any effort at legitimate enforcement online. Almost any network is capable of
non-infringing uses. Indeed, with the very rare possible

174

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53

exceptions of Kazaa, Napster, and the like, legitimate uses
of electronic communication, one would think or at least
hope, predominate the use of business, education, and even
open global networks in most important respects. If it was
somewhere between tough and impossible to reconcile fully
the broad policy mandate of Sony and the expansive standards for contributory infringement and vicarious liability
in the world of tangible copies, it is even more difficult in
the context of the Internet and other large computer
networks where the problems of infringement exist on much
a greater scale.
These conflicting forces of the doctrines of indirect
liability and the broad policy exception arguably articulated
in Sony push contrary holdings. The net result is a muddle
of apparently irreconcilable case law dealing with indirect
copyright liability and computer networks.
2. The BBS Cases. Before the Internet, before Usenet
groups even, there were bulletin board systems, or BBS for
short.57 As the name suggests, a BBS permits users to
post/upload and read/download messages and oftentimes
files on a central server that serves as a forum for the
group. Many, perhaps most BBS in the early years of home
computing, were operated by individuals seeking merely to
create their own online community. They provided hubs for
those sharing common interests in science, religion,
literature, current events, and, of course, illicit copies of
copyrighted software, games, and other protected material.
The early commercial online services, seeking to make
membership in their network a one-stop gateway for all the

57. The Free Online Dictionary of Computing (FOLDOC) provides a
serviceable layperson's definition of "bulletin board system":
<communications, application> (BBS, bboard Ibee'bordl; after a
physical piece of board on which people can pin messages written on
paper for general consumption-a "physical bboard'). A computer and
associated software which typically provides an electronic message
database where people can log in and leave messages. Messages are
typically split into topic groups similar to the newsgroups on Usenet
(which is like a distributed BBS). Any user may submit or read any
message in these public areas.
FOLDOC, at http://wombat.doc.ic.ac.uk/foldoc/index.html (last visited Feb. 26,
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organic communities, began to aggregate and republish
various BBS. Because BBS systems presented in a popular
and widely adopted form so many of the core copyright issues posed by computer networks, the controversies produced a number of published, even if contrary and less than
fully edifying, opinions. The reported cases exhibit the
range of possible approaches.
a. Cubby v. CompuServe-Welcoming the Information
Revolution. Picking up on the Sony ethos, a court can seek
to accommodate the development of new forims of communication and technological experimentation. Cubby, Inc. v.
CompuServe, Inc.,58 for example, though a defamation and
not a copyright action, addressed the issue of what knowledge should be attributed to an online service provider with
respect to the allegedly defamatory comments posted in a
section of a BBS made available through CompuServe, then
one of the major online subscription services that aggregated a great many BBS. 59 Because knowledge of the BBS
operator was the central issue, the case presents issues
closely akin to those in a contributory infringement analysis. The court made its favorable reaction to the positive
potential of the technology at issue, stating "[CompuServe]
is in essence an electronic, for-profit library that carries a
vast number of publications and collects usage and membership fees from its subscribers in return for access to the
publications. CompuServe and companies like it are at the
forefront of the information industry revolution."60
In keeping with its positive comparison of a commercial
online service with libraries and the advancement of human
knowledge, the court gave the somewhat novel technology
generous treatment, holding that knowledge for purposes of
contributory infringement could not be attributed to the
online service provider, CompuServe, largely due to the
policy imperative of permitting such a system to exist and
thrive. 61 The court insisted that online service providers
engaged in the dissemination of information must be

58. 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 140.
61. Id. at 142.
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afforded the same protections as traditional libraries and
book distributors with respect to the distribution of defamatory publications, citing the First Amendment policy militating against holding book distributors strictly liable. 62
The court also rejected vicarious liability, finding the level
of control required by basic agency principles lacking:
"While CompuServe may decline to carry a given publication altogether, in reality, once it does decide to carry a
publication, it will have little or no editorial control over
that publication's contents. This is especially so when
CompuServe carries the publication as part of a forum that
is managed by a company unrelated to CompuServe." 63
Though not a copyright case, the Cubby opinion demonstrates one approach to the problem of indirect liability for
the online publisher-let the technology grow and ensure
that the same protections enjoyed by those in the information business in the tangible world are ported to computer
networks.64
b. Sega v. Maphia-BlastingPirates in Every Harbor.
Instead of an electronic library, the same technology can
also present itself as a "piratical bazaar." 65 In Sega Enter.
Ltd. v. MAPHL4,66 a major video game publisher sought to
shut down a BBS over which illicit copies of its games were

62. Id. at 139.
63. Id. at 140. The case did not address the technological feasibility of
screening content for copyright infringement and thus, arguably misses a key
facet of any examination of "knowledge" in the context of computer networks.
64. See generally id.
65. Press Release, MPAA, Motion Picture and Recording Industries File
Suits Against Music City and Others (Oct. 3, 2001), available at
http://www.mpaa.org/Press/KaZaAPress-Release.htm (last visited Feb. 26,
2005) (announcing the MPAA filing of copyright infringement suits against
Music City Networks, Grokster, LTD, Fastrack (Kazaa)). The release attacked
"MusicCity and others for copyright infringement, calling the service a '21st
century piratical bazaar where the unlawful exchange of protected materials
takes place across the vast expanses of the Internet."' Id. (internal citation
omitted). Although this language was crafted by the film industry to describe its
more recent file-sharing bane, the florid description accurately expresses the
sentiment of the entertainment industry regarding prior "destructive
technologies."
66. 948 F. Supp. 923 (N.D. Cal. 1996).

2005]

FROM SONY TO GROKSTER

177

regularly traded. 67 The MAPHIA BBS bore all the indicia of
68
a piracy operation, then commonly called a "warez" board.
The system operator, Chad Scherman, went by his warez
handle "Brujjo Digital" doing business as MAPHIA or
Maphia Trading Company. 69 The users of the BBS
frequently used similar aliases. The BBS was operated for
the stated purpose of encouraging others to post protected
70
video games for download by the Maphia BBS community.
Given the illicit nature and purpose of the BBS at issue,
the court had little difficulty in reaching a holding of contributory infringement and therefore did not see a need to
wrestle with potential non-infringing uses or other arguments that might save the defendants. 71 As for knowledge,
the court noted that the data regarding posted and
downloaded files available to the system operator made the
trade "particularly known" to the defendant. 72 As for
contributory acts, the system operator specifically solicited
this copying and expressed the desire that these video game
programs be placed on the MAPHIA bulletin board for
downloading, going so far as to discuss the trade in Sega
SuperNintendo and SegaGenesis games he was seeking to
foster. 73 The defendant offered Sega games for download for

67. Id. at 926.
68. Id. at 927-28.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See id. at 939.
72. Id. at 933. Strangely, despite the ample evidence in the facts recited by
the court from which a finding of actual knowledge could easily be inferred, the
court refused to confront the knowledge element head on. Id. In fact, the court
could even be read as suggesting that knowledge is not essential when it
concludes that even if the defendants do not know exactly when games will be
uploaded to or downloaded from the MAPHIA bulletin board, their "role in the
copying, including provision of facilities, direction, knowledge, encouragement,
and seeking profit amounts to a prima facie case of contributory copyright
infringement." Id. Perhaps the defendants were so clearly bad guys that the
court allowed itself some conclusory sloppiness in analysis. It is also worth
noting that the opinion was the result of a preliminary injunction motion and,
as such, could deal in terms of likelihood of success rather than ultimate merits
per se.
73. In finding that the defendant's infringement was committed willfully,
the court explained: "He knowingly allowed others to upload and download the
Sega games, and expressly solicited others to upload games to his BBS." Id. at
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a fee or barter, that is, the more Sega games one uploaded,
74
the more he would be entitled to download free of charge.
If the stated purpose of the BBS were not enough, the
defendant also advertised and offered
for sale via the BBS
75
all the tools necessary to hack games.
c. BBS and Web Cases in the Middle-Liability as the
Path of Least Resistance. In the case of a plain piracy operation as in Sega, a finding of indirect liability for the system
operator seems sensible. The doctrines operate exactly as
they should by slamming a bad actor trying to profiteer off
another's property. Likewise, a court could follow the spirit
of Sony and take a solicitous view of new information technologies pushed forward by businesses that may only incidentally, unintentionally, and tangentially be related to
copyright infringement or other wrongs as in Cubby. This
leaves the question of how to deal with cases in the middle,
that are neither piracy operations nor an effort to develop a
digital library of Alexandria, just one community of folk
among countless others posting, downloading, ranting,
flaming, and otherwise doing what humans do when they
communicate in relative anonymity.
The purpose of these run-of-the-mill BBS typically is
not copyright infringement for commercial gain, but, as a
practical matter, copyright infringement happens via any
BBS once users start posting articles for others to read,
wish to propagate some funny thing they ran across, and
otherwise seek to share material that they themselves did
not author. Though the data sample is relatively small, it
936.
74. Id. at 928-29.
75. Id. at 929. All the facts gleaned from the opinion reinforce the
impression that the defendant was a pirate, and a brazen one at that, intent on
establishing a scheme that would net him illicit profit in dollars and games. The
defendant advertised, distributed, sold the video game copiers "Super Magic
Drive" and 'Multi Game Hunter," and boasted that he sells "everything from
Copiers to Modems to Hard Drives to Calling Cards (off the record, hehe) and
even Pentium Chips now." Id. It is interesting to note that in analyzing the
import of the sale of copying software and other piracy accoutrements a full ten
years after Sony, the court either through abject ignorance or willful noncompliance turned the Sony standard on its head, implicitly applying the
dissent standard by stating that non-infringing uses "have not been shown to be
the primary use of such copiers." Sega Enterprises, Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 857 F.
Supp. 679, 685 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (emphasis added).
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appears that when courts are faced with such run-of-themill BBS incidentally engaged in copyright infringement,
the breadth of the doctrines of indirect liability have sway.
Contrary to what many end users may consider to be part of
their core democratic freedoms, the operator of a BBS dedicated to discussion of current events will be held contributorily liable for users who post news and other articles for
user remarks and commentary. 76 Likewise, a BBS operator
can be held liable for infringing pictures posted by its users,
even if the operator, after receiving notice of the infringing
pictures, removes such files and thereafter monitors the
any more of plaintiffs photographs
files posted to prevent
77
from reappearing.

76. See L.A. Times v. Free Republic, No. CV 98-7840 MMM (AJWx), 2000
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5669 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2000). The court correctly held that the
posting of full-text copies of plaintiffs articles is copyright infringement. Id. at
*80. The finding of contributory infringement was based on a finding that Free
Republic induced such illicit reproduction and distribution of articles by
providing guidelines and instructions for posting and by actively encouraging
full-text copying. Id. at *19 n.29. Despite the manifest dissimilarity of the
enterprises at issue, the court cited Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 948
F.Supp. 923 (N.D. Cal. 1996), to support its holding. Id. at *66-67. In the fact
section of the opinion, the court significantly states that the BBS had the right
and ability to control user postings, even though the finding of liability was
based solely on a contributory infringement theory. Free Republic, No. CV 987840 MMM (AJWx), 2000 U.S.Dist LEXIS 5669 at *6-*7.
77. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
In Playboy, we have a forum with a purpose that may be somewhat less lofty
than that in Free Republic. Users of the BBS operated by defendant Frena
posted proprietary Playboy photographs for viewing and download by the BBS
community. Id. at 1554. The court gave no consideration to the fact that the
automated nature of the BBS system did not permit any practical remedy other
than monitoring files posted and removing those that are likely infringing, the
very action that Frena apparently was taking in response to Playboy's notice of
infringement. Id. The court reasoned, "There is no dispute that defendant Frena
supplied a product containing unauthorized copies of a copyrighted work. It
does not matter that defendant Frena claims he did not make the copies itself."
Id. at 1556. The finding of liability was not based on a contributory or vicarious
liability theory. Rather, the court found direct infringement by the BBS
operator in distributing and displaying the plaintiffs photographs. Id. at 1559.
It is difficult to find flaws in the logic of the holdings. The law seems reasonably
clear that such direct infringement is taking place. However, the net practical
effect of the holding would be to forbid the existence of BBS for any purpose. No
matter what efforts the operator made to keep infringing works from being
posted, s/he would be held liable for every infringing upload by a user without
even the benefit of the modestly ameliorating "knowledge," "financial benefit,"
and other qualifying requirements for a finding of indirect liability.
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3. The Web Cases. The few cases dealing with web sites
also reinforce the conclusion that a finding of liability of the
site or system operator is the path of least resistance under
the broad doctrines of indirect liability. The World Wide
Web arguably took off despite the demands of copyright
law. Prior to the DMCA which contains an express safe
harbor from copyright liability for such activity under
certain circumstances, it was not at all clear that one could
provide a hyperlink to a site that contained infringing
material without incurring indirect copyright liability. As
with the BBS cases, the easy answer is providing a link to
infringing material can be the basis for copyright liability,
and some courts had little difficulty finding such liability
without considering the potentially devastating impact of
such a holding to the existence of 7 automated
electronic
8
communication systems of every kind.
a. The Problem with the Doctrines as Evolved and the
Attempted Fix-RTC v. Netcom. If one looks at matters
from a purely legal perspective, taking the inherited precedent as it is passed down in the reporters, it is difficult to
fault findings of indirect or even direct liability for operating a BBS where infringing material is posted, a web site or

78. See, e.g., Intellectual Reserve, Inc. v. Utah Lighthouse Ministry, Inc., 75
F. Supp. 2d 1290 (D. Utah 1999). In Utah Lighthouse Ministry, the court found
a web site operator contributorily liable for providing links to material hosted
elsewhere that the web site operator had reason to know was infringing. Id. at
1291. As with Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996),
Utah Lighthouse Ministry presents a case of a willful defendant goading a court
into setting bad precedent with a reach that goes well beyond the defiant pirate.
Utah Lighthouse Ministry, 75 F. Supp. 2d at 1294. The defendant in Utah
Lighthouse Ministry had already been ordered to remove the infringing church
materials from its own site. Id. Thinking that it had found a clever way around
the court's directive, the defendant replaced the material itself with a link to
the infringing material hosted on a third-party site accompanied by the text,
"Church Handbook of Instructions is back online!" Id. at 1295. Given the facts
of the case, defendant's knowledge that the material was infringing was plain
(there was already a court order directed against the defendant effectively
saying so). See id. The court found a contributory act not only in providing the
link, but in defendant's active encouragement of users to click on it, reproduce
it, and post it elsewhere in order to affect the outcome of defendant's case. Id.
As with Fonovisa,the extreme facts of defendant's misconduct make the holding
fair and suggest a rule limited to such willful behavior. However, because the
courts ruling in those cases did not make such limitations explicit, these
opinions provide later courts fodder for very broad holdings even where
defendants are at most innocent infringers.
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service that provides links to infringing material, or any
similar automated technology that facilitates the sharing of
information. While sweeping policy judgments like that
which arguably lies behind Sony may be OK for those that
are final and infallible, those inhabiting inferior courts are
wise to stick with the clear direction of established precedent, and they generally do. One cannot say how far beyond
the VCR, copying equipment, or even the facts of the case
the Sony exception may reach, but it is clear what the general rule demands. Thus, when confronted with a new technical means of communication that implicates copyright,
the safer path is to find the technologist or service provider
at least indirectly liable.
Copyright is a strict liability statute. It does not matter
for purposes of ordinary infringement what the technical
limitations of a system are or what efforts within those
limitations a defendant makes to prevent or remedy
infringement. As soon as an unlicensed copy is uploaded
into RAM, recorded to disk, or traverses wires or the air79
waves to another user, infringement has occurred.
Notwithstanding the lesson of Sony, those who provide the
enabling technology have apparently contributed to such
acts with knowledge that infringement of the sort likely to
happen on their system is happening. Likewise, even if
Sony applies to vicarious liability claims (some courts have
made clear that it does not), any defendant who maintains
any level of oversight and control over the system or technology, such as a BBS operator, a webmaster, or a network
operator, has the requisite level of control and, if part of a
commercial enterprise, the necessary financial benefit as
well. The judge who does not seek to subject his opinion to
the policy whims of his appellate overseers is therefore
likely to find a technologist or service provider engaged in
providing or enabling any sort of computer network liable
for any type of infringement that takes place over that network.
The problem with this result lies not in its logic or
grounding in precedent. The problem lies with its practical
impact on the development of tremendously valuable and

79. MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993).
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useful technologies. It would seem that search engines
which routinely provide links to web pages and files with
infringing content, discussion boards where people are free
to say and post what they wish, chat and other servicesthe whole of the wired computerized world, could not exist.
The liability exposure of all those involved, from those who
provide the software to those who produce the hardware to
those who supply the concepts to those who supply the
wires, would simply be too great if statutory damages were
due every time a user engaged in an act of copyright
infringement. Happily, the Internet and other aspects of the
information technology revolution have occurred organically
without strong interference from copyright, but eventually
the copyright rules must accommodate reality, or reality
must be modified to accommodate the rules.
The most thoughtful and far-reaching attempt to reconcile copyright with network technologies came in the form of
Judge Whyte's seminal RTC v. Netcom8 ° opinion. Netcom
involved one of the many times the Church of Scientology
(The Religious Technology Center) has gone to court to prevent its secret, sacred texts from being exposed, often by
disgruntled former practitioners seeking to discredit the
religion by publishing its core documents.8 1 Netcom was an
Internet service provider over which a private party ran a
BBS where at least one user posted proprietary church
documents without a license from the Church.8 2 Netcom
did not create or control the content of the information
available to its subscribers.83 Although the court believed it
may have been possible to screen postings from particular
individuals or screen postings containing particular words,
Netcom took no action after receiving notice of the
infringement, claiming it could not shut out the offending
84
user without shutting out all users of the BBS at issue.
Rather than taking the easy way out by finding Netcom liable and letting Congress and the rest of the world go about
80. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Serv., 907 F.
Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
81. See id. at 1365-66.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1366.
84. Id.
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changing the technology or the law so that human communication as we know s it5 can go on, Judge Whyte confronted
the problem head on.
b. Netcom and Direct Infringement. As with all decisions that seek to correct flaws with inherited precedent,
Judge Whyte navigated new waters, crafting new rules in
Netcom. First, Judge Whyte had to grapple with the nettle86
some problem of the direct liability of the BBS operator.
Posted material is reproduced and stored on BBS servers
and then distributed to those who wish to download it. The
easy answer is that the BBS operator is directly liable for
these reproductions and distributions. After all, even a
copy existing only in computer-readable form in RAM is a
copy for purposes of an infringement analysis. The problem,
obviously, is that the Internet and other large computer
networks could not exist if the analysis ends here. Email,
web sites, listservs, FTP sites, and all the other forms of
computer-based communication that rely upon automated
systems to receive and route information to the appropriate
place would be overly burdened by copyright liability.
Refusing to issue an opinion that further divorces the
law from reality, Judge Whyte held that the incidental
copies made on the BBS as part of an automated process
initiated by a third party did not constitute direct copyright
infringement.8 7 The court reasoned that "designing or
implementing a system that automatically and uniformly
creates temporary copies of all data sent through it is not
unlike that of the owner of a copying machine who lets the
public make copies with it."88 Without question, almost anyone would want to live in a world where those in control of
servers permit their servers to support the network, routing
emails, download requests, and other requests that necessarily involve reliance on third-party wires and hardware.
How this can be done within the strictures of copyright is,
however, not at all clear. The linchpin for Judge Whyte's
conclusion is his forthright addition of a volitional element

85. See id. at 1361.
86. See id. at 1367.
87. Id. at 1373.
88. Id. at 1369.
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to the law of copyright.8 9 Although copyright is a strict
liability statute, the court concluded that there "should still
be some element of volition or causation."90 "Where the BBS
merely stores and passes along all messages sent by its
subscribers and others, the BBS should not be seen as
causing these works to be publicly distributed or displayed."9 1 In sum, Judge Whyte was saying that while copyright still holds the innocent infringer liable, there is some
class of truly innocent infringers who are not liable. 92 Whatever homage the opinion paid to the strict liability nature of
liabilcopyright, the court held that it was not really strict
93
ity in the context of automated network operations.
The real force behind the decision was a policy judgment that open computer networks must be permitted to
exist and thrive. 94 According to the Netcom court:
[I]t does not make sense to hold the operator of each computer
liable as an infringer merely because his or her computer is linked
to a computer with an infringing file. It would be especially
inappropriate to hold liable a service that acts more like a conduit,
in other words, one that does not itself keep an archive of files for
more than a short duration ...

it does not make sense to adopt a

89. Id. at 1370.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1372.
92. See id. at 1373.
93. See id. at 1370-71. The opinion makes some effort to distinguish
Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena,839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993). Netcom, 907
F. Supp. at 1370-71. It argues that Playboy deals only with distribution rights
where liability will be found regardless of whether defendant makes copies. Id.
In Netcom, reproduction from storage and retransmission is at issue. Id. While
it is true that the Playboy decision based its holding on the fact that the BBS
operator is directly liable on the violation of Playboy's right to distribute its
photographs (see Playboy, 839 F. Supp. at 1556), Netcom does not sharply draw
a meaningful distinction between those who operate a BBS directly on their
servers and those who provide access to such a BBS, reproducing and
distributing the same material on the BBS to its end users. See, e.g., Netcom,
907 F. Supp. at 1371. One is more likely to be a broader and socially important
service, and one is more likely closer to the content at issue and any editorial
control that can be exercised, but like a specialty shop existing within a larger
shopping center, each is dependent on the other in key respects.
94. See id. at 1372.
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rule that could lead to the liability of countless parties whose role
in the infringement is nothing more than setting up and operating
a system that is necessary for the functioning of the Internet.
Such a result is unnecessary as there is9 5already a party directly
liable for causing the copies to be made."

c. Netcom and Contributory Infringement. Although
Judge Whyte gave ISPs a free pass on direct copyright
liability, he did not grant them or any other service blanket
immunity. 96 There are still the doctrines of indirect liability
and the important policy interests they are intended to
serve. If ISPs and others engaged in operating and providing connectivity to networks could store, reproduce, and
transmit with absolute immunity, those seeking to game
the system could become the system. The Internet could
reduce copyright to irrelevancy. What was required, therefore, was a careful balancing of the large interest in the
existence of the Internet and like networks and the
legitimate intellectual property interests of content owners.
Without discarding the doctrines and the vital policies they
serve, Judge Whyte significantly reduced the reach of contributory infringement and vicarious liability in the context
of online service providers and others in the business of
keeping the network infrastructure of the land humming.
Netcom substantially limited the type of "knowledge"
required from the generalized knowledge standard that
predominated in prior cases. 97 Instead of a loose knowledge
that infringing acts of the type alleged are taking place, the
court framed the question as whether the defendant,
Netcom, knew or should have known that the BBS operator
at issue had infringed plaintiffs copyright following receipt
of plaintiffs cease and desist letter. 98 The knowledge the
court required is extremely specific. The defendant must

95. Id. The court also noted that it is "practically impossible to screen out
infringing bits from non-infringing bits." Id. at 1372-73. To the extent the
court's conclusion was based on this ground, however, its rationale will
necessarily grow increasingly weaker as DRM, acoustic and video
fingerprinting, and other technologies improve the ability of service providers to
screen material for copyright infringement on the fly.
96. See id. at 1373-77.
97. See id. at 1373-75.
98. Id. at 1374.
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know the direct infringer's identity (or, perhaps more accurately, the end user or service who initiated or possesses the
media on which such infringing copies were made) and that
the plaintiffs rights, as opposed to the rights of copyright
owners in some general way, were infringed. 99 Moreover,
the court made clear that mere knowledge of the allegation
or even knowledge that would constitute a prima facie case
of infringement is not necessarily sufficient. 10 0 The mere
receipt of a cease and desist letter with a copyright registration attached does not alone result in knowledge by the
service operator. 1' 1 The defendant must be able to verify
reasonably a claim of infringement over a possible fair use
defense, a defense arising from lack of a copyright notice, or
even the copyright holder's failure to provide sufficient
documentation. 0 2 Absent such verification,03 the operator's
lack of knowledge will be found reasonable.1
The court let the reader know immediately that it
would be taking a narrow view of the contributory acts
prong with its first two words on the subject, titling the section on the subject not contributory acts, but "Substantial
the court's accommodating
Participation."'' 0 4 Given
approach to the Internet, merely operating an essential,
automated service that supports the network will not cut it
as a contribution to copyright infringement.10 5 If it does not
matter that the defendant is making and transmitting unlicensed copies with its property for purposes of direct
infringement, it follows that it should not be determinative
10 6
for purposes of a contributory infringement analysis.
Because Judge Whyte believed that the business Netcom

99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1375.
105. See id.
106. See id. The court distinguished Sega, 857 F. Supp. at 679, on the
ground that the defendant actively solicited the uploading of the Sega games at
issue and, in fact, profited from such uploads directly. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at
1361.
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was generally engaged in is socially beneficial, he defined
the "acts" required in terms of omissions once the requisite
knowledge of the infringement problem is obtained. 10 7 In
the context of an ISP providing connectivity for a BBS, contributory infringement ought to be found if after having the
requisite knowledge of the infringement, the defendant fails
to "take simple measures to prevent further damage to
plaintiffs copyrighted works."10 8
In short, as interpreted by Netcom, the doctrine of contributory infringement merely requires the service provider
to behave responsibly when notified adequately of a specific
act of infringement. If it does so, it will not be held liable.
As re-interpreted in Netcom, even where the underlying
copyright infringement is clear and made possible only
through the acts or property of the defendant, the defendant, in effect, is entitled to a warning or a free pass on this
first act of infringement, with liability existing only to
incentivize proper, reactive behavior. Far from being a
strict liability statute, the rules under this novel reading
seem to grant every ISP a "get out of liability free card"
with every dunning letter. This arguably represents a fair
balance of the competing interests, allowing modern communication to go forth while still requiring good citizenship
when it comes to assisting others to police their copyrights
online. It is, however, a very long way off from the decades
of precedent stating that as a matter of fairness, as well as
for the policy reasons of incentivizing policing and loss

107. Id.
108. Id. at 1375. This standard, requiring the service provider to take
"simple measures" raises many questions. Of course, one wonders where
"simple" lies along the continuum theoretically possible at unknown cost and
routine at no added cost. It also raises the more interesting question of whether
the "simple measures" that may be required must be accommodated in some
fashion by everyone operating online. If a simple fix existed, for example, to
stem one type of infringement on one type of system, would all parties have to
adopt the architecture of such a system to make the simple fix possible? Or,
could one architect deploy a system in which the known simple fix would not
work? Would it matter whether this architecture was designed to solve
legitimate technical or other problems or whether it was designed specifically to
stymie the simple fix to copyright infringement that would otherwise be
available?
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spreading, the innocent infringer must pay. Here, if the ISP
acts as it should, nobody will pay. 109
d. Netcom and Vicarious Liability. The court limited
its tinkering with the developed standard for vicarious
liability. It found support for the contention that Netcom
had the right and ability to control in the facts that Netcom
had rules prohibiting copyright infringement, that Netcom
had the ability and had in fact kicked users off its system,
and that Netcom deleted specific postings on similar
community services in the past. 110 The ability to exclude
still sufficed to establish the right and ability to control
prong. The court, however, applied a much more restrictive
concept of direct financial benefit than the norm in the postFonovisa era.1 1 ' The court concluded that Netcom could not
have obtained a direct financial benefit from the infringing
112 Its
activity because Netcom offered a fixed-fee service.

109. See generally id. It may strike some as extraordinary that Judge Whyte
appears to be crafting such specific notice and response procedures from
generalized common law principles of third-party liability. Of course, such a
specific approach is far more useful for folks in the field grappling with the
practical problems of what action the law requires, although it brings the court
much closer to a truly legislative function. Lest one think that Judge Whyte was
making things up whole-cloth, the scheme the Netcom opinion establishes
closely resembles the notice and response scheme established in the copyright
statute for juke boxes. Under 17 U.S.C. § 116(a)(1) (1993), a proprietor is not
liable for infringing performances on a juke box within his establishment unless
he has failed or refused within one month after receipt by registered or certified
mail of a request by the copyright owner to make full disclosure or identify the
operator of the machine. The court also had the Passive Carrier Exemption of
17 U.S.C. § 111(a)(3) (1993) in mind when crafting its compromise solution for
online communication. This provision protects those engaged in providing
secondary transmissions of information if (1) they had no direct or indirect
control over the content of the primary transmission or over the particular
recipients of the secondary transmission and (2) the carrier's activities consist
solely of providing wires, cables or other communications channels for the use of
others. Id. An ISP like Netcom arguably fits this description. The court,
however, refused to stretch the statutory concept of common carriers to include
ISPs, explaining that ISPs "are not natural monopolies that are bound to carry
all the traffic that one wishes to pass through them, as with the usual common
carrier." Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1369 n.12. Faced with a very real gap between
reality and the law, it appears the court chose to model a solution based on
statutory provisions dealing with the most analogous problems it could find.
110. Id. at 1375-77.
111. See id.
112. Id. at 1377.
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revenues under this logic are the same X dollars per month
per customer regardless of whether or not any infringing
material is accessible via the Netcom service. 113 The court
distinguished this revenue model from those in Shapiro,
Bernstein & Co., 1 14 under which the defendant received
incremental revenues as a direct result of the sale of bootleg
records and the sale of tickets to unlicensed music
performances respectively. 115
Like many matters of economics, a difference in result
can often be traced to a difference in starting assumptions.
The predominant view of financial benefit, which presumes
that a financial benefit exists if infringement takes place in
the context of a commercial enterprise, begins from the
assumption that the infringing activity would not have a
place in the commercial enterprise if management did not
believe that it added value to the business, resulting in
some benefit, however hard to quantify, that would
ultimately hit the bottom line with bigger profit numbers.
Judge Whyte, on the other hand, began with the implicit
assumption that, at least in the context of a broad service
like that provided by an ISP, infringing activity is merely
incidental and irrelevant to the business. 1 6 The opinion
slammed the notion that Netcom received a financial
benefit as a result of having a policy that attracted
infringers to its system." 7 The opinion did leave open the
possibility of vicarious liability if the infringing activity is a

113. Id.
114. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., Inc. v. H.C. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304 (2d Cir.
1963).
115. See id. Netcom cites the district court opinion in Fonovisato support its
view of financial benefit. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1377. The district court in
Fonovisa similarly held that the swap meet operation, in part because of the
rent charged, does not scale with infringing activity. Fonavisa, Inc. v. Cherry
Auction, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 1496 (E.D. Cal. 1994). The Ninth Circuit's reversal
of Fonovisa and adoption of a very broad and diffuse notion of financial benefit
calls into question the vitality of this portion of Netcom as anything more than
persuasive authority for other jurisdictions, as the Ninth Circuit sits in review
of the Netcom court, the Northern District of California, and its Fonovisa
decision post-dates the Netcom decision. See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction,
Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996).
116. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1376-77.
117. Id. at 1377.
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draw for customers, but the implicit assumption of its
irrelevance flipped the burden of proof. The court would not
find a financial benefit in the absence of evidence that the
infringement "enhances the value of Netcom's services to
subscribers or attracts new subscribers." 118
Netcom provided the model for the notice and take
down regime established by the DMCA and arguably
represents the right compromise over indirect copyright
liability between the competing interests of content owners
and those providing connectivity to, or otherwise
facilitating the operation of, computer networks. 119 The
decision and its reasoning, however, were not widely
adopted as a general standard for contributory
infringement or vicarious liability. It remains the activist,
high-watermark for generosity to computer technology.
Although important later courts have expressly adopted the
Netcom standard for "knowledge" when performing a
contributory infringement analysis, the field of Internet
cases since Netcom remains inconsistent in result. The
easiest path for the jurist presented with the conundrum of
squaring the Internet with copyright liability remains
finding the defendant contributorily or vicariously liable
and often directly liable as well.
C. File Sharing and Novel Network Architectures Smash
Into
the Doctrines-From Counterrevolution to
Revolution and Incoherence in Four Short Years
1. What are P2P Networks and Why is Everyone So
Excited About Them?
a. Same Fight, Different Decade. In the latest highprofile round of the ongoing battle between content owners
and technology providers, Hollywood regained much of the
ground it lost in Sony.120 The differences between the technology at issue in Sony (the VCR) and that at issue in
Napster (a centralized P2P network) impact the legal
118. Id.
119. See H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 1, at 11-12 (1998).
120. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. (Napster I), 239 F.3d 1004 (9th
Cir. 2001).
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analysis. However, the differences have little to do with the
industrial turf war that motivated the disputes. In both
cases, Hollywood targeted what it believed was a "disruptive technology," i.e. one that required updating its accustomed modes of doing business. In both cases, the goal of
the plaintiffs was not to vindicate their copyright rights per
se, which could be accomplished with a damage award or
avoided altogether by granting a license on reasonable
terms, but to extend the copyright monopoly held with
respect to their vast body of entertainment works to the
new technology. Legal argument generally, and copyright
liability more specifically, is merely the form in which the
industrial battle over control of distribution in a new medium happened to be expressed because the content owners,
as usual, chose the courts rather than the marketplace as
the first, and for an inexplicable number of years, the only,
place to fight.
b. File Sharing as the "New New Thing." In a sense,
there is nothing new about file sharing. One can argue that
the fundamental purpose of any computer network is the
sharing of computer files. For many years, the computer
savvy have carried on a significant trade in files, licit and
infringing over BBS, FTP (File Transfer Protocol), SMB
(Server Message Block), and other methods and protocols,
many of which predate the rise of the Web. Indeed, file
sharing to select individuals, within a closed network or
with the wider world has been a standard feature in
Windows for nearly a decade. 121 Accordingly, there is noth-

121. Sharing of files within and between computer networks is possible
using the Server Message Block file-sharing protocol which has been a standard
feature of Microsoft Windows from Windows 95 onward. One online networking
dictionary (paraphrasing definitions offered in "The Encyclopedia of Networking
and Telecommunications"), defines "Server Message Blocks" as:
SMB is a high-level file-sharing protocol for exchanging information in
the Microsoft Windows network environment. It is the native filesharing protocol for Windows 95, Windows 98, Windows NT, and OS/2
operating system environments. It is also used in pre-Windows 95
versions of the Windows operating system for file sharing across
networks. The new CIFS (Common Internet File System), which allows
file sharing across the Internet or intranet, is based on SMB. SMB is
also widely available in the UNIX and VMS environments in the form
of Samba.
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ing terribly new about piracy on a massive scale online. For
more than twenty years, the software industry has faced a
major online piracy problem.
What is new are the types of files available online and
the industry affected. Beginning in the late nineties the
confluence of the MP3 format for audio files, processing
power, hard disc storage, and cheap bandwidth enabled the
efficient duplication, storage, enjoyment, and transmission
of music files via the PC. The problem of software piracy
online still dwarfs music and other content piracy, relegating Hollywood's problem to a mere rounding error in dollar
terms. However, because the files shared embodied popular
entertainment media, file sharing became the latest front in
the entertainment industry's incessant war with technology. Even though the commercial problem was not significant relative to other challenges online, the victim was new
and its litigious tactics made the problem both a question of
law and a mass media news story.
Far more important to human progress and the shape
the law should take (and far too often occluded by the hype
of entertainment litigation) are the novel and promising
features of P2P architectures and distributed computing.
The key insight of P2P is that the average commodity PC
with a DSL connection now has the power to perform core
network functions that once were the exclusive domain of
centralized servers run by businesses, universities and
other data and hardware hubs. Every client can be a server.
Moreover, all the power of the networked, connected
computers can be harnessed for a single project, in effect,
turning all the Internet-connected computers which participate into a single, super computer, with the processors distributed on the various desktops, dorms and living rooms
around the world. This is not fantasy. There is a significant
history of distributed computing projects. Users around the
world have donated their unused CPU cycles to SETI to
help search for intelligent life in the cosmos, "to the
Rothenberg Institute for Childhood Diseases to find a cure
for Tuberous Sclerosis Complex and to the Drug Design

See Tom Sheldon's Linktionary, at http://www.linktionary.com/s/smb.html (last
visited Feb. 25, 2005).
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Optimization Lab 22to design medicines to cure Anthrax,
Ebola and SARS.'
Of course, the success of Napster and its progeny
demonstrated that vast quantities of data can be efficiently
distributed without any centralized service hosting and distributing files. The world's largest conceivable library can
be created by individuals choosing to "share" all the works
already sitting in their home libraries with others connected by the network. The full promise of this technology
is likely still beyond our imagination. The inventors of the
Kazaa file sharing system have architected a P2P IP-based
telephone system permitting free calls to any other user,
anywhere in the world. 123 The users provide the infrastructure that once only AT&T, Bell, and state-owned monopolies could provide. The phone company could become a relic.
Where the power of all the computers in the world may lead
now that they can begin to speak and cooperate with each
other is unknowable, but surely exciting.
c. How P2PFile Sharing Works. The P2P file sharing
systems that have been at the center of the entertainment
litigation have come in three basic varieties--centralized,
fully-distributed, and hybrid systems. 124 In a centralized
system, such as Napster, each user selects which files on
her computer she wishes to share with the community. A
centralized server tracks which users are online at any
given moment, and what files they have made available to
share, compiling direct links to those files in a database.
Other users may query the database and receive a list of

122. See http://distributedcomputing.info/ (last visited Feb. 14, 2005), and
http://www.distributed.net (last visited Feb. 27, 2005), for lists of prior and
active distributed computing projects ranging from pure mathematics to climate
prediction, from particle accelerator design to drug design.
123. See Daniel Roth, SKYPE: Catch Us If You Can, FORTUNE, Feb. 9, 2004,
at 64.
124. For more thorough explanations of the various P2P architectures that
have been at issue in reported opinions, see Napster I, 239 F.3d at 1011-12
(describing the Napster centralized P2P file sharing system); Metro-GoldwynMayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1163-65 (9th Cir. 2004); In
re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 645-48 (7th Cir. 2003) (describing a
P2P system that piggybacks on AOL Instant Messenger). For general technical
and community news regarding the fully-distributed system Gnutella, see
Gnutella News, at http://www.gnutellanews.com (last visited Feb. 15, 2005).
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responsive links from the central server. When the querying
user clicks on a link provided from the central database, the
file is transferred directly from the computer of the user
who is making the file available to the user searching for
that file over the Internet. The file is never reproduced,
stored or even routed through the centralized server. In
effect, a centralized P2P system operates much like a
standard search engine, the primary differences being that
users supply the database of links to be searched, not the
search tool provider, and the links refer to files resident on
user computers, rather than the Web sites or media assets
located on Web sites.
A fully-distributed system, such as Gnutella and its
progeny, takes greater advantage of the computing power of
user computers, doing away with the central database of
links. There is no client-server hierarchy at any level. User
computers perform all network functions. So, in a fullydistributed or "pure" P2P system a user's query propagates
throughout the system, hopping from one computer to the
next, and so on until a suitable number of responsive links
are collected, which are then reported back to the user who
submitted the query. As with a centralized system, once the
querying user clicks on a link, the transfer of the file takes
place directly from peer to peer.
Fully-distributed systems proved to have some practical
limitations. In order to find enough responsive links to a
query, the query may need to propagate out to a great many
users. The systems could be slow, bog down, and even hang
due to the inefficiencies inherent in keeping the desired
information fully distributed in small bits and pieces across
the breadth of the network. Hybrid systems, such as Kazaa
and Grokster, split the difference between the elegance of
the pure, fully-distributed system and the efficiency of a
centralized database. In a hybrid system, some user computers, whether by the user's choice or designation by the
rules that run the network, serve as "super nodes," aggregating links to files being shared by a great many
computers on the one super node. In this way, an ordinary
query need not propagate out through thousands of user
computers to find responsive links. Most queries will be
satisfied by links collected on one or a few super nodes and
only the exceptional, off-the-wall query will need to trek
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through a multitude of user computers hoping to find something responsive.
These technical differences have produced a range of
results in file sharing cases that remains as varied and
inconsistent as those in Web, Internet, and BBS cases. The
broad standards seem neither to constrain results nor provide clear guidance to courts faced with the task of judging
new technologies and the personal and economic relationships they enable.
Reconquista-Hollywood Briefly
Napster
2. The
Recaptures the Ground Lost Over the VCR. Though the legal
battle was much the same as that fought over the VCR, the
legal result in Napster was quite different, substantially
rebalancing the relative rights of content owners and those
developing technologies related to the distribution and use
of content online. 125 The district court imposed a sweeping
preliminary injunction in a very poorly reasoned opinion
that tortured some of the key legal standards and appeared
at times to be more of an emotional outpouring of antipathy
toward Napster than a reasoned court order. 126 The Ninth
Circuit corrected the flaws in the district court's order,
applying the correct legal standards without significantly
modifying the net result. 127 With respect to contributory
infringement, the Ninth Circuit adopted the Netcom notice
and take-down standard and remained true to the Supreme

125. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal.
2000).
126. See id. The district court judge at one point referred to the Napster
technology as a "monster." Id. at 924. When questioned as to how Napster
should go about implementing the broad injunction given the technical
constraints of the Napster system and the limitations of existing technology, the
judge, in effect, told defendant Napster that, having created the monster, issues
of implementation were its problem. Kevin Featherly, Music Industry On
Napster Appeal: 'Crisis? What Crisis?' (July 14, 2001), available at
http://in.tech.yahoo.com/010714/llmlz.html (on file with author). The district
court also grossly erred in misstating the Sony standard for contributory
infringement, adopting the standard articulated by the dissent. See id. at 91617. Incredibly, the district court also found (although it was overturned by the
Ninth Circuit) that Napster's system was incapable of commercially significant
non-infringing use, notwithstanding the excitement over the P2P network
architecture that Napster pioneered throughout the technology community and
markets. See id. at 912.
127. See generally 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
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Court directive in Sony. 128 A "computer system operator"
like Napster, the court reasoned, is contributorily liable if
he discovers "specific infringing material available on his
system and fails to purge such material from the
system . . . . Conversely, absent any specific information
which identifies infringing activity, a computer system
operator cannot be liable for contributory infringement
merely because the structure of the
system allows for the
' 129
exchange of copyrighted material.
The court cited the technology-embracing standards
that, as applied in Netcom and Cubby, recognize that an
online service provider cannot examine every bit of information that traverses its wires or is routed by its software or
hardware. 130 Although the Ninth Circuit did not expressly
adopt it, the court cited with some approval the Netcom
standard for knowledge "that in an online context, evidence
of actual knowledge of specific acts of infringement is
required to hold a computer system operator liable for contributory copyright infringement."' 131 Despite the generous
approach to technology with the legal standards adopted,
the court upheld the district court conclusion that Napster
had sufficient knowledge, stating that the record supports
the finding that "Napster has actual knowledge that specific infringing material is available using its system, that it
could block access to the system by suppliers of the
infringing material and that it failed to remove the material." 132
Despite the "abuse of discretion" standard of review
applied by the court, the affirmation of the district court's
conclusion that Napster had knowledge could be significant.
The factual petard from which the top officers at Napster
chose to hang themselves consisted primarily of emails
acknowledging that much of the content on the system was

128. See id. at 1021.
129. See id. (citations omitted).
130. See id.
131. Napster I, 239 F.3d at 1021 (summarizing the knowledge standard in
Religious Tech Ctr. v. Netcom On-line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp.
1361, 1371 (N.D. Cal. 1995)).
132. Id. at 1022 (emphasis omitted).
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infringing, infringing downloads by Napster executives, and
a refusal to take sufficient remedial action in the face of
RIAA complaints. 33 Unfortunately, the Ninth Circuit did
not tell us which facts supported its conclusion that Napster
knew that "specific infringing material is available using its
system." To the extent the Ninth Circuit was affirming the
district court's decision, which looked largely to the damning emails to support its conclusion, it was adopting a very
broad view of knowledge at odds with the spirit of the legal
standard articulated. "Specific infringing material" could be
interpreted to mean, among other possibilities, something
as broad as copyrighted music, or music owned by a plaintiff, or songs by the Beatles, or "Yesterday," or a specific file
embodying a copy of "Yesterday" by the Beatles and all
reproductions of such file, or a specific single file embodying
"Yesterday," or the copy of "Yesterday" available through a
specific link. The Netcom opinion clearly envisioned something close to the last interpretation offered: knowledge
specific to a particular instance of infringing material, identified specifically enough to permit its removal. 134 The facts
and holding in Napster, however, could support any of the
foregoing interpretations.
The nature of the obligation to purge infringing material is similarly open to various interpretations. Once
knowledge (whatever that means) is obtained, does the
service provider need to remove the one specific instance of
the work that is actually known, implement technology to
remove all instances of the same file, all instances of the
same work, works owned by the same party, all instances of
similar works revealed by reasonable investigation, or some
combination or variant of the foregoing? The Ninth Circuit
addressed the nature of the purge obligation to a certain
extent when Napster came before it again, this time to
resolve a row over the implementation of 35the already
affirmed and recrafted preliminary injunction. 1

133. See id. at 1020 n.5.
134. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Serv., Inc.,
907 F. Supp. 1361, 1373-75 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
135. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. (Napster II), 284 F.3d 1091 (9th
Cir. 2002).
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Showing that little had changed in the tactics of the
entertainment industry, the plaintiffs made the accustomed
challenge to the requirement that they provide notice of
works they allege are being infringed, together with some
demonstration of ownership. 136 As usual, the court upheld
the notice requirement. 37 For its part, Napster challenged
the breadth of the obligation to purge that had been
imposed. 138 The court interpreted Napster's requirement to
purge quite broadly. 13 9 Even though the court recognized
that "Napster was able to prevent sharing of much of plaintiffs copyrighted works," it affirmed the court-ordered
shutdown of Napster for failure to comply with the injunction. 140 Napster's obligation was not merely to remove
noticed links but to "police the system by searching its
141
index for files containing a noticed copyrighted work."
Once Napster received a notice identifying a particular
song, ownership of the song by the noticing party, and
examples of the song present on the system, the burden
shifted to42 Napster to ensure that that song did not
reappear. 1
Napster argued that the district court had changed the
mandate of the injunction by requiring it not only to filter
files by text titles, as originally contemplated by the parties,
but to implement more accurate audio fingerprinting
technology. 143 The Ninth Circuit read the injunction as
requiring Napster "to police the system to its fullest extent,"
144
upholding the de facto modification of the injunction.
Elsewhere, the court stated Napster's obligation as doing
"everything feasible to block files from its system which
contain noticed copyrighted works."'145 The copyright
136. See id. at 1096.
137. See id.
138. See id. at 1096-97.
139. See id. at 1097.
140. Id. at 1096.
141. Id. at 1097.
142. See id. at 1095-98.
143. See id. at 1097-98.
144. Id. at 1098 (quoting Napster 1, 239 F.3d at 1023).
145. Id.
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owner's obligation, it seems, has not changed much from
the dance hall days. It must identify the copyrighted works
that it owns with some demonstration that the work noticed
has been infringed.
The nature of the service provider's obligation to purge,
however, scales with the advance of filtering and other
policing technology that becomes available. If perfect
filtering technology exists, as it effectively does for most
files embodying music content, the obligation to take down
such infringing material is effectively absolute once notice
has been given. 146 Napster's contention that the court had
changed the injunction in ordering the shutdown of
Napster's network entirely, suddenly imposing a "zero
tolerance" policy, was not incorrect per se. The requirements of the injunction had increased to "zero tolerance" for
only because existing
infringement of noticed works, but
147
technology made error inexcusable.
Significantly, the court phrased Napster's general
obligation as one "to patrol its system and preclude access
148
to potentially infringing files listed on its search index."'
The obligation to take down infringing material thus
includes the obligation to take down non-infringing files
which may be infringing. The purge obligation is over inclusive, extending the copyright monopoly farther than Sony

146. Audible Magic Corporation, for example, boasts "audio-fingerprinting"
technology capable of managing digital rights on P2P networks. See generally
Audible Magic Corporation, at http://www.audiblemagic.com/about.html (last
visited Feb. 15, 2005). Several major content owners, including Sony Music,
have placed their trust in this technology. See Bill Rosenblatt, Sony Music Gets
Fingerprinted (June 3, 2004), available at http://www.drmwatch.com/drmtech
/article.php/3363151 (last visited on Feb. 15, 2005).
147. The requirement to implement filtering or other technology available
raises a host of related questions. When is a technology sufficiently available?
Does an essentially off-the-shelf solution commercially available have to exist,
or is the outline of technology in an academic or white paper sufficient? How is
the expense of implementation factored into the requirement? If the practical
aspects of implementation, such as the cost of implementation relative to the
harm done, were not factored in somehow, it would seem that there should be
little tolerance for error even in the absence of technology. Theoretically, one
could always hire sufficient human screeners to monitor all traffic to ensure no
infringement takes place.
148. Napster II, 284 F.3d at 1097.
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would seem to permit. At least with respect to a system
found to be indirectly liable and subject to a court injunction, the copyright rights of the content owners limit the
use of technology for uses that may be entirely noninfringing to some extent.
The remainder of the indirect copyright liability analysis was entirely a creature of the loose standards that had
evolved. The Ninth Circuit, following its own Fonovisa
precedent, found that Napster contributed to the infringement of its users by providing "the site and facilities."'149 For
purposes of vicarious liability, it effectively equated the
right and ability to control the infringing activity with the
"ability to block infringers' access to a particular environment for any reason whatsoever . .. "150 The opinion did
not examine the nature of the actual relationship and the
terms governing that relationship, as one would do in a traditional agency analysis, because the court did not need to.
The standard, which says that power to block or veto establishes the right and ability to control, displaces the need for
a more nuanced, circumstance-specific look. Likewise, the
fact that Napster was a for-profit corporate entity satisfied
the financial benefit prong. The court did not need to
concern itself with Napster's revenue model or its income
history (neither of which it had); the fact that it was a
commercial venture, however ill-defined, was enough. 151
The Ninth Circuit implicitly rejected the more stringent
view of financial benefit articulated in Netcom, looking
instead to its prior Fonovisa decision. 52 As long as the infringing activity was 15a3 "draw" for customers, financial benefit will be presumed.

149. Napster 1, 239 F.3d at 1022 (citing Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction,
Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996)).
150. Id. at 1023.
151. See id.

152. See id.
153. See id. The broad Fonovisa view of financial benefit is arguably the
only one that could be applied in the case of Napster. See Fonovisa Inc. v.
Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 263-64 (9th Cir. 1996). Napster launched in
late 1999, the last and loftiest months of the Internet hey day. Napster, like so
many other companies, did not concern itself with current revenues. Opting to
build a user base and then convert this into huge gain for shareholders with an

2005]

FROM SONY TO GROKSTER

201

a. The Impact of Napster on Sony. On the one hand,
the Ninth Circuit Napster opinions represent a substantial
affirmation of Sony's vitality after the district court's choice
to misread, misapply, or completely ignore the most important precedent on the subject. The opinion made clear that
Sony does apply to computer networks, even one as reviled
as Napster's, and the standard evaluates potential, not current use. 154 However, in affirming the district court's
ultimate order, the Ninth Circuit found that "Napster's
actual, specific knowledge of direct infringement renders
Sony's holding of limited assistance to Napster."'155
Actual
knowledge, the court held, vitiates a Sony defense. 156
It is difficult to identify the logic supporting the court's
decision. There is no contributory infringement, regardless
of Sony, without a high degree of knowledge under the
standard articulated by the Napster court. So, it would
seem that the court's limitation of Sony would swallow the
Sony exception to liability altogether, stating that if one of
the two prongs of the contributory infringement test,
knowledge, is met, Sony offers no defense to contributory
infringement. Of course, if there were no actual knowledge
under the standard apparently adopted in Napster, there
would be no contributory infringement to begin with and
thus no need for a Sony defense.

IPO. In 1999, this did not seem so odd. Many companies, with far fewer users

had effectively converted their user numbers and demographics into tens, in
some cases hundreds, of millions of dollars in market value. So, on the one
hand, Napster, by the time it began seeking venture financing at the latest, was
a business in this sense and it cannot seriously be contested that the "draw" for
Napster's users, the source of the user numbers it sought to convert into IPO
cash, was largely the availability of illegal music files (MP3 files being the only
files available on Napster). On the other hand, one could not link dollars to
infringing activity as the Netcom approach arguably requires, nor could one
easily distinguish a non-commercial P2P service from Napster aside from the
aspirations of its founders and investors once the service gained in popularity. A
broad standard like that articulated in Fonovisa may be necessary to deal
venture-stage companies with a sale or IPO exit strategy, particularly where
infringing activity appears to be a major draw for the product or service offered.
Businesses with current revenues pose no such problems, however, and
therefore should be examined with the exactitude required by Netcom.
154. See Napster I, 239 F.3d at 1021.

155. Id. at 1020.
156. See id. at 1021.
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The court could be saying that Sony only applies in
cases where constructive knowledge is alleged. This seems
to be an exceedingly weak distinction. If, for example,
internal Sony memoranda existed akin to the emails circulating among Napster's officers-say a note in which a Vice
President of Sony acknowledged that he saw his sister-inlaw record a favorite episode of "Happy Days" with the
intent to keep it permanently-would the Supreme Court
have ruled differently? Should the Ninth Circuit have
reached a different result if there were no damning emails
circulating within Napster and the plaintiffs had not been
sufficiently specific in sending any cease and desist letters?
It would seem arbitrary for such important holdings to turn
on how many little jewels a plaintiff was able to unearth in
discovery.
Perhaps the Ninth Circuit was drawing an implicit distinction between services and unwired hardware. In the
case of an ongoing service, the service provider has the
opportunity to take remedial action once knowledge of
infringing activity is known, whereas Sony could not really
do very much to prevent copyright infringement once a VCR
had shipped. The plaintiffs argued, as they frequently do,
that Sony simply did not apply to an online service like
Napster, because that holding was limited to stand-alone
copying equipment. 157 The court appeared to rebuff this
argument, as most courts do, in holding that Sony does
apply to Napster. 158 However, the recognition that knowledge vitiates Sony may be the imposition of the same result
by other means, either because the manufacturer of hardware will generally actually know less than the operator of
an online service, though both may have the same practical,
constructive knowledge of how their products are used, or
because the limitation of Sony only applies in the context of
online and similar services, where as a matter of fairness,
knowledge without remedial action indicates a level of complicity. Whatever it means, the holding that knowledge guts
a Sony defense represents a significant limitation on the
reach of the Sony exception. 15 9

157. See id. at 1020-21.
158. See id.
159. As stated above, almost every time a court finds a technology or service
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In addition, the Ninth Circuit made clear that the Sony
exception applies only to contributory infringement, not
vicarious liability. 160 This, too, would seem to reduce greatly
the importance of Sony to computer networks and other
wired services. Far from providing a general safe harbor for
those developing agnostic technologies, Sony offers no assistance to any commercial product or service where users
may be kicked off or their conduct restricted. Under
Napster, Sony may be relevant only to the rare case in
which the facts support contributory infringement but not
vicarious liability, and there is no evidence of actual knowledge.
In holding that knowledge vitiates Sony, the court is
arguably making the intent or state of mind of the defendant a quasi-element in the contributory infringement test.
f the defendant does not actually know that protected rights
are being violated and if he retains that purity of mind and
purpose, Sony will shield him from copyright liability. If,
however, he knows that bad things are happening and
continues in his business anyway, thereby demonstrating a
certain level of disregard or even hostility to the copyright
rights of another, Sony affords no shelter. Still, if Napster
imposes an actual knowledge standard as it appears to do
and as later courts have so interpreted, there would be no
contributory infringement in the absence of knowledge in
any event. 16 ' Puzzling.

provider indirectly liable for the copyright infringement of its users, it must
identify some significant limitation of Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984), not apparent on the face of the opinion to get
to the desired conclusion. For example, in Cable/Home Communication Corp. v.
Network Prod., Inc., 902 F.2d 829, 846 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting Sony Corp. of
Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 438 (1984)), the court found
Sony inapplicable if the defendant "influenced or encouraged" infringement.
Taken together with Napster I, the Sony defense to contributory infringement is
unavailable in cases where the defendant had actual knowledge or influenced or
encouraged infringement. Because there is no contributory infringement by
definition without knowledge and contributory acts, Sony is rendered all but a
logical nullity.
160. See NapsterI, 239 F.3d at 1022.

161. In Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp.
2d 1029, 1032 (C.D. Cal. 2003), the Central District of California interpreted
NapsterI as imposing an actual knowledge standard.
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62-A
3. MP3Board1
"Traditional"Web Case During the
P2P Fray. The MP3Board site featured a traditional automated search engine which crawled the Web looking for
MP3 files and then crunched the links into a searchable
database that users could query. 163 The site also featured a
message board where users were encouraged to post links
to other sites containing audio files. 164 Users could also post
requests for links to particular songs, and MP3Board personnel would personally search for links to those songs and
post the links on the message board. 65 So, MP3Board was
an amalgam of Web-based services and technologies-a
search engine, a BBS, and a professional search service.
MP3Board received the predictable lawsuit from the RIAA
member record companies, claiming vicarious and contributory liability for the direct infringements of MP3Board
users.

In denying the parties' cross motions for summary judgment, the Southern District of New York infused new
energy into the requirement that a plaintiff in a copyright
action prove direct infringement before indirect liability
may be found. 66 The court, if its opinion takes root, set the
RJAA back decades in its long effort to loosen the standards
by refusing to grant summary judgment on the ground that
a material fact existed with respect to whether any direct
infringement took place, even though an MP3Board principal admitted that it was "particularly likely" that
MP3Board's users have used links it provides to initiate
unauthorized downloads of copyrighted music. 67 In the
absence of "user logs or other technical data showing the
downloading of copyrighted and unauthorized68 files," the
court would not give judgment to the plaintiffs.

162. Arista Records, Inc. v. MP3Board, Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16165
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2002).
163. See id. at *5.
164. See id. at *6.
165. See id.
166. See id. at *10.
167. See id. at *12-13.
168. Id. at *13.
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This attention to the basic requirements of copyright is
extraordinary in light of the generally lax standards that
have evolved and been applied, as outlined above- standards which in effect put the technology on trial. It is particularly striking given the nature of the MP3Board site.
Prior to the litigation, the MP3Board site was exactly what
one would think-a place for the community of MP3 enthusiasts to meet, to share ideas about where music could be
found, and to search for music. At least to the older eye of
this commentator, it had the feel of the "pirate's bazaar"
that Jack Valenti may have envisioned, with most partici169
pants going by online handles, engaging in "133t speak"
and otherwise reflecting their young, MP3-hungry subculture, unabashedly sharing information and enthusiasm for
the trade of illicit music files.
Neither would the court impute actual knowledge to
MP3Board based on the several threatening missives the
RIAA had sent. 170 While some of these cease and desist
letters were scanty on facts, at least one letter substantially
complied with the detailed requirements of the DMCA notice provision, naming particular artists and songs believed
to be infringed, together with screen shots of MP3Board's
site highlighting 662 links believed by the RIAA to be
infringing. 171 The court nonetheless found a material issue
of fact as to whether MP3Board had knowledge that its site
1 72
and services were used by some to download illicit music.
The court was not making any ultimate judgment on the
merits, merely letting the case proceed past plaintiffs'
summary judgment motion. However, given the nature of
MP3Board's service, the detailed notice with screen shots
provided by the plaintiffs and defendant's own admission
that it was "particularly likely" that some of its users were
169. "133t" notation is a form of abbreviating words utilizing numbers and
other symbols used by many of the hardcore online folk who consider
themselves the elite of the Internet, elite reworked in their lingo to "133t." For a
better idea of what the hacker lingo called "133t" looks like, see the following
133t translators: Jay's Site.com, at http://www.jayssite.com/stuff/133t/133t.
translator.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2005), and at http://www.albinoblacksheep.
com/text/leet.php (last visited Feb. 26, 2005).
170. Id. at *24-*30.
171. Id. at *28-*29.
172. Id. at *30.
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downloading unlicensed MP3's, it would seem that nothing
short of a direct and unequivocal confession by the defendant could settle the issue of knowledge on a summary
judgment motion under the standard applied by the court.
Likewise the court refused to impute constructive
knowledge of infringement to MP3Board, stating that the
in
case lacked the "strong indicia of constructive knowledge" 173
Fonovisa, Napster, and Maphia, among other cases.
Whatever one may think of the court's requirement of specific evidence of knowledge, its attempt to distinguish the
precedent is unconvincing. Indeed, it rests on the presumption that the principals at MP3Board did not know the
nature of their user's activities or the materials they were
posting, many of which boasted that the files to be found on
the other side of the link were illegal. 174 The BBS component of MP3Board, one must assume because it is no longer
available to inspection, probably looked much like the
community board on the MAPHIA site at issue in Sega v.
Maphia.175 The MP3Board case would be far more useful to
the evolution of the law if it openly admitted that it was
applying a more exacting requirement of evidence for
knowledge than that applied in prior cases, rather than
asserting that MP3Board is simply different in kind from
all that had gone before. It is not.
4. Aimster-The Seventh Circuit Wrestles with Sony
and Widely Accepted P2P Technologies. Aimster was a centralized P2P file sharing systems that piggybacked on the
widely distributed AOL Instant Messenger (AIM) program
and instant messenger communications network. Like
almost any instant messenger or other digital communications network, AIM permitted users to transfer files to others on the user's "buddy" or contact list. Some versions of
AIM also permitted users to designate a body of files that
would be made available to a designated list of other AIM
users-file sharing. The Aimster service and software
expanded this basic capability in several respects. In addi-

173. Id. at *21.
174. Id. at *12-*13.
175. See Sega Enters., Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 948 F. Supp. 923 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
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tion to basic file sharing capability, Aimster offered a paid
service, "club Aimster," which permitted members to
download the "top 40" most popular music files more easily
than by using the free service. Presumably to broaden the
reach of the network and the files available from its users,
Aimster also set by default all users of the Aimster system
as contacts or buddies of each other. 176 If the user did not
specify a smaller body of contacts, he would be able to
obtain files from and send files to the entire body of Aimster
users.
Writing for the Seventh Circuit, Judge Posner tried to
navigate between the extreme positions taken by the parties. The court summarized the positions of the parties and
its conclusions succinctly: "To the recording industry, a
single known infringing use brands the facilitator as a
contributory infringer. To the Aimsters of the world, a single non-infringing use provides complete immunity from
liability. Neither is correct." 177 The court accepted that Sony
applied to instant messaging systems over the objection of
the entertainment industry plaintiffs. In the process, the
Aimster court expressly rejected the holding of the Ninth
of specific
Circuit in Napster that actual knowledge
178
infringing uses vitiates a Sony defense.
To this extent, the Seventh Circuit reads Sony for the
broad, technology-accommodating principle that copyright
holders may not "prevent infringement effectuated by
means of the new technology at the price of possibly denying not infringing consumers the benefit of the technology." 179 At least one factor driving the court's analysis is an
apparent presumption that instant messenger systems like
AIM ought not to be tagged with the copyright infringements of its users. The court had "no doubt that some of the
attachments that AOL's multitudinous subscribers transfer
are copyrighted and such distribution is an infringement

176. In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 646 (7th Cir. 2003).
177. See id. at 651.
178. Id. at 649.
179. Id.
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unless authorized by the owner of the copyright."'180 Yet, the
court concluded without any analysis that AIM ought not to
be found indirectly liable. Aimster, if it is to be found
contributorily or vicariously liable, must be distinguished in
some material respect from the basic file sharing available
via AIM.
At the same time, the court was unwilling to accept the
oft-cited rule of Sony that technology need only be capable
of a single substantial non-infringing use. "Were that the
law," the court balked, "the seller of a product or service
used solely to facilitate copyright infringement, though it
was capable in principle of non-infringing uses, would be
18 1
immune from liability for contributory infringement."'
Unable to accept that the Supreme Court really wanted
lower courts to look at the capacity or potential of the system, as opposed to actual use, the court required some
evidence of non-infringing use before it would entertain a
Sony-based defense. 182 This evidence Aimster failed to proffer in any degree, leading the court to affirm the lower
court's finding that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on
the merits.
Unwilling to adopt the extreme positions of either party
in the litigation or a simple reading of the Supreme Court
precedent, Judge Posner crafted a middle-of-the-road rule
for his court to follow in the likely case of technologies that
support a demonstrable mix of infringing and non- infringing uses. Even where there is evidence of non- infringing
uses, the court stated, perhaps in dicta, that "if the
infringing uses are substantial then to avoid liability as a
contributory infringer the provider of the service must show
that it would have been disproportionately costly for him to
eliminate or at least reduce substantially the infringing
uses."'1 3 If Aimster's failure to produce evidence of noninfringing uses were not enough, the court found that
Aimster still would have failed this new mixed-use test.

180. Id. at 647.
181. Id. at 651.
182. Id. at 653.
183. Id.

2005]

FROM SONY TO GROKSTER

209

The Aimster system was implemented with encryption
that effectively precluded the service provider, i.e. Aimster,
from filtering its system of infringing works. 8 4 The system
was almost certainly so designed in order to make a Sony
defense stronger, particularly in light of the Ninth Circuit's
approach in Napster which looked specifically and narrowly
at the capabilities of the system before it. Just as Sony
could not control what a user did with the VCR once it left
its factory, so too, Aimster could not control what its users
did with its service. Perhaps this self-imposed incapacity
would have produced a different analysis if the Napster
panel were writing the opinion. Not so for Judge Posner
and the Seventh Circuit. Drawing upon analogies to willful
blindness as establishing the mens rea of knowledge with
respect to certain crimes, the court found that willful blindness to the conduct of its users establishes knowledge for
purposes of contributory infringement. Similarly, with
respect to the new mixed-use test to determine whether sufficient efforts at mitigation were made to avoid contributory
infringement, the court refused to permit Aimster to benefit
from its self-imposed impotence absent a showing that the
important value
encryption it deployed against itself "added
18 5
to the service or saved significant cost.'
While one can argue that the tests adopted in the
Aimster case are incorrect or not even permissible under the
superior authority of Sony, Judge Posner and the Seventh
Circuit should be commended for identifying the unresolved
difficulties in the existing law and crafting the best solution
possible, rather than producing yet another indirect copyright liability opinion that is wholly conclusory. The court's
basic theme that, notwithstanding Sony, "some estimate of
the respective magnitudes of [infringing and non-infringing]
uses is necessary for finding of contributory infringement ' 186 has the ring of common sense.

184. Id.
185. Id. The court did not reach the merits of the vicarious liability claims
against Aimster, but provided some indication that vicarious liability was
something of a stretch, stating "we are less confident than the district judge was
that the recording industry would also be likely to prevail on the issue of
vicarious infringement." Id. at 654.
186. Id. at 649.
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5. The Grokster and Morpheus Risorgimento-Site
and Facilities in Pure and Hybrid P2P. One significant
problem with pursuing a strategy of endless war, whether
actual or of the softer, litigious variety, is that no matter
how well-funded the effort, no matter how many victories
have been tallied in the past, ultimately one will be
confronted with a more challenging set of circumstances
and lose. The entertainment industry has, again, proven
this simple truth.
Less than five years after the first major ruling against
Napster, the Ninth Circuit, the court that affirmed Napster
and broadened the scope of the injunction, published its
opinion in Grokster. It is now clear that, at least in the
Ninth Circuit, hybrid and fully-distributed P2P file sharing
systems like those at issue in Grokster (the hybrid Kazaabased Grokster client and the fully-distributed Gnutellabased Morpheus client) do not generally run afoul of the
rules of secondary copyright liability.187 Where once stood a
Ninth Circuit opinion favoring content owner rights to such
an extent that only the foolhardy would develop technologies to locate or distribute content online without first
obtaining broad licenses from every major content owner,
now stands a Ninth Circuit roadmap showing exactly how
to architect a file sharing network and business around it
without any worry of copyright liability.
On substance, the Grokster court goes a long way
toward clarifying exactly what Sony means in the Ninth
Circuit. As indicated in Napster, a technology need only be
capable of a substantial non-infringing use to merit a Sony
defense, just like the Supreme Court said in the Sony opinon. This, of course, creates a clear conflict with the "gloss"
put on Sony by the Seventh Circuit in Aimster. Rather than
trying to obscure the difference, the Grokster court openly
and unabashedly recognized the plain disagreement
between the Seventh and the Ninth Circuits.188

187. Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1155.
188. In the ninth footnote, the Grokster opinion acknowledges the frank
disagreement of the Circuits:
We are mindful that the Seventh Circuit has read Sony's substantial
non-infringing use standard differently. It determined that an
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Though it is much easier to qualify for a Sony defense
in the Ninth Circuit than in the Seventh, the substance of
the defense itself post-Napster is of extremely limited
value.18 9 The Grokster court squares the existence of a Sony
defense to contributory infringement with the rule in
Napster that knowledge vitiates a Sony defense by using
two different definitions of knowledge. Once a defendant
showed "that its product was capable of substantial or
commercially significant non-infringing uses, then constructive knowledge of the infringement could not be imputed.
Rather, if substantial non-infringing use was shown, the
copyright owner would be required to show that the
defendant had reasonable knowledge of specific infringing
files." 190 In this way, the Sony defense, the standard for
contributory infringement which requires knowledge, and
the Napster rule that knowledge (at least of a certain kind)
vitiates Sony, can all logically coexist.
What is left, however, is an extremely weak Sony
defense. Sony, according to Grokster, merely means that a
finding of contributory liability cannot be based on
constructive knowledge. In the ordinary case, a notice of
alleged infringement-of the sort that typically precedes
litigation--obviates any need to rely on constructive knowledge. So, in the ordinary case, at least the ordinary case of
the past, Sony is ultimately of little import as interpreted
by the Ninth Circuit. However, the defendants in Grokster
prevailed notwithstanding notices from the copyright plaintiffs as a matter of timing. Because a defendant's knowledge
important additional factor is how "probable" the non-infringing uses of
a product are. The Copyright Owners urge us to adopt the Aimster
rationale. However, Aimster is premised specifically on a fundamental
disagreement with Napster I's reading of Sony-Betamax. We are not
free to reject our own Circuit's binding precedent. Even if we were free
to do so, we do not read Sony-Betamax's holding as narrowly as does
the Seventh Circuit.
Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1162 n.9 (internal citations omitted).
189. Clearly, Grokster and Morpheus would not have qualified for a Sony
defense under the Seventh Circuit Aimster standard. In Grokster, it was
effectively uncontested that the "vast majority of the files [on the file sharing
networks at issue] are exchanged illegally and in violation of copyright law." Id.
at 1160.
190. Id. at 1160-61.
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must exist at the time when the defendant contributes to
infringement, if the rules are to serve the policy aim of
fairness, the defendant must possess "specific knowledge of
infringement at a time at which they contribute[d] to the
infringement, and fail[ed] to act upon that information."' 91
The court concluded that with respect to Grokster and
Morpheus, the "notices of infringing conduct are irrelevant,"
because "they arrive when Defendants do nothing to facilitate, and cannot do anything to stop, the alleged infringement" of specific copyrighted content. 192
The upshot of this interpretation is that Sony does
shield a technologist from liability if he loses all control of
his product prior to infringement taking place, as was the
case with the VCR. In the world of computer networks,
Grokster can be read for the proposition that a real-time
service, or perhaps even a fast service, will receive the same
protection as a VCR because a highly specific level of
knowledge is required and no complaining notice could
possibly arrive in time for a service provider to take corrective action. The logic flows without error, but content
owners are unlikely to appreciate reasoning which holds
that even a thousand notices complaining of a transfer of
the same work, perhaps even copies of the same file from
the same user will all be considered untimely as a formal
for action on the part
matter and will trigger no obligation
193
of the service provider as a result.
With respect to material contribution, the court stuck
with the Fonovisa/Napster"site and facilities" analysis. In
the context of a hybrid or fully-distributed system it
produces a quite different result. Because neither Grokster
nor Morpheus maintained a central database of links or
other critical nodes in the network through which informa-

191. Id. at 1162 (quoting Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster,
Inc., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1036 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (citing Napster 1,239 F.3d at
1021)).
192. Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
193. The neat doctrinal compartments crafted by the court still need a good
deal of fleshing out and leave much to be litigated. Chief among the questions
later courts will have to answer is what exactly is "reasonable knowledge" and
how, if at all, does it differ from the "knowledge" generally required by
contributory infringement.
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tion travels, they did not provide the site and facilities for
infringement and thus did not contribute to copyright
infringement, notwithstanding the vast quanta of infringing material trafficked with the aid of their technology.
The court recognized that the genius of P2P is that
every computer may function as both a client and a server,
permitting any network activity to take place anywhere
within the global network. 194 One might think that under
circumstances where a developer or other technologist
directs activity to take place this direction ought to be of
little legal import, as almost any activity can be directed to
take place almost anywhere on the network. The database
of links may be kept on a company computer, a user
computer, disbursed among user computers designated as
supernodes, or held in a latent, unassembled form on all the
connected computers. Napster, Grokster, and Gnutella have
proven that all such models can achieve essentially the
same result.
The key to understanding the court's holding is the
distinction it made between what a service provider may be
required to do to its own computers and what a court may
ask it to do to software and data already resident on user
computers. The court expressed its willingness to boss
around access providers and traditional server operators
and a deep reluctance to trespass on another person's
machine. The court stated that failing to alter software
"located on another's computer is simply not akin to the
failure to delete a filename from one's own computer, to the
failure to cancel the registration name and password of a
particular user from one's user list, or to the failure to make
modifications to software on one's own computer." 195 The
court does not provide any meaningful explication as to why
one "issimply not akin" to the other. The court's distinction
is arguably supported by recent cases which have found
trespass to chattels in the use of auction systems, email
servers, and the like. Perhaps a man's machine is his castle.
In an age of automatic software updates, ubiquitous
EULA's, adware, pernicious cookies, and everything else

194. Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1158.
195. Id. at 1163.
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that crawls into our systems without our knowledge, the
notion seems quaint, maybe even formalistic. If the court
were willing to require the defendants to update their client
software, which in turn would permit the implementation of
effective policing measures, it would seem difficult to avoid
a finding of liability.
This conclusion to take the system exactly as it is also
serves as the linchpin in the court's vicarious liability
196
analysis, which likewise finds the defendants not liable.
Of course, without a central database of links, a technology
or service provider has no effective means to control what
users do based on its dominion over its servers. Because
neither system required a log-in or registration as currently
implemented, users also could not be excluded from the
system without modifying the client software. The contractual power of the service providers was either weak or nonexistent and like implementing some registration system, it
could only be modified by mandating an additional transaction with the users/direct infringers. Because Grokster and
Morpheus could not exclude users without touching their
computers in some fashion and modifying the current
system, the service providers did not have the right and
ability to control. Because the court would not require the
defendants to make any changes to the system, the analysis
is at an end.
The court's strong insistence that it takes the defendant's system exactly as it comes allows the court to avoid
evaluation of policing technologies altogether. While there
is now an abundance of DRM and other solutions that at
least claim to control the use and distribution of files over
open networks, it seems remedial action could have been
197
ordered or encouraged with a finding of liability.
However, implementation of any technological control
measures would change the system and thus were beyond

196. In Napster, the court noted that Sony does apply to the Napster system
and that the court will take the Napster systems exactly as it is. Napster I, 239
F.3d at 1020-1021.
197. The Audible Magic Corporation, for example, sells "audio
fingerprinting technology" endorsed by several major record companies. See
Audible Magic Corp., at http://www.audiblemagic.com (last visited Feb. 26,
2005).
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the court's inquiry. The plaintiffs noted that Napster was
ultimately required to implement comprehensive filtering
mechanisms that effectively gutted the utility of the service.
In response, the Grokster court explained that the duties to
police to the fullest extent possible do not arise until there
has been a finding of liability. 198 Because the court did not
find defendants liable in Grokster it would not place any
duties to implement filtering technologies, regardless of
feasibility or their intrusiveness on non-infringing conduct.
The court also employed the stark distinction it sees
between changing data or software on a defendant's
computer and doing the same on a user's computer. As the
court put it, again without further explanation, "a duty to
alter software and files located on one's own computer
system is quite different in kind from a duty to alter software located on another person's computer."'199
To the plaintiff copyright owners, all this may seem
rather formalistic. They may with some justification feel
like a drowning man who is informed that the law places no
duty on any of the onlookers to lend a hand. It appears that
one lesson to be drawn from Grokster is: Design your
system and relationship with your users in such a way that
they are wild and uncontrollable, root and branch. Any
efforts to police or control the system will doom the
technology in court. From the point of view of the court otherwise faced with the impossible task of evaluating possible
alternative technologies, the engineers and entrepreneurs
who wish to develop technologies without working at a film
studio or record label, and the public who deserves laws
that produce predictable results, the result in Grokster may
hit the mark.

198. The court explained:
[T]he Copyright Owners confuse the right and ability to supervise with
the strong duty imposed on entities that have already been determined
to be liable for vicarious copyright infringement; such entities have an
obligation to exercise their policing powers to the fullest extent, which
in Napster's case included implementation of new filtering
mechanisms.
Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1166.
199. Id.
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D. Real Politik of the Cases-Critical,but only Partial
Explanations
With standards as malleable and broad as those that
have evolved in the area and with a history of case law
covering circumstances as rich and varied as those dealing
with entertainment and the creative schemes to get the
goods without paying for them, one can view the result of
any given case as a function of how generous a view a
particular judge takes of technological progress. Some
courts look at new means of sharing information and cannot
help but speak in terms ripped from First Amendment ju200
risprudence, as in Netcom, Cubby, and MP3Board cases.
With an astute analogy to the First Amendment, but dubious legal reasoning, one court went so far as to adopt the
New York Times v. Sullivan standard of actual malice 2as
01
the standard for knowledge in the copyright context.
Other courts either do not share such enthusiasm for technological progress or choose not to accommodate such policy
concerns by doing somersaults around precedent that
makes a finding of liability hard to avoid in almost every
circumstance that makes it to the courts. These courts can
write short memoranda of disposition, dispatching cases
(and the defendants with them) in a quick paragraph as in
Playboy v. Frena and Utah Lighthouse Ministry, assured
that they have not strayed beyond the reach of the precedent. 202
Many of the cases also appear to support another critical
explanation. The bad guys, or at least those that look and
smell bad on the facts, tend to lose, while defendants
engaged in similar conduct with better optics-standing in
the business community, a mainstream brand, deeper consumer penetration-tend to garner the judicial somersaults
required for a holding that might excuse the defendant's

200. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. 1361; Cubby, 776 F. Supp. 135; MP3Board,
2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16165.
201. See Universal Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 82 F. Supp. 2d 211, 221 n.44
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (citing New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)).

202. See Playboy Enters., Inc., 839 F. Supp. 1552; Utah Lighthouse Ministry,
75 F. Supp. 2d 1290.
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conduct. MAPHIA was a pirate "warez" BBS;203 the Cherry
Auction swap meet in Fonovisa had already been sued and
raided by police; 204 the principals in Cable/Home were bent
on a mission to create and distribute illicit descrambler
chips and continued to hawk their wares on and offshore
a preliminary injunction against them had been
even after
205
issued.
This non-legal interpretation goes a long way toward
explaining the district court's oddly rough treatment of
Napster and the difficult legal issues presented in the
Napster case. Almost all superficial appearances in Napster
were negative. The damning emails by the teen-aged founder and other principals, the braggadocio about putting the
record companies out of business, the underground vibe of
the Napster brand and early marketing, the almost exclusively Gen Y user base, and the limitation of the service to
MP3 files, a format closely associated with music piracy in
the minds of many, at a minimum, made Napster a poor
representative of the more benign and profound potential of
P2P network architectures. By contrast, Judge Posner's
analysis in Aimster began with the assumption that AOL
Instant Messenger must be found to be an acceptable noninfringing product, notwithstanding the doubtless fact that
the system, like Napster and Kazaa, facilitates the reproduction and distribution of vast quantities of infringing
material. 20 6 One must wonder what the legal reasoning and
result would have been if Napster were not carrying the
banner for the network architecture it pioneered, but AOL
or some other trusted brand and the P2P network at issue
was marketed primarily as a means of sharing family

203. See Sega Enters., Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 648 F. Supp. 923 (N.D.Cal. 1996).
204. Fonovisa,76 F.3d 259.
205. See Cable/Home, 902 F.2d 829.
206. Judge Posner reasons that the fact that "copyrighted materials might
sometimes be shared between users of such a system [Aimster] without the
authorization of the copyright owner or a fair use privilege would not make the
firm a contributory infringer. Otherwise, AOL's instant-messaging system,
which Aimster piggybacks on, might be deemed a contributory infringer." In re
Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d at 647. The court begins with the
presumption that AOL Instant Messenger must be deemed a non-infringing,
permissible technology, then excludes possible rules that would yield a contrary
result.
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photos or home movies among a defined family user
group .207

Of course, Sony directs courts to look to the potential
uses of technology. 208 The Grokster court clearly was much
more interested in preserving the potential of an interesting
technology than in remedying the infringement at hand. If
one wishes to find critical explanations or motivations
behind the Grokster opinion, several may be found lying on
the surface. The court expressed a high regard for the potential of the technology at hand, a low regard for the
approach of the plaintiffs to new technologies and deep
skepticism as to the court's or anyone's ability to do a better
job than the market in picking and choosing technologies
that should be permitted to go forward. In a brief opinion,
the court took the time to observe in dictum that from the
dawn of mechanical music devices, the music industry has
never met a technology it liked: "From the advent of the
player piano, every new means of reproducing sound has
struck a dissonant chord with musical copyright owners,

207. Courts in other contexts have gone to great lengths to excuse the direct
and actual knowledge of defendants where the atmospherics favored the
defendant. In a case challenging the Communications Decency Act for example,
AOL had received a number of complaints informing it of child pornography
available through its online service and took no remedial action, yet AOL was
given every presumption of honest ignorance and good conduct. eBay has been
involved in cases dealing with the sale of Nazi paraphernalia and other illicit
items in various jurisdictions which have remained for sale on its service long
after the first complaints arrive. These cases, however, do not hold eBay
complicit in the illicit sale of contraband, even though eBay runs the auction,
brokers the transaction, and had sufficient notice to take remedial action. It
would seem that the AOL's and eBay's of the world are afforded great latitude
in such matters, with courts willing to chalk up failures to excusable
bureaucratic bungling because the company has a reputation that engenders a
deep presumption of good conduct. While one cannot know for certain, it
likewise seems that those businesses catering to gainers, song swappers, and
other anti-establishment youth cultures, the perennial nightmare of each
succeeding generation once it hits middle age, have a good deal of prejudice to
overcome before an honest evaluation of the nature of the technology is a
possibility.
208. See generally Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417
(1984). But see Aimster, 334 F.3d 643 (reinterpreting and limiting Sony so that
a single potential, substantial, non-infringing use will not save a technology
used predominantly for infringing purposes).
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often resulting in federal litigation." 209 Even though the
court accepted that the "vast majority" of content trafficked
on the systems at issue was infringing, it still embraced the
current non-infringing uses as deeply meaningful and the
potential for the technology as too good for a court to stifle,
citing how independent bands and public domain publication efforts, such as Project Guttenberg, have been able to
use the system legitimately to their advantage. 210 Lastly,
the court was open in expressing how its view of the institutional competence of the court relative to that of the market
shaped its decision:
We live in a quicksilver technological environment with courts illsuited to fix the flow of internet innovation. AT&T Corp. v. City of
Portland, 216 F.3d 871, 876 (9th Cir. 1999). The introduction of
new technology is always disruptive to old markets, and particularly to those copyright owners whose markets are sold through
well-established distribution mechanisms. Yet, history has shown
that time and market forces often provide equilibrium in balancing
interests, whether the new technology be a player piano, a copier,
a tape recorder, a video recorder, a personal computer, a karaoke
machine, or an MP3 player. Thus, it is prudent for courts to

209. Grokster, 380 F.3d 1158.
210.
A careful examination of the record indicates that there is no genuine

issue of material fact as to non-infringing use. Indeed, the Software
Distributors submitted numerous declarations by persons who permit
their work to be distributed via the software, or who use the software
to distribute public domain works. One striking example provided by
the Software Distributors is the popular band Wilco, whose record
company had declined to release one of its albums on the basis that it
had no commercial potential. Wilco repurchased the work from the
record company and made the album available for free downloading,
both from its own website and through the software user networks. The
result sparked widespread interest and, as a result, Wilco received

another recording contract. Other recording artists have debuted their
works through the user networks. Indeed, the record indicates that
thousands of other musical groups have authorized free distribution of
their music through the internet. In addition to music, the software has
been used to share thousands of public domain literary works made
available through Project Gutenberg as well as historic public domain
films released by the Prelinger Archive. In short, from the evidence
presented, the district court quite correctly concluded that the software
was capable of substantial non-infringing uses and, therefore, that the
Sony-Betamax doctrine applied.
Id. at 1161-62 (citations omitted).
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exercise caution before restructuring liability theories for the
market abuses, despite their
purpose of addressing specific
211
apparent present magnitude.

Under Sony which looks to the potential of technology,
current uses, user demographics, and the like should be of
relatively little importance to a court's analysis as was the
case in Grokster. Still, the prejudice that arguably exists in
cases like Napster, is not entirely indefensible. As Sony also
makes clear, the question of indirect liability is ultimately
212
an equitable judgment, a matter of fairness and justice.
There may, therefore, be a legitimate place for the intent or
state of mind of the defendant in the court's assessment of
justice in the circumstances, in order to promote the fairness of holding the defendant liable. Indeed, some courts
unwittingly introduce intent into their analysis. As
discussed above, in Fonovisa, for example, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that the defendant "actively strives to provide the
environment and market for counterfeit recording sales to
thrive,"213 even though the defendant's intention does not
directly figure into the standard for contributory infringement. One could argue either way whether it is appropriate
for a court to tilt the scales for such reasons to achieve the
paramount policy objective the law does overtly recognizefairness.
III. THE FUTURE OF SECONDARY COPYRIGHT LIABILITY: THE
PROBLEMS AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS FOR A DIGITAL WORLD
A. The Problems with the Doctrines Generally-Overly
Broad Common Law Doctrines for Novel, Technical
Problems
Those charged with articulating and applying the
doctrines of indirect copyright liability have a daunting task
that appears to provide little room for compromise. They
must deal with technology-new modes of finding, using,
storing, and transporting information-that seems to tilt to

211. Id. at 1167.
212. See id.
213. Fonovisa,76 F.3d at 264.
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the extremes. The high level of knowledge of and control
over what transpires over computer networks makes finding indirect copyright liability tough to escape. Technology
permits close to perfect tracking of who sends what to
whom over the wires and also provides the tools to filter out
offending transmissions, leaving a technology or service
provider with little excuse for not policing and purging out
copyright infringement. At the same time, Sony seems to
direct that even a single, potential non-infringing use saves
a technology. Under this standard, liability could almost
never be found. The sensible ground that lay between the
extremes of unavoidable liability or freedom from liability is
difficult to hold.
One must ask why the law pushes courts to the
extremes when the optimal result likely lies in the sensible
middle ground of compromise. Several major problems with
the current state of the law stand out.
1. Loose Common Law Principles-A Warning Sign.
The simple fact that the bounds between the competing
interests of content owners on the one hand, and technology
and business innovators on the other, are perennially
defined by broad common law principles argues for the
inadequacy of the statutory code we have. Contributory
infringement and vicarious liability are judge-made, ad hoc
concepts intended to fill the interstices, not make up the
law. It is difficult to find other industrial flashpoints where
the law relies almost exclusively on broad-stroke common
law principles to govern such highly technical matters
between such large competitive interests, particularly
where the substantive law has always been code-based. For
example, the regulation of oil refining technology is not left
up to the common law doctrine of nuisance.
The shakiness of the legal ground on which the battle
between technology and content is fought is visible in the
lengths to which otherwise excellent courts will go to
stretch the precedent they have to deploy. Recent cases
applying the doctrines to new network technologies would
lead the uninitiated to believe that contributory infringement and vicarious liability rules are hard and fast, go back
to time immemorial, and have already confronted an issue
very much like the one at hand. In fact, their evolution is
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the story of judges making decisions on the fly to deal with
specific problems not contemplated by the code, frequently
the unexpected spawn of new technologies-dance halls,
concert promotion organizations, make-a-tape machines,
and peer-to-peer networks among others. Many of these
cases are irrelevant or provide extremely thin analogies to
the problems of the digital age. Even the notion that these
ad hoc rulings make up coherent doctrines is rather recent,
not emerging with judicial force until the 1960s at the
earliest.
The slow-to-change, evolutionary genius of the common
law may have produced admirable rules relating to property and torts which are much the same century to century.
It is not particularly well-suited to the lightening reactions
required to stay current with the schemes of pirates and the
harried pace of technological innovation in our time. Copyright law as applied to computer networks, particularly
novel P2P and other architectures, present a series of judicial opinions reflecting first or second impressions. Judges
do not have the luxury of leaning back upon the refined
precedent of the ages, deciding merely which glosses and
nuance should be applied to the particular facts. They have
to make up the rules again and again, as fast as innovations make it to the courtroom.
2. Overbreadth.The most obvious problem with the law
of contributory and vicarious infringement as it currently
stands is overbreadth. The doctrines have expanded wildly
to accommodate new circumstances-the equation of the
right to exclude with a right to control, the presumption
that any for-profit enterprise receives a financial benefit
from any infringement related to its business, the inclusion
of "support services," such as parking and plumbing as
legally sufficient contributions to copyright infringement, or
a concept of knowledge so broad that the phone company
could be said to know of every murder and drug deal
discussed over its lines. If Napster is correct in attributing
knowledge and control to the extent technology permits the
identification and purging of infringing material, and
perhaps even somewhat beyond that point, then it seems
that any online service provider will necessarily be liable
for the infringements of its users on the system, at least
once there has been an initial finding of liability.
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The broad articulation of the standards results in an
absence of even modest predictability in the context of new
technologies, especially network technologies. The rules are
broad enough to hold a parking valet and commercial
landlord liable for infringement. The question, therefore, is
not whether the rules are broad enough to pin liability on
any particular activity, because they almost always are
whenever a copyright violation is involved. The question is
whether a court will choose to extend those rules to the
activity at hand or seek a way out. Setting aside statutory
DMCA safe-harbor arguments, a lawyer still cannot give
solid advice as to whether providing a link to a web site
that has infringing material is contributory infringement or
whether a search engine or other automated process may
catalog and distribute information gleaned from such a site,
let alone the relative obligations of those who own machines
that comprise a distributed network, those who architect it,
implement it with software, and provide the support
services that make it run. The easy and arguably required
result in any case involving infringement over a computer
network is that liability should attach to almost any sort of
service, including a hardware or software provider that
enables the network. Of course, such a result consistently
applied, would also wipe out many of the technological and
economic gains of the last decade, forcing a wired world to
unplug itself.
B. Non-Legal Solutions to the Problems of Secondary
Copyright Liability
Even if practical difficulties are created by ambiguities
in the law, a number of non-legal solutions are possible. The
litigation could continue until one party/industry drops out
or the parties reach some accommodation regardless of
what the courts say. Perhaps the entertainment industry
will eventually find business models that make it and their
consumers happy, thereby killing the piracy problem with a
business solution. After all, the software industry has
managed to grow greatly despite a much more insidious
piracy problem by structuring its business around the
problem, not turning their fate entirely over to the courts
for decision. Technology could also obviate the problem.
Encryption and digital rights management technologies,
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bolstered by the anti-circumvention provisions of the
DMCA, may advance to the point that copyright infringesignificant scale is impossible or highly
ment on any
14
impractical.2
C. Residual Need for Legal Resolution
This current spate of techno-media courtroom carnage
overuses of computer networks will likely pass. Good ideas
are not easily forgotten, so the technology at issue will
remain. Good ideas are quickly adopted, so the consumer
demand for digital media will likely continue to exist on a
massive scale and increase until a better, and as yet
unforeseeable, mousetrap comes along. Rationality will
eventually return to the space and content owners, which
hopefully, will implement business models that maximize
profits in the new markets created by technology rather
than trying to drag out the lives of their horse-and-buggy
offerings. Some stasis point among the competing interests
will be reached and peace will return at some point.
Even assuming the foregoing to be true in the short
term, a significant and perhaps unsafe assumption, there
still is a residual need for legal solutions. First, the recent
warfare between content owners and technologists is not
new, but is merely the latest emanation of an inherent
market conflict. It will be repeated. The greater the frequency of significant technological innovation, the greater
the frequency of such strife will be. And, this strife is far too
costly to all parties involved. The ambiguity of the rules
engenders litigation and confrontation under which neither
the technologist nor the content owner can say with any
certainty what is clearly his turf and what belongs to the
other. Indeed, the rules are so broad, and the precedent so
varied in result, that not only is judicial resolution
encouraged, but massive litigation of the same issues
against multiple defendants in different jurisdictions is also
encouraged. A good or bad result in one case changes little
in the field, as the interested parties throw down the
gauntlet time and time again in various jurisdictions,
working to add another document to their portfolio of

214. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (1999).
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supporting decisions.
The transaction costs of working through the dispute in
this manner are far too high. The businesses involved, of
course, front tens of millions of dollars in legal expenses,
but this amounts to what is probably a mere rounding error
relative to the broader impacts of legal ambiguity. There
are huge costs to the bottom lines of the businesses
involved. The recording industry, for example, claims that it
loses billions in sales every year to piracy, much of it to
online piracy. 215 If the law were clear that a network such
as Napster's could only be operated by record companies or
their licensees, as is the official position of the recording
industry, the loss of the recording industry to such piracy
would doubtlessly be less. Participation in such piracy
would also be far more costly. ISPs and universities would
probably have little more interest in facilitating music file
sharing than they do in serving child pornography or other
plainly illicit material. The clarity of the law would moot
debate and uncertainty. This is not to say that illicit
behavior would not exist in some places, just as child
pornography is doubtlessly transferred inadvertently by
legitimate online services and other business. It is merely
an argument that it would occur with limited frequency and
in the small, underground spaces where such clearly illegal
activity takes place.
The savings would not be on the content owner's side
alone of course. Clarity would also prevent hundreds of
millions of dollars and vast human resources from being
poured into dead-end technologies. Napster alone received
more than $100 million in venture and other financing,
which was essentially all lost.216 If the law were clear that

215. The RIAA estimates that "[elach year, the industry loses about $4.2
billion to piracy worldwide." See RIAA at http://www.riaa.com/issues/piracy
default.asp (last visited Feb. 16, 2005).
216. It has been widely reported that Bertlesmann alone sank around $100
million into Napster. Prior to the Bertlesmann investment, venture capital firm
Hummer Winblad invested at least $13.5 million in Napster. See Sandeep

Junnarkar, Lawsuit Targets Bertlesmann over Napster, CNET NEWS.COM, Feb.
20, 2003 at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-985285.html (last visited Mar. 28,
2005); Dan Primack, Napster Fallout Could Affect Buyout Firms, PRIVATE
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Napster's core technology was and always would be illegal,
it surely would not have attracted such large investments
from such significant players. The cost of ambiguity is well
illustrated by BMG, one of the five major record labels.
BMG is a key RIAA member. It held the industry line and
sued Napster along with its cohorts. At the same time,
BMG poured at least $85 million into Napster, becoming its
de facto owner. While BMG was paying the doubtlessly
hefty lawyer bills of Williams & Connolly, among others, to
destroy Napster, they were investing (most likely) greater
sums into keeping Napster alive, developing and improving
in anticipation of the day after the legal strife ends. If a
sophisticated
multinational
corporate
group
like
Bertelsmann sees an imperative to be on both sides of the
"v." in high profile litigation at an out of pocket cash cost to
it that likely ran well over $100 million, it is reasonable to
conclude that the ambiguity of the outcome resulting from
the ambiguity
in the governing copyright law has a significant cost. 217
The contrary hypothetical indicates the existence of
massive costs arising from the baseline legal ambiguity. If
one assumes that copyright law were clear, that Napster
was not liable for the infringements of its users, a great
EQUITY WEEK WIRE, July 16, 2004 at http://www.privateequityweek.com/pew/
freearticles/1070550087895.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2005).
217. Both Hummer Winblad and Bertlesmann would be punished for their
support of Napster. Each was sued by the plaintiff group in Napster for their
role in financially supporting the allegedly illicit enterprise that was Napster. It
is quite striking that Bertlesmann's status as a major record label and plaintiff
against Napster offered it no immunity from a suit driven largely by Universal
Music Group and EMI. See Sandeep Junnarkar, Lawsuit Targets Bertlesmann
over Napster, CNET NEWS.COM, Feb. 20, 2003 at http://news.com.com/21001023-985285.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2005); Dan Primack, Napster Fallout
Could Affect Buyout Firms, PRIVATE EQUITY WEEK WIRE, July 16, 2004 at
http://www.privateequityweek.com/pew/freearticles/1070550087895.html
(last
visited Mar. 28, 2005)
One could also argue that Bertelsmann invested so heavily in Napster not
because it thought Napster had a significant chance of prevailing, but because
it believed there was a significant chance of a business resolution. If
Bertelsmann was thinking that Napster could, with the significant industrial
pull of Bertelsmann, settle the litigation amicably, they were extremely far off
the mark. Bertelsmann failed to end the litigation. The plaintiffs even rejected
out of hand a $1 billion settlement offer from Napster crafted during
Bertelsmann's period of effective control.
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deal of unnecessary cost is likewise avoided. As before, the
direct costs of litigation are avoided. Obviously, the
hundreds of millions in venture capital and the efforts of
the hundreds of engineers engaged in developing P2P
network technologies would not be lost out of hand, but
would contribute to what may be profitable ventures. Less
obvious is the cost avoided by the record labels. If the law
were clear and the record labels somewhat rational, they
would not have adopted a wait-and-see or litigate-to-thedeath strategy, insisting that their own product is the only
legal means of obtaining the content they own. Instead of
sitting on the sidelines for much of the last decade (or at
least since the widespread popularization of the MP3
format in 1997) watching, as they believe, their CD sales
erode and consumer habits turn away from their products
as a direct result of Internet-based technologies, the record
companies presumably would have engaged in business
online years earlier, perhaps saving them the many billions
they claim to have lost to piracy during that period.
Assuming the record labels are rational actors, it seems
that the hope of an ultimate legal victory over unlicensed
online music systems, or at least the hope of a long-term
stall while various jurisdictions worked out ambiguities in
the law ,kept the record labels from offering a viable online
product for so many years while their consumers rapidly
adopted the technology it despised. While such games of
"what if'involve a great many assumptions that can be
easily challenged, the record companies almost certainly
could have generated huge revenues over the last decade
had they only been able to monetize a portion of online
transactions involving their content, transactions which
dwarf CD sales by every metric except revenue generated.
One must ask why they opted to forego such an opportunity, particularly when they seem to admit the gravity of
the cost to the industry of losing the Internet to what they
believe is infringing activity.
The argument for clarity is not, therefore, necessarily
an argument for imposition of one rule or another, or even
for a rule that coincides with one or another party's view
entirely. A rule that splits the proverbial baby would work
just as well, so long as its dictate were just as clear. It is an
argument for the efficiency that comes with clarity. It
should also be borne in mind that ambiguity also imposes
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large costs on the consumers, as they are forced to make a
difficult choice. Consumers can use a service that may be
likely to be illegal, which could result in significant
personal civil and criminal liability-in the context of
distributed networks, both as end users and possibly as
network providers as well. 2 18 Alternatively, the consumer
could continue to use the products and services sanctioned
by the ancient regime which may be less efficient and more
costly in terms of dollars than a digital service without legal
pressures would be. In the case of the recent controversies
regarding music, there is no question that almost any
digital model would be far more efficient in terms of
usability and fairly ought to cost far, far less to the
consumer than CDs as the cost of "goods" sold (for want of a
more accurate term) would be far less and the number of
potential sales far greater.
If there is unquestionable benefit to having a legal solution going forward, the question remains how the law ought
to be modified. There are a number of possibilities.
D. A ProposedFix to the Doctrines in their PresentFormClarify and PareBack the Sweep of the Rules
The doctrines of indirect liability themselves could be
massaged to bring more predictability to all concerned. The
chief difficulty with the doctrines as they currently stand is
overly loose language in the precedent. So, no major reconceptualization would be required, but merely a
tightening up of the rules so that they define a narrower
body of those potentially liable. For the most part, merely
taking the language of the rules seriously, treating each
word as a limiting factor, would bring a good deal of order
and predictability. This approach could be considered conservative in that it returns to something closer to the
import of the words, and with it probably closer to the
intent of the courts who crafted those words as well.

218. Regardless of how clearly legal or illegal a service may be, the
consumer's use of that system may still constitute direct or indirect
infringement, as where a consumer uses a service to create unlicensed
reproductions of copyrighted recordings for commercial distribution.
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1. Vicarious Liability: The RIGHT to control and a
DIRECT FinancialBenefit Should be Required. In the case
of vicarious liability, a new focus on defining the right to
control or supervise, as contrasted with the mere power to
do so, would bring a great deal more clarity to the matter,
while still supporting a rule in flexible, general terms. It is
doubtful that the various dancehall courts would have been
as willing to hold a large bouncer at the door accountable
for the choices of the band merely because the bouncer
could have kept the band from coming into the door. The
bouncer did not have the right, even if he had the power, to
keep the band out. The same cannot be said so easily for the
dancehall owner who hires and pays the band. The
distinction between right and power necessarily emphasizes
the terms that govern the relationship between the direct
infringer and the defendant, as many of the older cases do,
including the Gershwin and Shapiro.219 Where no express
terms are present, the nature of the relationship, the
intention of the parties, and the purpose for which any
power is exercise would be germane.
These are loose factors, but they still provide a good
deal more guidance than the current formulation of the rule
does, as the power to exclude almost always exists in any
online enterprise. Instead of ending the inquiry at whether
the machines operating the service may be turned off or a
user may be barred at the gates, a court would need to take
a more meaningful look. If an online service provider possesses the power to see the files a user is downloading to his
computer, for example, would it be relevant to know
whether the service provider exercised the power? Had a
policy forbidding any look at the content or names of files a
user downloaded? Had a policy limiting any exercise of the
power strictly for purposes of maintenance of the system,
support, billing? Or, alternatively, had the provider exercised its power to police for copyright infringement or

219. Professor Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld provided what are now the
standard definitions of "right" and "power" nearly a century ago. In Hohfeldian

terms, "A" is said to have a right that "B" shall do an act, if "A" may force "B" to
do the act via legal process if necessary. "B" would, in this situation, have duty
to act as "A" directs. A power is the capacity to change a legal relationship. An
offeree, for example, has a power to create a contract by accepting the offer.
WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS (1919).
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otherwise snooped about the system? The foregoing questions speak to whether the service provider possessed the
right to monitor and censor its system, as opposed to a mere
power to do so. Equally important, this approach leaves it
to the service provider and its customers to define the
nature of their relationship, taking the matter to a certain
extent out of the vagaries of judicial determination.
As the number of obvious factors to be considered
makes clear, a focus on the right to control provides no
bright line rule. Any examination of vicarious liability must
be able to press through disclaimers of control made
primarily to avoid copyright liability. Courts still must determine the legitimate expectations of consumers and businesses to the extent such expectations are deemed a
significant factor. In addition, any rule still must confront
catch-all reservations of rights by landlords, service providers, and other potential defendants-clauses in the lease,
license, or terms of use that give the defendant carte
blanche to terminate, refuse to serve or kick out their
clients for any reason or no reason at all.
A good many assumptions must be made as to the
import that should be accorded the foregoing factors. The
purpose of reigning in the reach of vicarious liability would
be served by assumptions that: (1) a broad reservation of
rights in governing rules alone does not include or imply
the right to snoop through communications looking for
copyright infringement, and (2) the legitimate expectations
of consumers must weigh heavily as a factor for or against a
defendant's right to control with respect to copyright
infringement, in much the same way as expectations serve
to limit the enforceability of contracts of adhesion. 220
A return to the requirement that a defendant receive a
direct financial benefit from the infringement at issue
would also go a long way toward defining vicarious liability
in a more meaningful way. At present, the dominant view is

220. The Restatement Second of Contracts, for example, effectively reads
unexpected, objectionable terms out of standardized agreements. If the offering
party has reason to believe that the party manifesting assent would not do so if
he knew that the writing contained a particular term, that term is not part of
the agreement. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §211(3) (1981).
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that any for profit enterprise could be found vicariously
liable for copyright infringement however remote, unquantifiable, and unidentifiable the benefit it receives from copyright infringement may be. Truly, there need not be any
traceable financial benefit at all. Anything that is done by a
business, must in some way be good for the enterprise or it
would not be done, the argument runs, and therefore must
in some way result in a financial benefit because the aim of
any commercial enterprise is profit. The requirement of a
demonstrable, quantifiable, financial benefit that is a direct
result of copyright infringement would return the rule to its
older, more defined status and purpose. Copyright royalties
could not be avoided and piracy could not escape punishment via the manipulation of corporate shells or other alter
egos, but neither would businesses, such as trade show
organizers, be liable for third-party copyright infringement
that has little to do with the core business of the defendant
and makes at most an incidental, de minimus or perhaps
purely hypothetical contribution to the bottom line.
2. Contributory Infringement: Getting a Handle on
"Knowledge" The generator of ambiguity in the standard
for contributory infringement is the term "knowledge." As
discussed above, "knowledge" could mean everything from
knowledge of a specific act of infringement of a specific
copyrighted work, known to be owned by the plaintiff to the
general idea that some infringement of somebody's works
are likely taking place somewhere along the line. As with
the other key terms that shaped the doctrines of indirect
copyright liability, there is precedent supporting the
extremes of possible meaning, as well as more nuanced
definitions in between. Several of the major cases dealing
with online activities, most significantly Netcom and
Napster, go to some lengths to pare back knowledge from a
generalized sense that infringement of the type alleged is
taking place, to a requirement of actual knowledge of a
specific act of infringement, plus a failure to take remedial
action once knowledge is obtained. The departure and
significant amendment of an ability to cleanse behavior by
prompt action to fix the problem is arguably a recognition
by these courts of the problem the broader definition of
knowledge poses in an online context. If the broader, more
general definition applied, it would seem that knowledge
would fail to serve as a limiting factor where mass, digital
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communications and computer networks are concerned.
A great many possible definitions of "knowledge" could
be argued as a fix. A definition along the lines of the
following may be workable: "Knowledge" for the purpose of
contributory copyright infringement means actual knowledge of a specific act of copyright infringement by a person
with the authority to take remedial action, received at a
time when remedial action regarding that act is possible,
provided the knowledge is obtained in the ordinary course
of business and is specific enough to permit a cost-effective
remedy for that act of infringement.
As this attempt to craft a definition illustrates, any
concept of "knowledge" needs a good deal of unpacking and
depth for it to have useful meaning. One must know whose
knowledge matters and why; what the object of that knowledge is; how detailed the information must be before
liability will attach; and what affirmative steps, if any, are
required once such knowledge is obtained. Implicit within
any standard of knowledge is how each of the foregoing facets of the standard relate to the type of remedial action the
law contemplates. This, again, requires yet a further inquiry into how the policies supporting the doctrine-fairness, encouraging policing and loss spreading/risk allocation-may best be implemented. This inquiry, again, begs
the question of what are the ultimate policies and purposes
that justify the doctrine in the first place. All of this means
that there are a great, great many ways reasonable people
could define knowledge. It does not mean that knowledge
cannot be defined with more precision.
Currently, the knowledge prong as applied to online
services has not been so much a limiting term that brings
reasonable people to the same conclusions as to what is and
is not permissible, but an empty vessel into which judges
with varying views about the scope innovation should be
afforded relative to established copyright monopolies may
pour their biases and equitable sensibilities. Even if one
concludes that the Netcom standard-(I) specific knowledge
at a time when the defendant contributes to the infringement, and (2) failure to act on that information-strikes the
right balance, there are still difficulties in applicationthere is still wide room for interpretation in factual
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contexts. 221 The court in Napster, for example, appeared to
adopt the rather restrictive Netcom standard, but at the
same time affirmed a ruling of liability based on evidence of
rather generalized knowledge of infringement taking place
on the Napster system. Even a strong, actual knowledge
standard raises the question of what evidentiary weight to
afford notices of infringement. It is not an accident that the
safe-harbor provisions of the DMCA provide such detailed
requirements for a conforming notice. 222 Absent such
detailed requirements, there will always be ample room to
litigate who knew what, when, and whether that knowledge
ought to be attributed to the defendant.
While reasonable people can debate the substance of
what the standard for knowledge should be, a standard that
does not constrain reasoning or produce consistent results
over time is one that needs to be fixed.
3.Confirmation/Definition of the Rule in Sony. A
reinvigoration or confirmation of the dictates of Sony from
Supreme authority could also alleviate much of the stress
between nascent technologies and content owners. The
Sony holding remains controversial and somewhat
enigmatic. In the case that presented the closest analogy to
the VCR challenged to date, the digital MP3 player, the
Ninth Circuit eschewed any direct discussion of Sony,
choosing instead to base its finding that the MP3 player
was a legal device on the arcane peculiarities of the definitions of various devices found in the Audio Home Recording
Act. 223 In the recent file sharing battles, the copyright
plaintiffs have argued that Sony simply does not apply to
any online service, that once a thing gets wired, once a
thing becomes a service dependent on an ongoing interaction with the seller, the staple of commerce analogy on

221. This is a distillation of the standard originating in Netcom and Napster
provided in Grokster. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, 259 F.
Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
222. See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (1999). The statute provides a laundry list of
required contents for a notice of infringing material to an online service
provider to trigger take-down obligations, as well as a requirement that the
service provider register with the Copyright Office, an agent to receive such
notices.
223. See Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc.,
180 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1999).
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which the Sony holding was premised loses all force. The
Ninth Circuit in Napster flatly rejected this contention,
finding without equivocation that Sony remains the law
and is applicable to online services. However, the Napster
court did articulate severe limitations on the reach of Sony.
Most notably, the Napster court stated (1) Sony provides no
defense for vicarious copyright liability, and (2) the presence of knowledge vitiates a Sony defense to contributory
infringement. Under this interpretation, at the outset, we
know that Sony has no applicability to one of the two theories of indirect liability. This is a severe limitation given
how interconnected, or even muddled, the distinction
between the two doctrines is in the case law. One doctrine
is rarely discussed without the other and rarely is liability
found under one doctrine and not the other. The notion that
knowledge vitiates a Sony defense for the doctrine it does
cover seems to render the defense an absolute nullity.
Knowledge is required as one of the two elements of
contributory infringement. If there were no knowledge,
there could be no contributory infringement and hence, no
need for a special Sony defense. The only way to reconcile
the two premises of the Napster court- (1) Sony provides a
defense to contributory copyright infringement, and (2)
knowledge vitiates that dissent-is to argue that the
"knowledge" required to vitiate the defense is different in
character, setting a higher threshold than the "knowledge"
required for a finding of contributory infringement. This is
precisely what the Grokster opinion does. The Napster
opinion provides no indication of such a nuance at play.
Moreover, given the ambiguity of the "knowledge" requirement in the contributory infringement cases, such a
nuanced read, seems extremely difficult to implement in
any meaningful way. Lastly, under the Grokster gloss on
Sony, as discussed above, the Sony defense is extremely
limited in scope with respect to any technology that permits
remedial action in response to a notice to take place. As
soon as a potential plaintiff sends a notice of an act of
infringement at a time when the potential defendant may
act on it, the Sony defense has completely evaporated.
The Seventh Circuit's cutbacks on Sony and the open
split now between the Ninth and Seventh Circuits calls out
for clarification. Where the Ninth Circuit has accepted that
Sony applies to any technology with a potential substantial
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non-infringing use, but severely limited the scope of the
defense for which such a technology qualifies with its
Napster holding that knowledge vitiates a Sony defense, the
Seventh Circuit has rejected the Napster limitation on the
substance of the Sony defense, but held that a technology
must demonstrate more than a mere potential for noninfringing use to qualify. These are two very different ways
to accomplish the need each court saw to put Sony in a
box-guard the gate to the prize more carefully or make the
prize worth less. However, the Supreme Court opinion does
not suggest any such limitations.
These cutbacks, among the others discussed supra at
II.A., should be discarded. 224 The Supreme Court has
already made the tough policy decision balancing the
competing interests of major content owners and technology
producers-the production and sale of any technology with
a substantial non-infringing use, or even the potential for
such a use, does not by itself create copyright liability for
the producer or seller. The rule in Sony expresses a strong
policy judgment from the highest authority that has
somehow been lost as a force in recent appellate decisions.
The implicit policy that copyright will not stand in the way
of the development of useful, agnostic technologies--eVen if
the primary purpose of the technology at issue is to copy
media protected by copyright, as was the case with the
VCR-has not been a major factor in courts' evaluations of
subsequent technologies.
E. The Case for More FundamentalReform
Even if the doctrines were tightened up as described
above and Sony reinvigorated as a harder rule and policy
directive, contributory infringement and vicarious liability
still may not provide the requisite guidance to future
technologists and copyright owners. The rules of indirect
copyright liability and the policies behind them are
especially problematic in the context of computer and

224. As discussed above, writing for the Seventh Circuit in In re Aimster
Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003), Judge Posner expressly
rejects the Ninth Circuit's limitation of Sony in the Napster opinion. However,
rather than embracing Sony as it is written, Judge Posner places his own
limitations on Sony in plain contradiction to the key language of Sony.
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communication networks, the focus of current controversy
and quite possibly the battleground where industrial wars
deploying weapons of indirect copyright liability will likely
be fought for some time to come. The current rules of
contributory and vicarious liability may ultimately fail in
the digital age.
As devices become smarter and centralized reporting
and control becomes possible and common on a wide range
of devices, any tests focusing on how the integrated
software/network/equipment product or service operates is
likely to have significant shortcomings. The tests for vicarious liability and contributory infringement that we have
were crafted for a context far removed from global computer
networks, leaving us with rules that fail to serve the major
policies that justify the imposition of liability on someone
who does not actually infringe anyone's copyright. The
marked differences between the relationships among
human, machine, and market in the world of tangible
media infringement and that in the wider world of global
computer networks and digital media deprive the tests we
have and the tort and agency analogies that drive them of
relevance.
Indeed, the rules we have seem to encourage the very
gaming of the system indirect copyright liability is intended
to prevent. Looking at what a party does or could know, or
what a party can or could control when it seems that all
may be known and all may be controlled, may force manufacturers to architect around the rules and design services
to avoid knowledge and control without necessarily
or its
changing the essential functionality of the product
225
impact on the legitimate rights of content owners.
Beyond this practical failure, the current tests lead
courts to ask questions that are incomplete and neglect a
whole range of factors that are highly relevant to fairness,
loss, spreading/risk allocation, and incentivizing policing.
The extremely important inquiry into where the line ought

225. The configuration of Kazaa and the FastTrack network systems
arguably were formed as much or more by a desire to avoid liability than
network or business efficiency.
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to be drawn between the copyright monopoly on the one
hand, and the freedom to innovate and communicate on the
other, fails to take into account what seem to be some of the
most important factors in making such a judgment.
In short, the rules for indirect liability we have may
simply be off the mark, pushing courts to ask questions and
make judgments on bases that serve none of the interests
involved.
F. Problems Inherent with Indirect Liability and
P2P/Networks Generally-TheRules and Policies are
Ill-suited to Computer Networks
1. Tensions Inherent Within the Rules. Trying to apply
the rules as they are, often leads to a Kafkaesque parody of
justice. We know from established a precedent that there is
no vicarious liability for a mere absentee landlord.
However, it is also well established that merely providing
the site and facilities to known infringers is enough to
establish liability as at contributory infringer. So, it would
seem that the hypothetical landlord cannot evade contributory infringement liability if he ought to know what his
tenants are doing. The landlord may try to avoiding contributory infringement by establishing rules in the lease or
other governing document that preclude copyright
infringement and create a right to evict the tenants if such
behavior is discovered and so on. However, by doing so, the
landlord strengthens the case against him for a vicarious
liability as he has now established the right to control and
police the infringing conduct of his tenant, regardless of
whether he knows of infringing conduct or not. The wouldbe defendant has no good options. Efforts to strengthen the
facts to avoid one form of liability may condemn him under
the other form of liability in equal proportion.
There is also a danger to defining indirect liability with
greater precision. Brighter lines create greater opportunities to game the system. Clear rules could bring predictability to the legitimate the business person, as well as the
charlatan. Even assuming that people of reason could craft
rules adequate to handle all known technologies and
business arrangements, neatly dividing the known universe
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into the legitimate and illicit, it is doubtful that any general
rule could accurately anticipate and properly deal with new
technologies and the always-creative schemes of those
looking to tap dance around whatever boundaries are
demarked by the rules. It is possible that a cost of predictability today
is a rule so specific that it may permit mischief
226
tomorrow:

This tension between a specific serviceable rule today
that may become quickly outmoded and a more nebulous
rule which is more adaptable to the unforeseeable, is
arguably the manifestation of a larger problem of crafting
rules for indirect copyright liability in the first place. As the
Supreme Court in Sony made clear, the root question is one
of equity-whether it is just to hold one person liable for the
wrongful conduct of another. Any effort, therefore, to cram
what is at heart a gestalt judgment of fairness under the
circumstances into discrete tests may be doomed, torn
asunder by the competing needs for meaningful, limiting
language, and a test flexible enough to get the bad guy in
unforeseeable circumstances. Over time any such tests are
bound to be stretched out of any logical cohesion as a result
of the ultimate need to hold the wrongful actor accountable
in new, shifting circumstances. Even after a careful retuning, a decade hence we may find the strings stretched back
to the cacophony that currently reigns.
2. The Tort and Agency Underpinnings Lose their
Power as Reliable Analogies. Neither the joint enterprise
liability, nor the agency analogies that underpin and shape
the rules for indirect copyright liability seem close to the
mark with respect to computer networks. Arguably, these
analogies have not worked for a very long time as evidenced
by the wide deviation from traditional principles of agency
and joint enterprise tort liability summarized above. Still,
the analogies made a good deal of sense in connection with
traditional piracy operations
and license-avoidance
schemes. Agency is close to the facts where orchestras play
in dancehalls, or a concessionaire operates a department in
a store. Whatever the formal relationship from a business

226. This tension of course is not unique to copyright, but exists wherever
the choice between specificity and looser, more general terms exists.
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organization point of view, one party is a functional part of
the defendant's enterprise. The same is true for joint torts
and those who produce, market, and distribute infringing
content. Whether one pushes the record button themselves
or provides essential media stock, management, capital, or
equipment, the defendant is part of a clearly defined joint
effort to infringe copyrighted material. Moreover, in the
older piracy paradigms, the chief purpose of the joint efforts
is copyright infringement. It is not an incidental byproduct.
Voluntary participants in a computer network simply
have no easy analog to a pre-digital age. Even though filesharing and other computer networks facilitate piracy on a
massive scale, the participation of the users who connect to
the network, permit their computers to respond to queries,
route information, and otherwise function as a node can
hardly be compared to any sort of joint enterprise contemplated by tort or prior copyright law. It could be an enterprise of tens of millions whose entire volitional involvement
may be nothing more than downloading a network client or,
perhaps, even merely connecting to a network which then
uses their machine to direct traffic. The network participant who elects to provide infringing material for unlicensed "sharing" is clearly more involved, but in that case,
the involvement is so close to the unlicensed reproduction of
the works made available that the participant is almost
certainly a direct infringer, authorizing the reproduction of
another's works, if not making reproductions and distributions himself. With the exception of the rare networks, and
arguably Napster and Kazaa rank among these, where
infringing activity predominates, it is a stretch to say that
user participation in the network is akin to participating in
a tortious enterprise. Of course, there are putative participants even further removed from any old-world analog,
such as those who created the protocols (the traffic rules)
that define the network, those who write the software that
implement those rules and those who make that software
available for download.
We are far from agency relationships and concerns as
well. While networks are often described as communities, it
is hard to see how end user participants running network
clients can be said to be agents of each other, or of the
technologists who created or helped implement the
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network. In the ordinary case, such as the millions who
operate the computers which make up the Internet,
computer owners choose to participate in the network for
their own benefit and/or out of a sense of general communal
obligation.
The tort and agency analogies became loose metaphors
long ago. They are strained beyond breaking when matched
against the new relationships among individuals and
automated machine processes that are at the heart of P2P,
distributed, and other computer networks. By employing
rules that are a creature of these now inapt analogies,
courts are driven to ask the wrong or incomplete questions.
3. The Utility of the FactualAnalogs from Precedent to
the DigitalReality of the Present. Just as the tort and
agency doctrinal rationales lose their force in the context of
network technologies, the factual analogies that spring
from the case law likewise no longer work. One can discuss
intelligently make-a-tape machines, video rental booths,
trade shows, and the like in terms of landlords and tenants,
dance halls and orchestras, concert promoters and department stores. The analogies become strained to the point of
absurdity when dealing with the novel relationships made
possible by automated electronic communication, storage,
and distribution. There simply is no good analogy in our
common law copyright heritage to the role of an individual
who owns a computer which functions as an node in a
distributed network, to the network engineers who designed
the protocols that govern and create the system, to the
software engineers who produce the clients and other
programs that facilitate communication pursuant to the
protocols, to the service providers who offer connectivity,
and so on. The nature of the protocols that define the network and the mass, cooperative efforts to implement and
sustain the networks have no clear old-world analogs. Even
if abstract principles can be divined from the precedent,
the subject matter of prior cases is irrelevant. To the extent
that these principles are inextricably tied to the technologies and business organizations they were intended to
address, they may be of limited use to present and future
problems. At a minimum, the tropes and language of indirect copyright liability analysis-dancehalls and landlords,
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staple articles and copying equipment-provide little
guidance to the thorny problems now before the courts.
4. The Secondary Liability Test Factors Do Not Serve
Their Intended Policies Online. In addition to the landlord,
dance hall, and other paradigms of the precedent being of
little value, the substance of the rules themselves are
problematic in the context of computer networks. Even if
one could engineer a return to the old, tighter standards for
vicarious liability and contributory infringement, a strong
tendency for any standard to slide to one extreme or
another remains when dealing with computer networks.
The power of computers to gather information and to
control transactions on a massive, inhuman scale necessarily skews the knowledge element of contributory infringement and the right and ability to control element of
vicarious liability. Current technology removes the prior
practical limitations of implementing the policies that
undergird the rules, calling into question whether the policies themselves, which may now be implemented on a massive scale with unforgiving precision, are entirely desirable.
a. The Contribution of Site and Facilitiesand Fairness
in a Global-Networked Environment. Perhaps the mismatch
between the policies and test factors driving decisions on
liability and the problems presented by computer networks
is best illustrated by the material contribution prong of the
test for contributory infringement. Of course, the contribution requirement ensures that the defendant actually do
something significant to further the injury to the copyright
owner, rendering the defendant culpable for the harm
caused. In the online context, most courts have used the
rule growing out of Fonovisa that the provision of "site and
facilities" constitutes a sufficient contribution. Both Napster
and Grokster turned on whether the defendant provided the
site and facilities for the infringing activity. In Napster, the
court found Napster liable because the centralized database
of links maintained on a company server constituted the
site and facilities for the infringing activity. By contrast,
the court in Grokster did not find the defendant liable,
absent evidence that the defendant company owned a com-
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puter that served as a node on the network at some point. 227
In the chunky, space-consuming world of human
beings, it makes some sense to look at site and facilities.
They are major ingredients in any enterprise. If one looks
at the classic troika of enterprise essentials-land, labor,
and capital-site and facilities covers two of the three
essentials. In most ventures, the major use of capital is the
procurement of space, equipment, and other facilities
required. Land is essential to locate those facilities.
Providing site and facilities for a joint enterprise like a
traditional bootleg operation is typically a major, essential
contribution. Moreover, one typically has control over and
responsibility for what is done with equipment and space
that he controls. It would be difficult for the owner of a
warehouse and print shop to argue that he bears no responsibility for an illicit publishing operation run out of his
physical plant.
A focus on site and facilities, however, makes absolutely
sense
when dealing with computer networks. The funno
damental insight of peer to peer or distributed networks is
that any computer, any node on the network, may effectively operate as a server-any task may be pushed off to
any computer on the network to achieve the same results.
While fully distributed systems do present some technical
difficulties, they have been largely overcome with respect to
distribution of most entertainment media in very short
order. Providing a centralized computer or even large server
array may be a de minimus contribution to the network in a
fully-distributed or hybrid system made up of thousands or
even millions of linked machines. Of course, from any
human point of view, it makes no difference where any
activity comprising the infringement takes place. At
present, therefore, it seems that the law is not prohibiting

227. In both the fully-distributed and hybrid P2P network models, the
architects and promoters of the network often provide some key hardware
infrastructure at the outset. Although the users can provide all necessary
computer and connectivity in either configuration, there is the problem of how
to start the network. Someone, somewhere needs to be the first node and
publicize that fact to other would-be users/nodes so they have somewhere to
connect to. Until a critical mass of users develops, someone needs to keep the
network going.
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any functionality, but merely stating an overt preference for
one form of network architecture over another. It is difficult
to see how any rational policy is served by such preferences
for essential computing and storage to be pushed off of defendant's computers and onto user computers.
From the consumer's point of view, the changes are immaterial in that the functionality remains the same.
Usually, even the interfaces of the products remain much
the same. It is of no consequence and most users are probably wholly oblivious to the difference in network design
among Napster, Kazaa, Gnutella, and others. If they type a
term in the search box and get responsive links to files
available for download, what bits exist where on the network is wholly immaterial. From the content owner's point
of view, the harm resulting remains as great, the wound as
painful, whether the database of links is located on a server
owned by a central company, a server owned by a private
consumer, or exists in no one place, but is scattered among
millions of user computers and reassembled upon request.
Again, the functionality remains the same. To find one system infringing and one permissible when the technology
does essentially the same thing seems wholly arbitrary if
the essential benchmarks are what the technology does and
what consumers are doing with it. The rule we have under
Napster and Grokster is akin to determining whether one is
liable for a car crash based not on the way he drove or the
damage caused, but on how the engine of his car operates.
The focus with respect to hybrid systems like Kazaa,
and fully distributed systems like Gnutella, on whether the
defendant company ever owned a server on the system
seems absurd and an inquiry that can only lead to the very
games that the breadth of the doctrines are intended to
preclude. If the technologist who designed the network
needs a core group of servers in order to bring the network
to life before a critical mass of authentic users exists, it
would be easy enough to operate those computers off-site,
under the ostensible ownership of employees, friends, college students, friends, or a newly created entity to take a
trip to Vanuato, Iran, Sea-Land, or other exotic locales
beyond the practical reach of U.S. copyright law to set up
those servers that will seed the system. Moreover, given the
activity of the potential user base and its immense size, it
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may be wholly unnecessary for the architects of the system
to even take such action. The protocols could be published
and client software could be distributed in sufficient degree
to build a massive global network entirely by word-ofmouth.
The practical importance of the locus and ownership of
a server is of increasingly little value. In the world of tangible media, ultimate control, and therefore responsibility, is
closely tied to site and facilities. If the printing press is
mine and the print shop that houses it is mine, I almost
certainly have a high degree of control over how and for
what purposes these essential assets are used. If they are
not mine, if a piracy operation is ongoing in someone else's
print shop with no connection to me, there is probably very
little I can do to control how and for what purposes that site
is used. This is not the case with computer networks.
Current technologies, including acoustic sampling technologies that can identify a music file based on actual sound
content, as well as DRM solutions exist that can track,
control, and account for transactions over even entirely distributed networks. Regardless of whether a defendant provides computers for the network, anyone who controls the
protocols that define the network, the client software that
implements those rules, and so on, could incorporate such
controls into their essential products. "Site and facilities,"
therefore, is not a determinative factor with respect to what
remedial action may be taken. Instead, the real questions
are whether one may design, provide client software for, or
participate in an open network in which no such controls
are implemented. This is a question which the current doctrines of indirect copyright liability are ill-equipped to
answer.
b. The Relationship Among Knowledge, Policing, and
FairnessOnline. Any focus on "knowledge" as the key factor
distinguishing permissible from illicit conduct in the
context of digital network technologies raises serious
countervailing policy concerns. There is only so much a
human being or an organization of human beings may
know. Thus, "knowledge" serves as a real limiting factor
when human beings dealing with tangible media are at
issue. But the case is quite the opposite when digital media
and electronic communication (that will subsequently be
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attributed to the human beings in charge) is at issue.
Computers can effectively record every transaction and
communication, identifying not only the parties and quantitative metrics (size of file, time sent, etc.), but the substance
of what is communicated with unerring precision.
"Knowledge" may accordingly have a far deeper and
broader attribution in the computer context relative to the
more traditional scenarios involving books, records and
tapes. Rather than being a limiting factor, looking to an
actor's knowledge becomes an expansive one as the actor
can now possess vast records of everything that has tranor with the and of its service
spired over its network
228
software or device.
The online service provider wishing to avoid liability
has only two poor choices. It could purposely eschew knowledge and design systems that scrupulously avoid creating
any record of transactions and communications. This choice
has the appearance of willful ignorance, rather than mere
lack of knowledge, particularly if one assumes that the cost
of harvesting such knowledge is relatively slight. 229 The service provider who accepts that it possesses knowledge of all
that transpires on its system can only remove the taint of
that knowledge and possible copyright liability by taking
remedial action. Thus, this broader attribution of knowledge threatens to turn all service providers into copyright
police without any external impetus.
The technology does not change the underlying policy
behind the rule of encouraging policing for copyright
infringement. The thoroughness with which this policy may

228. It seems unavoidable that a computer recording a fact of an illicit
transmission or the easy possibility of a computer to do so will ultimately be
attributed to the service operator as knowledge of the transmission. If one
assumes that copyright owners will identify specific transactions or
demonstrate that such transactions take place, that technology to identify
infringing matter exists and copyright owners will send notices of infringement
demanding implementation of controls, it is hard to see how a network operator
can avoid knowledge.
229. There is case law holding that willful ignorance is tantamount to actual
knowledge. In Aimster, the Seventh Circuit borrows concepts of culpability
based on willful ignorance directly from criminal law on the subject. Aimster,
334 F.3d at 650.
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now be implemented, however, raises questions as to
whether this policy objective is entirely desirable. Aggressive pursuit of contributory infringement claims against
network nodes and intermediaries could likely require all
involved in modern communications to screen the text of
every piece of mail, to scan and identify every file transmitted, to track the identities of senders and recipients, and
the like in order to ensure that their possession of information from which a copyright infringement could be detected
does not result in liability for that infringement. Many
doubtlessly do not want their emails, files, and online
activities tracked and reviewed. 230
This is not to say that a human being necessarily needs
to review every piece of mail. However, the implementation
of technology to determine whether the information sent
embodies a list of identified copyrighted works seems all
but unavoidable under the present doctrinal regime. Video
and audio fingerprinting technology capable of identifying
the work embodied within a file by the content itself,
231
regardless of format, bit rate, and the like already exists.
Screening text content for print works protected by copyright presents even fewer challenges. If technology permits
such identification and weeding out of transmissions that
violate copyright, it is hard to see how, absent a change in
the law, a service or technology provider engaged in
facilitating that transmission could avoid both contributory
infringement liability and implementation of such technol2
ogy.

23

230. When news of the FBI's "Carnivore" project, a system to screen vast
quantities of email, ATM and other electronic transactions, became public, for
example, the general outcry was sufficient to kill the project. See "Carnivore
Eats Your Privacy," Wired Magazine (July 11, 2000), available at
http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,37503,00.html.
231. See, for example, the software products offered by Audible Magic at
http://www.audiblemagic.com/. Audible Magic's audio fingerprinting technology
has been endorsed by EMI and other major record label interests.
232. The DMCA safe harbors of Section 512 are, of course, designed to
provide immunity from copyright liability for such online service providers.
However, the DMCA also requires implementation of "standard technical

measures." The statute does not define this term, but the intention presumably
is to require online service providers to implement whatever technologies
protective of copyright that become standard. Thus, the advance of technology
in screening and enforcement will erode the safe harbor protections. In order to
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Some may argue that, much like a drug sniffing dog at
an airport, technology that only singles out illicit content
for human review and action cannot be said to violate
anyone's privacy. On the other hand, a great many others
would chafe at permitting the handful of major copyright
owners to dictate controls over all communication, to "sniff'
every communication and interaction online, merely
because some communication may infringe copyrights they
own. If the government cannot routinely screen mail and
computer files to root out international terrorism and other
threats far more grave than copyright infringement, one
wonders whether the ordinary person would understand
why the telephone company, software company, or other
party involved in facilitating communication would be
permitted to sift through all the communications in and out
of his house looking for unlicensed books, music, and
software. Although it is not an overt factor in copyright
jurisprudence, there could be a real chilling effect on
communication and transactions that would be so screened,
eliminating zones of discourse and skewing behavior toward
older more costly forms of communication where privacy is
better safeguarded precisely because the media is less flexible and useful.
The greater integration of networked technology into
the daily lives of ordinary citizens increases the problems
for businesses of all sorts, as well as the consumer worried
about corporate monitoring and oversight of his conduct.
As more and more devices become interconnected, as home
and office wireless networks link a user's Pocket PC with
his calendar and portable media, with his home computer,
with his telephone, with his digital video recorder, with his
digital library of books, documents, and pictures. All of
those are linked with Internet-based services which manage
the user's money, provide news, television and other
subscriptions, and push products to the user's doorstep, the
scope of product, and service providers that may be
compelled to monitor and control consumer behavior for
copyright violations expands. Not only will traditional ISPs
need to worry about the substance of user traffic, but the
telephone company, the manufacturer of music and video
avail themselves of the DMCA immunity from liability, the service provider
will, in fact, be required to implement such technologies.

248

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53

recorders and playback devices and so on will have to as
well. Because a digital video recorder, such as a Tivo device,
is linked to a centralized service for purposes of downloading schedules and software, it seems that ultimately the
operator of that service, perhaps even the device manufacturer, will be pressured by copyright liability to track what
user's are doing for copyright purposes. Is a user fastforwarding through commercials? 233 Storing a movie for
longer than time-shifting would permit, or even making a
secondary computer, DVD, or tape copy of the movie? Is a
scholar cutting a little bit too much text from a book for
normal fair use purposes? Pasting that text into another
protected work without permission from the author of that
second work? Watching only one part of a program or
viewing a movie out of sequence? If this scheduling service
reaches into the user's wallet, telephone, desktop computer,
handheld computer, or office workstation, even more parties
along the path may be in a position to look at what that
user is doing to identify copyright infringement. Businesses
that seem wholly removed from the copyright fray today,
such as credit card companies and mobile phone manufacturers, may find themselves inextricably implicated tomorrow. Under the current rules of contributory infringement,
which make avoidance of knowledge in a networked world
increasingly difficult, businesses could be forced to pursue
less efficient architectures and business models to avoid
knowledge. Consumers may be forced to choose between
the old and the less useful on the one hand, and new,
empowering technologies on the other. The "new and

233. The crux of the lawsuit brought by the major film studios against the
makers of the RePlayTV Digital Video Recorder was the "auto-skip" feature of
RePlay TV, which automatically skipped commercials upon playback. While the
studios apparently have no objection to enabling fast forwarding through
commercials or at least not a significant enough objection to file any suit
against VCR or DVR makers on that basis, the studios argued that selling a

device with software that effectively fast forwarded for the user constituted
indirect copyright infringement. See, e.g., Paramount Pictures Corp. v. RePlay
TV, 298 F. Supp. 2d 921, 923 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (dismissing suit by RePlayTV
users alleging an unlawful taking of their property rights in RePlayTV
machines and explaining the substantive and procedural background of the
content owner's suit against RePlayTV). The makers of RePlayTV, SONICblue,
filed for Chapter 11 protection and sold the relevant assets. The new owners,
Digital Networks North America, Inc., dropped the controversial features in
order to end the litigation. See id.
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improved" tag may come the price of giving up accustomed
ways of using content and expectations of privacy in doing
SO.
c. Right and Ability to Control in a Networked World.
As with contributory infringement, the increasing interconnection of computer networks and our daily lives has a
great impact on the policy judgment inherent in the rules
for vicarious liability. The policy of incentivizing policing
which largely justifies the strict liability nature of vicarious
liability rulings is closely tied to the notion that liability
should follow the defendant's capability to control the direct
infringer, or at least to prevent his infringing acts. Just as
courts charge defendants who provide the "site and facilities" for infringement that takes place with the aid of such
site and facilities, courts look to the place where infringement takes place to determine if the defendant had the
right and ability to control the infringing activity. The right
to keep someone out, the right to exclude someone from the
premises where infringement takes place, thus constitutes
sufficient control as in Fonovisa. The landlord or site operator with such power can keep infringement from happening
within his ambit by simply asking the direct infringers to
move along.
This reasoning drove the Napster decision with respect
to vicarious liability. The court reasoned that Napster was
like the swap meet operator in Fonovisa. Where the swap
meet operator controlled who went in and therefore what
ultimately took place within the gates of the market place,
the court defined the "premises" of Napster's system as the
centralized database of links. 234 Because Napster controlled
the central database of links and had the power to keep
people out of these "premises," it should be held vicariously

234. The court placed great emphasis on this very inexact metaphor in its
vicarious liability analysis. First, the court affirmed the use of the analogy by
the district court, defining the Napster system as "the premises that Napster
'controls and patrols."' Napster I at 1023. The court then measured the metes
and bounds of these hypothetical premises, concluding that "[t]he file name
indices ...are within the 'premises' that Napster has the ability to police." Id.
at 1024. This lead directly to the court's ultimate legal conclusion, "Napster's
failure to police the system's 'premises,' combined with a showing that Napster
financially benefits from the continuing availability of infringing files on its
system, leads to the imposition of vicarious liability." Id.
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liable according the logic of the Ninth Circuit. This
Euclidean reasoning about what takes place within the
lines that define space under the defendant's control simply
fails in the context of computer networks. The arguments
against "site and facilities" as a material contribution to
infringement apply with equal force to defining "right and
ability to control" in terms of physical premises for purposes
of a vicarious liability analysis. Policing and effective control are not dependent upon control of a physical locale in
computer networks. Effective filtering and rules precluding
or making infringement more difficult may be implemented
at other critical points in the network that the defendant
may control even if it does not own the computers, wires, or
airwaves over which such rules are implemented. The
policies of fairness and incentivizing policing are accordingly not served by the inquiry into who may be barred at
the sewer gates that the cases lead us to make.
As computers, telephones, DVRs, and other devices
come equipped to download software and information, and
as these devices become increasingly integrated with supporting online services, more and more businesses arguably
have the "right and ability" to control. Sony did not "know"
about VCR copyright infringement in the specific sense of
what programs different users were recording when. Even if
they did know, there was not much Sony could do about it
once the VCR left its control. Not so with the DVR and any
other device that connects to a network. There is no reason
why those who run the online service component of Tivo
cannot control what people do with their DVRs. They, after
all, produce and install the software necessary to run the
machines and maintain a telephone line link with every
machine. They can know what is going on-what is
downloaded, stored, played and transferred on their
devices-and they can control what the user does if they so
choose. In this way, as once dumb machines become
smarter, their manufacturers and service operators
move
235
into the purview of vicarious copyright liability.

235. The Tivo DVR and accompanying online service has not yet run into
such copyright problems as the major copyright owners have been successful at
keeping DVR's with features they dislike, such as auto-skipping of commercials
and sharing recordings, off the market. SONICblue, now RePlayTV, sold a
device with those controversial features and was cowed into pulling it off the
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The standard for vicarious liability could prove to be a
serviceable test if, as suggested earlier, the requisite "right
and ability to control" were redefined, sensitized to the
expanded potential for control in the context of networked
machines and services. As with the element of knowledge in
contributory infringement, the greater potential for control
in a wired world raises a new public policy concern that the
law should accommodate in some way. Now that it is possible to control what people read, watch, and search for to
an extreme degree, a rule that requires the exercise of such
control to the full extent technically feasible may not be
desirable. There are potentially strong countervailing costs
to public discourse and personal privacy that accompany filtering for copyright infringement over computer networks
that simply were not present when dancehalls, video
screening booths, and make-a-tape machines were at issue.
A new gloss stresses the "right" to control, with that "right"
strongly informed by cultural expectations of privacy and
the other factors that help define the constitutional right of
privacy may strike the right balance. The problem is essentially the same as that addressed by Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence-defending privacy from the steady creep of
technology which, if unchecked by countervailing presumptions, will ultimately erode the private sphere to nothing.
d. An Illustrative Example for Lawyers-CD-ROM's,
Online Research Services and the Fight between West and
Bender over Star Pagination. The efficiency of an online
database versus periodic distribution of packs of CDs to
every user is instructive. We know from Bender that the
publisher of CD-ROMs containing judicial opinions cannot
be held vicariously liable for infringing compilations of
those cases that the users may make using those CDROMs. Once out of the hands of the publisher, the publisher
has no right or ability to control the use of its products.
Suppose that it is far more efficient for Bender and users
alike to make the same content available through an online
service. Users are freed of the need to maintain a stack of
CD-ROM drives and a computer infrastructure capable of
making those drives available to multiple computers and, in
addition, are guaranteed more up-to-date information than
market largely due to litigation by the major Hollywood content owners. See
infra note 232.
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would be possible from the periodic shipment of revised CDROMs. Bender, for its part, is relieved of the cumbersome
and expensive task of pressing CD-ROMs and shipping
them to every customer at regular intervals. (If Bender
were in the business of assisting its customers to develop
the hardware capability to run and access remotely at numerous sites a Bender CD-ROM tower, it no longer has to
do so as any Internet-connected computer could log into the
central database.) Indeed, the relative popularity of online
legal services such as Bender's Lexis service, relative to the
largely dead business of delivering the same content on
CDs, would seem to support the greater efficiency and
usability of an online service. Yet, it would seem that a
different result with respect to vicarious liability is mandated in each case.
In the online model, Bender would have a good deal of
knowledge as well as the right and ability to control what
its users were doing on its online service. If, in fact, users
were utilizing the references to the West reporter system in
online cases to infringe the copyright West holds in its
arrangement and organization of cases (a doubtful prospect
but nonetheless the core issue of this important case), 236 it
is difficult to see how Bender could avoid either indirect
copyright liability or implementing meaningful screening
and control measures to preclude such copyright infringement. If, as discussed above, one assumes that consumers
have a strong negative reaction to the notion of electronic
dogs sniffing and recording their every move, copyright
imposes an unnecessary and perverse incentive in favor of
CD-ROM distribution. 237 Under either mode of distribution,
users could just as easily violate West's copyright. West
could be harmed in equal degree under either system. All
that is at issue then is whether Bender ought to be liable

236. It should be noted that virtually all of the legal matter provided on the
CD-ROMs at issue in the Bender case is public domain material. All that was at
issue was the extremely thin copyright, if one exists that at all, in West's star
pagination system, that is, the page on which the same case it appears in West's
competitive law reporter product. Because the worry West raised with respect
to Bender users recreating the West Digest by using page references is largely
theoretical and hypothetical, Bender most likely has not exposed itself to
significantly more copyright liability by offering a comparable product online.
237. Many lawyers would not welcome monitoring of their research. It may,
indeed, clash with the central values of the attorney work product privilege.
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for those infringements. Any legal rule that would create
such a powerful incentive for the obsolete or sub-optimalfor shipping CDs instead of transmitting files, for sending a
repair technician instead of building in the ability to service
a machine remotely, to prefer a clunky distributed network
architecture where a centralized one would work better,
and so on, must be questioned. The copyright tail in this
scenario is truly wagging the dog of technical progress.
e. Loss Spreading and Risk Allocation Among Those
Who Enable Open Networks. Setting aside concepts of fairness and policing, there is still the dollar and cents concern.
If we assume an economic harm (copyright infringement),
then where is it most efficient to place the burden of that
cost? This question is, of course, a valid and important one
regardless of the technology or commercial structure at
issue. However, here, too, it seems that while they may ask
the correct question, the doctrines of contributory and vicarious liability provide an answer that is difficult to
defend.
In traditional agency law, the principal bears full
responsibility for the acts of his agent, even if performed
against his wishes and solely on the authority inherent in
the agency relationship. It is thought by those who defend
the rule that because the agent is subject to the control of
the principal, the principal will have the proper incentives
to appoint and manage his agents carefully. 238 Liability follows the potential to control. Moreover, the agent is often
also liable for his own misconduct and unauthorized
contracts. 239 In this way, the law makes certain that the

238. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 140 (1984) (stating that the
liability of the principal to a third person arising from a transaction conducted
by an agent may be based upon the agent's authority, apparent authority or the
"power arising from the agency relation and not dependent upon authority or
apparent authority"). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1984) provides
the complementary rule for tort liability. "A master is subject to liability for the
torts of his servants [a sub-species of agent] committed while acting in the scope
their employment." Id.
239. As a general background matter, an individual, regardless of agent or
servant status is liable for the torts he commits. Agency law provides for the
special circumstance of holding a third party (a master) jointly liable for the
torts of another (his servant). Ordinarily, an agent does not become liable under
contracts made on behalf of a disclosed principal. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
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injured party has the widest choice of defendants and likelihood of recovery while leaving it to those who are at least
partly responsible to divide up the loss the among themselves later. The same logic justifies joint and several
liability for joint tortfeasors. The plaintiff gets to pick his
to say that
defendant and it is no excuse for a defendant
240
other people not sued are also to blame.
This logic fails in the context of network-enabled
technologies. So many parties are involved end-to-end that
it seems both unfair and inefficient to impose all liability on
one or another link in the long commercial chain. The logic
of joint and several tort liability may lead to singling out an
individual despised service (Napster) while leaving other
essential technology and service providers (AOL, AT&T,
IBM, etc.) who also profit from and enable the infringing
behavior entirely off the hook. Sony and AOL-Time Warner
may have their subordinate entities sue Napster out of existence while at the same time profiteering from the sale of
computers optimized for downloading music, portable MP3
players, broadband services and other products designed for
and marketed to direct infringers.
The logic of joint and several liability fails here because
Napster does not have an effective ability to divide its loss
among all the others who provide essential services and
devices. The copyright owner plaintiffs could choose to sue
their sister corporations who also provide essential
hardware, software, and services that drive online

AGENCY § 320. An agent, however, may be a party to a contract, fully liable for
all the performance due thereunder, where the principal is not disclosed or is
known by the agent and the other party to be non-existent or incompetent. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §322; § 326.
240. The black-letter tort rules closely track the standards for secondary
copyright liability. The Restatement provides that one is liable for the tortious
acts of another if he "knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty
and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct
himself." The commentary explains, "Whenever two or more persons commit
tortious acts in concert, each becomes subject to liability for the acts of the
others, as well as for his own acts. The theory of the early common law was that
there was a mutual agency of each to act for the others, which made all liable
for the tortious acts of any one." Id. The Restatement also pins liability on third
parties who have a duty to control the tortious conduct of another and fail to
exercise such control. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF Torts § 877 (1991).
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infringement, but they do not. If others who power the
direct infringement of users are to share in the cost of
compensating for the harm, the chosen defendant must be
able to join these other companies as co-defendants, cross
claim, or otherwise seek recompense. It is not at all clear on
what basis a defendant like Napster could seek to join such
companies as co-defendants or assert contribution or
indemnity claims against them, because they are, in fact,
24
neither agents of nor joint tortfeasors with Napster. 1
Indeed, it is well-established black-letter law that the
defendant need not be for purposes of indirect copyright
liability. The formal relationship between the defendant
and other possible co-defendants may be quite remote.
There is a broad cost to the current regime. Copyright
plaintiffs have the power, under the loser-pays-all standard
of contributory and vicarious liability, to target and kill
some technologies, while letting others off altogether. The
rule gives copyright plaintiffs a big say in what range of
services and modes of communications are available without necessarily any regard for the efficiency of the result,
ignoring the tough policy question of who ought to pay and
in what proportions. Perhaps ISPs are in the best position
to absorb and pass along the cost of copyright infringement.
Perhaps the makers of hard discs or blank CD media should
pick up a proportion of the tab, or even PC makers who
advertise machines optimized for building media libraries.
The current arrangement does not permit the exploration of
any of these possibilities. If the copyright owners elect not
to pursue such defendants and if there is no clear basis for a
selected defendant, like Napster, to seek some recompense

241. Tort law provides joint liability and a right of contribution where
liability is premised on participation in a tortious joint enterprise. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF Torts § 491 (1986). More broadly, tort law provides a
general right of contribution whenever a defendant discharges a claim when
liability may appropriately be attributed to others as well. See id. at § 886A.
The third Restatement keeps the same basic regime of joint and several
liability with a right of contribution. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF Torts § A18
(2000); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF Torts § 23 (2000). The third Restatement
demands an additional layer of equity among tortfeasors, requiring the fact
finder to assign comparative responsibility among joint and severally liable
defendants. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF Torts § A19 (2000); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF Torts § 26 (2000).
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from the myriad other players in the digital media and
distribution space, then these questions simply not be posed
or answered.
There is also a significant cost to copyright owners in
the current all-or-nothing indirect liability scheme. The
providers of software and other tools that are unlikely to be
found vicariously or contributorily liable may still facilitate
copyright infringement on a massive scale. As discussed
above, AOL Instant Messenger (AIM) is a case in point.
242
AIM, a software tool used by many millions of people,
provided the network, users, and technological platform for
Aimster, an add-on to AIM that facilitated the traffic in
media files over AIM. Even without Aimster, instant
messenger programs like AIM permit the sending and
sharing of files with a broader user group and, in this way,
doubtlessly facilitate the unlicensed reproduction and
distribution of copyrighted material on a massive scale. Yet
it is highly unlikely that any court, under any standard,
would burden AIM or a similar instant messenger service
with the unbearable liability of all copyright infringement
that takes place over its system. The favorable bias is
apparent in both Judge Posner's treatment of AIM and the
Seventh Circuit's restrictive reading of Sony: It is clear that
AIM most likely would not be found liable. Yet, even if
actual non-infringing use predominates, on a system as vast
and widely adopted as AIM, infringement may be taking
place on a massive scale. The all-or-nothing aspect of the
current rule places judges in the difficult position of determining whether a minority, perhaps a very tiny minority, of
infringers on a system can doom it. Faced with such a
choice, judges are likely to approach the problem as Judge
Posner did, that is, begin from the assumption that the
service must be found to be non-infringing and therefore not
liable in any degree. The copyright owner plaintiff is thus
deprived of any recovery from a plaintiff that may be in a
better position to bear and pass on the costs of infringement
taking place over its system than the service provider
devoted to infringing uses. With the AOLs of the world
being effectively untouchable, copyright owners can only
crush the small companies on the periphery, missing the

242. In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003).
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chance at a meaningful recovery.
Faced with a choice foisted upon them by the current
all-or-nothing scheme, some courts will favor the future
promise of new technologies even if infringing uses
currently dominate the user behavior as in Grokster. If
plaintiffs get to choose who stands in the dock, then courts
must issue what amounts to either a full acquittal or a
death sentence, with no option of any intermediate
sanctions.
We have an all-or-nothing standard of liability, but the
online reality is often something in the middle, a system,
network, or technology that permits a great deal of legal,
socially valuable communication, but also facilitates some
infringement. Depending on the scale of the system or technology, even a relatively de minimis use for copyright
infringement, in terms of number of infringing users or
data transferred, still can amount to a huge loss for copyright owners. This loss, in an all-or-nothing system, will
likely go totally uncompensated.
IV. CONCLUSION: NEW PERSPECTIVES AND APPROACHES

It is difficult to square the all-or-nothing liability
regime we have with the purported quest to compensate the
injured copyright owner while spreading the attendant loss
and risk in the most fair and efficient manner. If defendants cannot be added to apportion fault among all the
relevant players, and courts lack the power to assess
proportional fault and levy partial judgments, damage
awards remain too blunt an instrument to fine tune incentives toward an efficient result. Currently, it seems damage
awards and injunctions serve primarily as a useful
bludgeon for entrenched players to beat to death new
entrants promoting technologies and modes of business that
challenge the existing, profitable order. They do not lend
themselves to a nuanced balancing of the competing policy
directives to compensate authors for their creativity,
advance useful technologies, and maximize consumer
freedom to see, use, and read what they wish. Indeed, the
rules we have seem to ignore some of the most basic considerations one would want to factor into achieve a fair result
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that balances the interests of content owners, technologists,
and consumers.
A. What the Current Rules Ignore
In assessing the method of operation and functionality
of a technology, it would seem highly relevant to factor:
"

the actual, relative uses of the technologyinfringing and non-infringing
* the gross quanta and economic cost of the
infringement it assists
" the potential utility and commercial value of the
technology relative to the costs of the infringement it assists
" the actual intent of the developers and other
technologists, as evidenced by the design,
marketing, and sales history of the product at
issue
" the scale of the harm suffered by copyright owners relative to the costs that a finding of liability
would impose on the technologist and its customers
In assessing whether the law ought to mandate the
imposition of filtering technologies to identify and screen
out infringing transactions, it would likewise seem highly
relevant to consider:
" the financial cost of implementation and how
that loss is likely to be allocated among the
constituencies
commercial
and
consumer
involved
" the loss of non-infringing functionality, its commercial value, and its social value
" the social cost of reducing the area of human
privacy and the secondary effect of chilling
speech
Currently, none of these critical concerns necessarily
factor into the analysis required by the rules for secondary
copyright liability.
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B. An Extremely Brief Summary of Some Significant
Proposalsand Points of View
Of course, this commentator is not the first to notice
deficiencies in the current doctrines, nor is this article the
first to propose possible solutions. A whole spectrum of
opinion already exists.
1. The Techno-Libertarian Perspective. On the one
extreme, one can find techno-libertarians sympathetic to
the proposition that, at least in the context of digital technologies, information wants to be free and should be free.
These thinkers look to the Internet, open source movements, and other phenomena of the digital age to challenge
the very assumptions that underlay our intellectual property regimes. Though his views are far more interesting and
nuanced than this cursory summary can indicate, Professor
Lawrence Lessig is a leading proponent of this perspective,
with organizations such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation and the Creative Commons, offering activist, community, and litigation support. 243 Far from being part of the
ordinary batch of law review proposals, it is fair to say that
those who believe information online should be generally
unfettered has spawned a cultural movement that reaches
beyond the legal profession to engineers and artists among
other unlikely coalition partners.
2. The Entertainment Industry's Endless War: Its
Recent Efforts to Outflank the Courts with the Induce Act.
At the other extreme are the proposals of the major
entertainment industry trade groups. The major content
owners, especially in the post-Grokster age, are also interested in legal reform, but their interest is predictably
limited to expanding the scope of copyright vis-a-vis new
technologies. The latest and most publicized legal reform
effort from the entertainment industry is the proposed Inducing the Infringement of Copyright Act of 2004 (the

243. See http://www.lessig.org (containing information about Lawrence
Lessig); http://www.eff.org (containing information on the Electronic Freedom
Foundation); http://www.creativecommons.org (containing information on the
Creative Commons movement).
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"Induce Act"). 244 Under this proposal pushed by the film
and music industries, whoever "intentionally induces" a
copyright violation would be liable. Under this scheme "intentionally induce" would be broadly defined to include acts
aiding and abetting infringement. 245 The aim of the legislation is clear-to expand the range of conduct for which third
parties may currently be held liable for the conduct of
another. The Induce Act would not clarify, improve, or otherwise modify the current muddle of secondary copyright
liability. By its terms, it would not "enlarge or diminish the
doctrines of vicarious and contributory liability." For purposes of this article, therefore, the Induce Act is of little
importance as it does not seek to improve or otherwise
change the doctrines of secondary copyright liability. Instead it wishes to add another basis for secondary liability,
in addition and totally incremental to contributory
infringement and vicarious liability. The Induce Act thus
offers little promise to improve the current law in any way
and would most likely only increase the problems of ambiguity, over-breadth, and lack of predictability, among other
problems discussed above, that currently impact the existing law of secondary copyright liability.
Even if the Induce Act were a proposal to displace
contributory infringement and vicarious liability in whole
or part, it is difficult to take it as a serious proposal to fix
244. See S. 2560, 108th Cong. (2004). The bill was introduced by Senator
Hatch, along with eight others, on June 22, 2004. The Act provides:
Section 501 of title 17, United States Code, is amended by adding at
the end the following:
"(g)(1) In this subsection, the term 'intentionally induces' means
intentionally aids, abets, induces, or procures, and intent may be
shown by acts from which a reasonable person would find intent to
induce infringement based upon all relevant information about such
acts then reasonably available to the actor, including whether the
activity relies on infringement for its commercial viability."
"(2) Whoever intentionally induces any violation identified in
subsection (a) shall be liable as an infringer."
"(3) Nothing in this subsection shall enlarge or diminish the doctrines
of vicarious and contributory liability for copyright infringement or
require any court to unjustly withhold or impose any secondary
liability for copyright infringement."

Id.
245. See id.
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shortcomings is the current law, given the overtly parochial
nature of the proposed legislation. While it is easy to see
why potential copyright plaintiffs and their attorneys would
favor the legislation, it is hard to see how the Induce Act
attempts to balance the legitimate, competing interests of
developers against those of
consumers and technology
246
major content owners.
Predictably, the major technology developers have shot
back. The Consumer Electronics Association which counts
the likes of Apple, Intel, and Microsoft among its members,
have called the Induce Act "by far the biggest threat to
technology and innovation in 20 years," predicting that if
the legislation is enacted it "will gut the Supreme Court's
new litigation on
Betamax ruling and unleash massive
'247
innovators and venture capitalists.
The familiar battle lines are drawn and the contenders
are blasting away at each other in Congressional committees and the press. The Induce Act may be many things,
but, at least in its current form with its current industry
sponsorship, it shows little promise of resolving the generations-old struggle between content and technology. Indeed,
it appears that the Induce Act may already be a political
dead letter, as the U.S. Register of Copyrights stated publicly that 248
the current Congress is unlikely to take up the
measure.
3. Off-beat Proposals to Ponder. Some academics, notably among them Professor Robert Merges, have examined
the merits of expanding compulsory licensing to cover
controversial digital uses of copyrighted works. 249 Professor

246. See Declan McCullagh, Antipiracy Bill Targets Technology (June 17,
2004), available at http://news.com.com/antipiracy+bill+targets+technology
12100-10283-523810.html (last modified June 17, 2004).
247. CEA, Induce Act Will Eliminate Betamax Protections, Create A Huge

New Class of Liability for Innovators and Others, Says CEA (July 22, 2004)
(Press release from CEA), available at http://www.ce.org/press-room/pressrelease detail.asp?id=10509 (last visited Mar. 8, 2005).
248. See Declan McCullagh, Anti-P2P Bill May Slip Past Legislative Rush,
(November 18, 2004), available at http://news.com.com/anti-p2p+bill+may+
slip+past+legislative+rush/2100-1028_3-5458680.html (last modified Nov. 18,
2004).
249. See Robert P. Merges, Compulsory Licensing v. the Three "Golden
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Merges concludes that compulsory licenses are particularly
inappropriate for content distributed digitally-ultimately
finding efficiency and greater creativity in property rights,
contracts, and voluntary markets.
Professor Terry Fisher has left the intellectual property
reservation altogether by challenging those who watch the
space to treat the problems facing the entertainment industry not as problems of defining property rights per se, but
as problems of providing and protecting public goods.
Professor Fisher's solution, therefore, is to treat the entertainment industry like a public utility and to solve the
public goods problem as we often do with a use-based tax. 250
Fisher's unconventional proposal has deservedly generated
a good deal of academic discussion. It is, however, unlikely
to draw many adherents among major content owners who
seek to expand the horizons and legal advantages of copyright-based businesses, not reduce it to capped returns
based on marginal taxation of other goods and services.
With great respect for the complexity of the problem
and the other thinkers that have offered or critiqued
unconventional solutions, I offer my own modest proposal to
resolve the content wars while doing justice to all interests
affected.
C. A New Point of View, A Proposalfor a New Solution: No
Fault, Fully-Apportioned Copyright Liability for Actual
Harm Caused by Infringement
As discussed at length above, the current rules are, at a
minimum, lax beyond reasonable cohesion and predictive
force, particularly as applied online. The language of the
contributory and vicarious liability tests, as well as the protechnology force of Sony, provides a means of limiting and
defining results. However, the disconnect between the current rules, the policies they are intended to serve, and the
new policy concerns raised by computer network technologies cannot be remedied merely by putting a new gloss on
Oldies" Property Rights, Contracts, and Markets, 508
(2004).

CATO POLICY

ANALYSIS

250. See WILLIAM FISHER, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE

FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT 1-18 (2004) available at http://cyber.law.harvard.
edu/people/tfishertPTKIntroduction.pdf (last visited Mar. 8, 2005).
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the same old tests. A more restrictive view of the language,
or a Sony defense, may put secondary liability in a box, but
the box may not be the right size or shape to deliver fairness, economic efficiency, and appropriate levels of policing
and privacy.
The foregoing list of relevant factors suggests a multifactor balancing test looking to the nature of the current
and potential uses and the impact of liability on the technology at issue, future technologies, and their potential
social benefit. However, because the results depend upon
the relative weights accorded so many disparate concerns,
it would be a long, slow, common law slog to develop practical guidelines on which copyright owners and technologists
could rely with confidence. As discussed earlier, when one is
dealing with innovation-particularly that driven by
computer technologies-the world moves too quickly for the
inherently conservative process of refining precedent with
judicial practice. 251
Perhaps the most serviceable solution is to change the
policy perspective that shapes the tests and justifies the
result-to remove concepts of culpability from the equation
altogether and move to a strict liability, no fault system
that seeks primarily to compensate the economic harm
caused by copyright infringement as efficiently as possible.
Under such a perspective, the role of courts would not be to
sit in judgment on the potential virtues of a technology,
making what is in effect a life or death decision on the
device or system at issue. Rather, courts or whatever administrative body to which Congress might delegate the
task, would be charged with tallying the instances of
251. Given the equitable nature of the challenge, it may be more
intellectually honest to abandon the quest for defined rules in favor of a multifactor balancing test that openly acknowledges the judge's discretion in
determining the results. Indeed, the only way to fully explain the disparate
precedent may be a frank acknowledgement that different judges have different
sensibilities as to when it is just to hold one party liable for the wrongful
conduct of another, a sensibility which turns on such contentious matters as the
value of encouraging new business models and new technologies when they
appear to be destructive to established interests today and their ultimate value
is unknown. Even if one assumes, however, that subjective judgment alone
determines the outcome in these cases, the stakes for content owners and
technologists alike are simply too high, the repetitive cycles of development and
litigation too costly to industry and society to abandon the aspiration for rules
that provide both predictability and equity.
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alleged infringement, assessing the actual harm, and apportioning responsibility among the various device manufacturers, software developers, ISPs, and others who,
wittingly or not, by design or not, provided essential products or services that enabled the infringement to take place.
A system that permits some proportionate recovery
from the various technology and service providers that
enable such infringement has a number of benefits over the
current system of complete, joint liability of each defendant
for all acts of infringement. If a fair and efficient allocation
252
of the true costs of infringement were the guiding light,
copyright owners would benefit by being able to obtain a
proportionate recovery from the successful companies that
are unlikely to be found liable under the current rules, but
still enable the infringement of which they complain, such
as ISPs, the makers of storage devices, and so on. True,
those companies who otherwise would not be liable or targeted by the copyright industries under the present regime
would be comparatively worse off, but if compensation for
damage suffered is the key, they are merely forced to internalize a cost they previously externalized via a quasi tort
(copyright infringement) on third parties (copyright
owners).
Permitting some proportionate recovery would also
moderate the tough choices foisted upon judges by the allor-nothing system and permit the crafting of rulings aimed
at the efficient allocation of the costs of infringement.
Judges would be relived of the impossible task of assessing
the future potential of a technology. Instead of sitting in
judgment over whether a device or other technology may
exist, courts are relegated to a much more basic regulatory
function. Under a proportionate liability, no-fault rule, the
market makes decisions with respect to what technologies
are worthy.
In order to succeed, any business that in any way facilitates copyright infringement would have to make most of
its money from non-infringing activities. In this way, the

252. One may argue that statutory copyright damages are punitive in
nature. If that is so, calculating the costs of infringement based on mandatory
statutory damage rates could make fair allocation of the loss impossible.
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market makes a practical decision regarding the comparative worth of infringing and non-infringing uses of a
particular technology, not the courts. Moreover, because
user adoption and behavior patterns change, the availability of technology is not ultimately dependent on a final
judgment by a court. No court, for example, would ever sit
in final judgment over whether the VCR should exist, but
would merely force VCR manufacturers to pay for their contribution to the infringing reproduction of television
programming on video tape not covered by the fair use of
time shifting, to the extent they, among other hardware and
service providers, are to blame. Changes in business models, consumer demand, and other market realities would
effectively determine the result without a court ever making an ultimate decision on the merits of a technology. If
manufacturers had been forced to internalize a fair portion
of the infringement they enabled, perhaps the VCR would
not have been a viable device in 1979. Five or seven years
later, with the growth of the home video market, the result
may have changed. So too may the practical outcomes of
P2P networks and other nascent technologies change over
time under a rule of no-fault, proportionate liability.
Of course, the dependence of outcome on external
factors such as the availability of licensed content for use on
a particular technology creates an incentive for hard bargaining between technologists and content owners. However, each interest holds significant cards. Technologists
could not force the copyright owners to license material to a
new medium or platform, but copyright owners could not
keep a hated device or system off the market either. So long
as the damages for copyright infringement closely tracked,
or were somewhat lower than, the expected returns from a
licensing arrangement or other likely business solution, the
parties would have an incentive to negotiate toward a
viable business model, not litigate for years in the hope of
hitting a strategic jackpot.
The matter ultimately comes back to whether one really
views all those providing essential products and services to
the direct infringers, a list that would include the likes of
AOL, Sony, IBM, AT&T, HP, and many other blue chip,
brand name companies, as something akin to joint tortfeasors with or agents of their direct infringer end users.
Because the analogies seem strained beyond usefulness, the
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logic of charging any party with the misfortune to be targeted with a lawsuit for the full, astronomical liability of
mass infringement online leaves placement of the burden
somewhat haphazard and recovery from the major players
uncertain. The real question of who ought to pay and in
what proportions is simply not answered by the judicial
inquiry the current rules demand.
This no-fault, comparative liability point of view is
admittedly a departure from Sony and the generous view of
technology it espouses and that this commentator shares.
However, as discussed above, Sony means very different
things to different courts, has not prevented litigation from
taking place, and certainly has not served as a successful
defense to every technology with a potential, substantial
non-infringing use. Sony has not brought peace and extremely important courts faced with the challenge of reconciling new network technologies with copyright ownership
have limited Sony severely (Napster) or concluded that
Sony cannot possibly mean what it says (Aimster).
It is not as drastic a departure from the current standards of indirect liability as one may first think. The notion
of strict liability has long been accepted in vicarious liability, so disregarding the cleanliness of one's hands in order
to spread risk or allocate loss effectively is not new to copyright law. Quantifying loss and apportioning it among various parties involved also is not conceptually new, though it
seems uncommon in copyright cases.
Although it hardly brings instant understanding and
predictability to all parties, as the dollar figure for actual
harm and the comparative portion to be charged to any
defendant will be variable, the risk and potential liability
remain far more predictable than under the present system.
The device, software, or service provider hit with a vicarious or contributory infringement suit currently faces a betthe-company gamble. A court will either give it a clean bill
of health, as in Sony, or hold it fully liable for billions in
damages, as in Napster. As the radically differing outcomes
with respect to P2P file sharing systems, other online
services, and the VCR itself show, the outcome in any given
case cannot be gauged with any confidence. Commercial life
or death is a roll of the judicial dice. If courts sought merely
to compensate for loss and apportion liability fairly and efficiently, potential defendants have a much more concrete
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risk to assess-the amount of infringement taking place, its
cost to copyright owners, and the defendant's relative role
in such infringement. Again, these are numbers over which
competing expert witnesses would doubtlessly fight, but the
risk of loss is at least amenable to quantification and objective study like any other commercial liability.
Some might argue that the task is too complex, the
variables too soft, to serve as a basis for a court decision.
However, the task is far more mundane than asking courts
to determine whether a novel technology has the potential
for a substantial non-infringing use, makes a sufficiently
material contribution to infringement, or generates a financial benefit sufficiently linked to infringing activity. Moreover, tallying and apportioning loss is not an unaccustomed
task for courts. Courts are asked to answer problems of
relative fault all the time. In fact, in a joint tort such as
contributory infringement, it is the very same analysis in
which a court would engage if it had all the potentially
liable defendants before it.25 3 In essence, this new no-fault
concept merely ports the strict liability of vicarious liability
to the tort concept of comparative fault and liability.
There are undeniable problems with reorienting the
doctrines of indirect liability around new or differently
weighted policy objectives. Absent clear action from
Congress or an activist Supreme Court, the precedent is
what it is and remains binding on the jurisdictions that
have articulated the standards we have. Many may chafe
against the notion of completely divorcing liability from
concepts of fault or treating defendants similarly regardless
of intent, knowledge, or other mental state that speaks to
the fairness of liability. In order to compute and allocate actual harm, the concept of statutory damages, which may
overcompensate some plaintiffs in economic terms, would
have to modified or courts would have to be given discretion
to ignore such statutory minimums. Plaintiffs would need
the broad procedural power to join or otherwise bring to
court all relevant parties in order to obtain a full recovery.
This would raise practical problems on a scale that may be
unfit for judicial resolution, requiring some sort of administrative oversight, rate-setting and/or clearinghouse system

253. See supra note 241.
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such as those that exist with respect to music and digital
sound recording performance royalties which rely upon the
administration of performance rights societies and copyright arbitration royalty panels to operate the complex
compulsory licensing scheme.
The optimal solution is not clear. What remains clear
are the inadequacies of the law we have to deal predictably
and justly with novel technologies. By whatever means, the
potential costs, in terms of stifling innovation in areas that
could broadly benefit humankind, and the loss of privacy,
and chilling of speech deserve to be addressed directly by
the law. It is time for the discussion of dancehalls to end
and the talk of global, pervasive networks to begin with the
fresh thinking the novelty of the circumstances demand.

